Polycephalous Anatomy of the EC in the WTO: An Analysis of Law and Practice by Leal-Arcas, Rafael
EC Polycephalous Anatomy  Rafael Leal-Arcas 
 
1
Polycephalous Anatomy of the EC in the WTO: An Analysis of Law and Practice 
By 
Rafael Leal-Arcas
Abstract 
 
This article analyzes the unique legal position of the European Community (EC) in the world trading 
system. Its polycephalous anatomy derives from the fact that all 25 Member States of the EC are 
members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) along with the EC itself. This means that when 
referring to the EC, the whole as well as its parts are independent Members of the WTO. This has legal 
and political consequences related to the allocation of powers between the national and supranational 
levels that will be analyzed. The article explains what is meant by a “mixed agreement” and analyzes the 
various existing types of mixed agreements in the field of the European Community’s external relations. 
The effects of the EC’s international agreements vis-à-vis third parties are examined. EC Treaty practice 
has become increasingly dominated by mixed agreements for they reflect the legal and political reality 
that the EC is not a single State for the purposes of international law. Problems raised by mixed 
agreements do not exist within the context of exclusive EC competence, but instead relate to the EC’s 
functioning. Within the EC treaty-making, there is a tendency to sign mixed agreements rather than pure 
Community agreements in areas dealing with the EC external relations. This shows their importance for 
the European Community and for its position in the world. The article concludes with some suggestions 
on what might be the optimal way to move forward in the complex field of external relations law of the 
EC and the European Union (EU). 
 
I. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 2 
II. The Problem of the EU in its External Relations ..................................................................................... 7 
A. On Foreign Policy .............................................................................................................................. 11 
 
 Lecturer in Law, Queen Mary, University of London, (Centre for Commercial Law Studies, UK); Formerly, Visiting 
Researcher at Harvard Law School (European Law Research Center) and Fellow at the Real Colegio Complutense (Harvard 
University); Emile Noel Fellow 2004-2005 at New York University School of Law (Jean Monnet Center for International and 
Regional Economic Law and Justice); Visiting Scholar during the fall of 2003 at the University of Wisconsin-Madison Law 
School (Institute for Legal Studies). Ph.D. candidate, LL.M. (European University Institute, Florence, Italy); J.S.M. (Stanford 
Law School); LL.M. (Columbia Law School); M.Phil. (London School of Economics and Political Science); B.A., J.D. 
(Granada University, Spain). The author has formerly served in various capacities at: the World Trade Organization Secretariat 
(legal affairs division); The United States Court of International Trade (Chambers of Judge Pogue); European Court of Justice 
of the European Communities (Chambers of Advocate General Kokott); Court of First Instance of the European Communities 
(Chambers of Judge Lindh); Delegation of the European Commission to the United Nations; United Nations Secretariat 
(economic and social council); European Commission Secretariat-General (forward studies unit); Council of Ministers of the 
European Union (legal service’s external relations team); European Parliament Secretariat (Directorate-General for research). 
The author has previously taught at the National Law School of India University (Bangalore, India), where he was POROS 
Chair in European Union law, and the Law School of the Universidade Federal Minas Gerais (Belo Horizonte, Brazil). The 
author is most grateful to Professors Angel Sainz-Badillos and David Kennedy for their generosity in providing him with 
excellent means for work while he was at the Real Colegio Complutense of Harvard University. 
EC Polycephalous Anatomy  Rafael Leal-Arcas 
 
2
B.- The Case of External Economic Relations ....................................................................................... 19 
B.1.- The European Community In The World Trade Organization: An Overview .......................... 25 
B.2.- The Diagnosis: Polycephalous (and Polyphonic?) Anatomy of the EC in the WTO ................ 29 
III. Allocation of Competences between the EC and its Member States.................................................... 31 
A.- Principal-Agent Theory and International Negotiations................................................................... 33 
B.- Legislative Competence.................................................................................................................... 34 
B.1.- Exclusive EC Competence......................................................................................................... 35 
B.2.- Shared Competence ................................................................................................................... 39 
B.3.- Complementary Competence..................................................................................................... 47 
B.4.- Exclusive EU Member States’ Competence .............................................................................. 48 
C.- Non-legislative or Executive Competence........................................................................................ 50 
C.1.- Implementation of Legislative Acts........................................................................................... 50 
C.2.- Administrative, Material or Budgetary Implementation of Community Acts........................... 50 
D.- Criteria for Evaluating the Distribution of Powers and its Compliance........................................... 51 
IV. Definition of Mixed Agreements.......................................................................................................... 57 
V. Inadequate Explanation of Mixed Agreements...................................................................................... 62 
VI. Typology of Mixed Agreements........................................................................................................... 64 
A.- Type of Competence......................................................................................................................... 65 
A.1.- Parallel Competences................................................................................................................. 65 
A.2.- Shared Competences.................................................................................................................. 67 
A.2.a.- Concurrent Competences .................................................................................................... 68 
A.2.b.- Coexistent Competences..................................................................................................... 69 
B.- Type of Mixity .................................................................................................................................. 73 
VII. Conclusion of Mixed Agreements....................................................................................................... 78 
VIII. Implications of Mixed Agreements for Third Parties ........................................................................ 79 
A.- Liabilities of the EC and the Member States to Third Parties .......................................................... 80 
B.- Effects on Third Parties of Mixed Agreements Concluded in Violation of EC Law ....................... 82 
IX.- The Panacea: The “Duty Of Close Cooperation”................................................................................ 87 
A.- Community Coordination ................................................................................................................. 92 
B.- Close Cooperation And Unity of Representation Principle.............................................................. 93 
C.- Some Preliminary Conclusions......................................................................................................... 94 
X. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 94 
 
I. Introduction 
 
This article aims at providing insight to the European Community’s (EC) position within the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)1 and the World Trade Organization (WTO).2 We will see that 
 
1 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, signed in 1947, was created by the Bretton Woods meetings that took place in 
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire (U.S.), in 1944, setting out a plan for economic recovery after World War II, by encouraging 
reduction in tariffs and other international trade barriers. The GATT is one of the three mechanisms for global economic 
governance established at Bretton Woods, being the other two the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. 
The GATT was a collection of rules applied temporarily, without an institutional basis, unlike the WTO, which is a permanent 
organization with a permanent framework and its own Secretariat. For almost fifty years, the GATT focused exclusively on 
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the EC’s specific problems and challenges for the European Court of Justice (ECJ) are partly related to 
the EC’s sui generis position in the WTO. In this sense, the opinion of Advocate General Tesauro with 
regard to Case Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice is helpful for understanding the unitary 
character of the EC’s external trade relations: “The Community legal system is characterized by the 
simultaneous application of provisions of various origins, international, Community and national; but it 
nevertheless seeks to function and to represent itself to the outside world as a unified system.”3 We shall 
see more specifically the problem that the EC faces in its external trade relations by analyzing the so-
called “duty of close cooperation” and unity in the Communities’ external relations. We will also deal 
with the difficult and old issue of allocation of competences between the EC and its Member States in EC 
trade policy. 
 As a result of the allocation of competences, mixed agreements shall be analyzed, in the latter part 
of the article. In this sense, we shall first explain what is meant by a mixed agreement and will see what 
Dominic McGoldrick has said in this respect.4 We shall see that the European Community appears to be a 
 
trade in goods, leaving tariffs and quotas aside in the various rounds of negotiations of the world trading system. The GATT 
set the terms for countries who wanted to trade with each other. The GATT signatories were called “contracting parties.” The 
Uruguay Round, completed in 1994, replaced the GATT with the WTO, a global trade agency with binding enforcements of 
comprehensive rules expanding beyond trade. The GATT has now become one of the eighteen agreements enforced by the 
WTO. 
2 The World Trade Organization (WTO) is a global trade agency that was established through the GATT Uruguay Round 
Agreement signed in 1994. The WTO provides dispute resolution, administration, and continuing negotiations for the 
seventeen substantive agreements that it enforces. The WTO and its underlying agreements set a system of comprehensive 
governance that goes far beyond trade rules. It is argued by some commentators (Lori Wallach being one of the most relevant 
activists in the public domain) that the WTO system, rules, and procedures are undemocratic and non-transparent. The WTO’s 
substantive rules systematically prioritize trade over all other goals and values. Each WTO member is required to ensure “the 
conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures” [WTO Agreement Article XVI (4)] to the WTO’s 
substantive rules. National policies and laws found to violate WTO rules must be eliminated or changed; otherwise, the 
violating country faces trade sanctions. The economic, social and environmental upheaval being suffered by many countries 
that have lived under the WTO regime since 1995 means that business-as-usual at the WTO is over. It remains to be seen 
whether the handful of powerful WTO members who have dictated WTO policy since 1995 will adapt to the new reality. By 
the same token, it is also unclear whether countries demanding changes to the WTO’s current system of rules that are 
damaging their national interests may begin to withdraw if those changes do not take place. Regarding withdrawal from the 
WTO Agreement, although Article XV (1) is clear and reads that “Any Member may withdraw from this Agreement. Such 
withdrawal shall apply both to this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements and shall take effect upon the expiration 
of six months from the date on which written notice of withdrawal is received by the Director-General of the WTO,” the 
withdrawal from certain rules or agreements is not entirely clear. 
3 Tesauro AG in Case C-53/96, Hermès International v. FHT Marketing Choice BV, 1998 E.C.R. I-3603, para. 21. 
4 DOMNICK MCGOLDRICK, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Longman, (1997). 
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unique creation from the perspective of international law.5 A brief note on the importance of attempting 
to reach a proper conception of the mixed procedure shall be made. We shall see the various types of 
mixed agreements6 that exist in the field of the external relations of the European Community. We shall 
then look into the conclusion and effects of the EC’s international agreements vis-à-vis third parties. 
Attention shall be paid to the fact that problems raised by mixed agreements do not exist within the 
context of exclusive European Community competence. Some of these problems have to do with the 
functioning of the European Community.7 We shall see how the Member States have delegated their 
authority to negotiate international trade agreements to the supranational level.8
We shall also see that within the European Community treaty-making, there is a tendency to sign 
mixed agreements rather than agreements of European Community exclusive competence in areas dealing 
with the external relations of the European Union (EU). This shows their importance for the European 
Community and for its position in the world.9 Although the EC increasingly wants to become an 
international actor and somehow assert its international personality and identity, it also has to accept that 
Member States and third parties have legitimate interests.10 EC Treaty11 practice has become increasingly 
 
5 MCGOLDRICK, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Longman, (1997), at 1. 
6 For types of mixed agreements, see Rosas, A. “Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements” in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) International 
Law Aspects of the European Union, Kluwer Law International, 1998, pp. 128-33 and Schermers, H.G. “A Typology of Mixed 
Agreements” in  O´Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. (eds.) Mixed Agreements, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983, pp. 23-
33. 
7 See Meunier, S. "Talking with a Single Voice: European Integration and EC-US Trade Negotiations", Abstract; paper 
prepared for delivery at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, The Sheraton Washington 
Hotel, August, 28-31, 1997. 
8 Supranational literally means 'at a level above national governments' – as opposed to 'intergovernmental,' which means 
'between or among governments.' Many EU decisions are taken at the supranational level in the sense that they involve the EU 
institutions, to which EU Member States have delegated some decision-making powers. 
9 Ehlermann, C.D. Mixed Agreements: A List of Problems, in O’Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. (eds.) MIXED AGREEMENTS, 
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983, p. 3. 
10 The relationship between the EC and third States is a unique experience in international law and international relations. 
11 Treaties are usually composed of articles, Protocols and Declarations. As an example we have the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
composed of 15 articles, 13 Protocols and 58 Declarations. In the case of the EU, there are currently founding treaties, 
amending treaties, accession treaties and budgetary treaties. There is also an EU Constitutional Treaty, which seeks to 
consolidate, simplify and replace the existing set of overlapping treaties. It was signed in Rome on October 29, 2004 and is due 
to come into force in the near future, conditional on its ratification by all EU Member States. In the meantime, or if the EU 
Constitutional Treaty fails to be ratified by all EU Member States, the EU will continue to work on the basis of the current 
treaties. As for the founding treaties, there are four of them: the Treaty of Paris (1952), establishing the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC), which expired in July 2002; the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom); the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC); [these last two treaties are known as the 
Treaties of Rome (1958). However, when the term "Treaty of Rome" or the acronym "TEC" are used, it is to mean only the 
EC Polycephalous Anatomy  Rafael Leal-Arcas 
 
5
dominated by mixed agreements12 for they reflect the legal and political reality that the EC is not a single 
State for the purposes of international law.13 We shall see how the EC’s membership and participation in 
international organizations14 is highly variable for an organization which pretends to act as a single 
actor.15 
This article does not deal with treaties that are entered into by the Member States alone (if that 
were the case, they would not be mixed agreements stricto sensu), but treaties which in substance cover 
matters of exclusive EC competence. If it is not possible to have Community adherence to such treaties 
(because the treaty is only open to States), the EC competence may be exercised “through the medium of 
the Member States acting jointly in the Community’s interest.”16 Nor does this article deal with treaties 
concluded in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), where the EU 
technically lacks legal personality.17 However, the situation with respect to the EU legal personality has 
fundamentally changed since the enforcement of the Treaty of Amsterdam,18 although Article 24 of the 
 
EEC Treaty]; and the Treaty on European Union (1993) [this Treaty changed the name of the European Economic Community 
to simply "the European Community," and introduced new intergovernmental structures to deal with the aspects of common 
foreign and security policy, as well as police and judicial cooperation. The structure formed by these so-called Three Pillars 
(Community pillar; foreign and security policy; police and judicial cooperation) is the European Union, whose scope then 
became more overtly political as well as economic]. With respect to the amending treaties, there are also four of them, which 
are: the Merger Treaty (1967), which provided for a Single Commisison and a Single Council of the then three European 
Communities; the Single European Act (1987), which provided for the adoptions required for the achievement of the Internal 
Market; the Treaty of Amsterdam (signed in 1997), whose purpose was, inter alia, to simplify decision making in addition to 
further integrating the common foreign and security policy concept. It also amended and renumbered the EU and EC Treaties; 
and the Treaty of Nice (signed in 2001), where qualified majority voting was again extended to more areas, abolishing the 
national right to veto in some policy areas. A concept of "enhanced co-operation" was introduced for countries –there must be 
at least eight of them- wishing to forge closer links in areas where other EU Member States disagreed or if they are unable or 
unwilling to join in at this stage. The outsiders must, however, be free to join in later if they wish. The accession treaties came 
into being for every enlargement of the EU. As for budgetary treaties, there have been two: the Budgetary Treaty of 1970, 
which gave the European Parliament the last word on what is known as "non-compulsory expenditure;" and the Budgetary 
Treaty of 1975, which gave the European Parliament the power to reject the budget as a whole, and created the European Court 
of Auditors. 
12 MCGOLDRICK, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Longman, (1997), at chapter 5. 
13 This is also the case for the EU, “it is difficult to see anything short of a major war provoking a transition to a statehood”, 
Hill, C., The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualising Europe’s International Role 31 JCMS, 305-28, p. 325 (1993). 
14 For the participation of the EC in International Organizations, see FRID, R. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EC AND 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. LEGAL THEORY AND PRACTICE, Kluwer Law International, (1995). 
15 MCGOLDRICK, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Longman, (1997), at chapters 2 
& 10. 
16 Opinion 2/91, ILO Convention No. 170 [1993] ECR I-1061, para. 5. See also MCGOLDRICK, INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Longman, (1997), at 82-83. 
17 Eaton, M.R. Common Foreign and Security Policy, in O’Keeffe, D. & Twomey, P. (eds.) LEGAL ISSUES OF THE 
MAASTRICHT TREATY, Chichester, Wiley Chancery, 1994, p. 224. 
18 Rosas, A. The European Union and mixed agreements, in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. (eds.) THE GENERAL LAW OF EC 
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Treaty on European Union (TEU)19 refers to the conclusion of CFSP agreements by the Council.20 The 
final subtitle will be devoted to concluding remarks on the issue of mixity in the EC external relations. 
This unique legal and political situation, in which the EC and its Member States participate, raises 
a number of research questions: is there more legal coherence by having exclusive EC competence21 on 
all issues of EC trade policy? Does Article 133 EC after the Nice Treaty suffice to reach the aim of the 
EC’s common commercial policy? Is Article 133 EC an adequate legal instrument for the purposes of the 
EC’s common commercial policy? If the EC acts together externally, might it help to join internally 
within the EU? Would deeper integration of the internal market for, say, services strengthen the 
negotiating position of the EC in the international trade arena? How does the political context shape this 
legal issue? How does it impact the thinking about the legal solution, taking into account the fact that the 
EU is legally federal (i.e., it possesses a federal legal structure) but politically intergovernmental (i.e., it is 
an intergovernmental political structure)? What political consequences will the legal outcomes have? In 
Amato's view, no member of the EU is powerful enough to be taken seriously on its own in the 
international arena. Thus, in order to play an effective role in the world, Europe must join together. In this 
 
EXTERNAL RELATIONS, 2000, p. 203. 
19 Article 24 TEU reads: 
 
1.   When it is necessary to conclude an agreement with one or more States or international organisations in implementation of 
this title, the Council may authorise the Presidency, assisted by the Commission as appropriate, to open negotiations to that 
effect. Such agreements shall be concluded by the Council on a recommendation from the Presidency. 
2.   The Council shall act unanimously when the agreement covers an issue for which unanimity is required for the adoption of 
internal decisions. 
3.   When the agreement is envisaged in order to implement a joint action or common position, the Council shall act by a 
qualified majority in accordance with Article 23(2). 
4.   The provisions of this Article shall also apply to matters falling under Title VI. When the agreement covers an issue for 
which a qualified majority is required for the adoption of internal decisions or measures, the Council shall act by a qualified 
majority in accordance with Article 34(3). 
5.   No agreement shall be binding on a Member State whose representative in the Council states that it has to comply with the 
requirements of its own constitutional procedure; the other members of the Council may agree that the agreement shall 
nevertheless apply provisionally. 
6.   Agreements concluded under the conditions set out by this Article shall be binding on the institutions of the Union. 
20 Paasivirta, The European Union: From an Aggregate of States to a Legal Person?, 2 Hofstra Law & Policy Symposium, 
1997, pp. 37-59. 
21 On the issue of coherence and external competences generally, see Gauttier, P. “Horizontal Coherence and the External 
Competences of the European Union,” European Law Journal, Vol. 10, pp. 23-41, 2004. 
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sense, coordinating its foreign trade policies and streamlining the process was one of Amato's major 
ambitions during the Convention on the future of Europe.22 
II. The Problem of the EU in its External Relations 
 
With two remaining Communities23 (currently there are only two Communities24 since the European Coal 
and Steel Community [ECSC] Treaty expired on July 23, 2002),25 one Union, and three different pillars 
of competences and decision-making, it is no wonder that third parties are often puzzled.26 In order to 
avoid this chaos, it was proposed at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference of 1996-97 to create a 
single legal entity, the European Union, just like the United Nations (UN) or the World Trade 
 
22 See conversation with Giuliano Amato in the framework of a seminar held at NYU Law School on March 26, 2002 under 
the title “The Futures of Europe: Ideas, Ideals and Those Who Make Them Happen,” in 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/seminar/02/Amato_script.rtf (last visited June 20, 2005). 
23 In the 1950s, six European countries decided to pool their economic resources and set up a system of joint decision-making 
on economic issues. To do so, they formed three organizations. European Communities is the name given collectively to these 
three organizations, i.e., the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC), and 
the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), when in 1967, they were first merged under a single institutional 
framework with the Merger Treaty. They formed the basis of what is today the European Union.  
The EEC soon became the most important of these three communities, and was eventually renamed simply the “European 
Community” by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which at the same time effectively made the European Community the first of 
three pillars of the European Union, called the Community (or Communities) pillar. Subsequent treaties added further areas of 
competence that extended beyond the purely economic areas. The other two communities remained extremely limited: for that 
reason, often little distinction is made between the European Community and the European Communities as a whole. 
Furthermore, in 2002 the ECSC ceased to exist with the expiration of the Treaty of Paris which established it. Seen as 
redundant, no effort was made to retain it — its assets and liabilities were transferred to the EC, and coal and steel became 
subject to the EC Treaty. 
24 In fact, the two remaining Communities work as one entity which functions in the framework of two Treaties, even if they 
are legally different. In this sense, legally binding agreements concluded by the EC are still signed on behalf of one or both of 
the existing Communities. It must be said clearly that the EC, and not the EU, is a member of the World Trade Organization or 
regional fisheries organizations, to give just two examples. In this respect, see Sack, J. “The European Community’s 
Membership of International Organizations”, Common Market Law Review, 32, 1995, pp. 1227-1256. 
25 See the decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the EU Member States, meeting within the Council, on 27 
February 2002 on the financial consequences of the expiry of the ECSC Treaty and on the research fund for coal and steel at 
2002/234/ECSC, Official Journal of the European Communities L 79, Vol. 45, 22 March 2002, in http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_079/l_07920020322en00420059.pdf (last visited June 17, 2005). Also see, 
http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/misc/74346.pdf, p. 2. 
26 For a comprehensive study on the ramifications of the expiration of the ECSC, see Ubertazzi, B. “The End of the ECSC,” 
European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 8 (2004) N° 20, at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-020a.htm (last visited February 
15, 2006), as well as Groenendijk N. and Hospers G.J., “A requiem for the European Coal and Steel Community,” in The 
Economist 2002, 601-612. Also, Meunier, S., «La Communauté européenne du charbon et de l’acier est morte, vive la 
fédération européenne», in Revue du Marché commun et de l’Union européenne 2001, 509-515; Obwexer, W., «Das Ende der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl», in Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 2002, 517-524; Vallterra 
M.C., «La disolución de la Comunidad Europea del carbón y del acero: estado actual», in Revista de Derecho Comunitario 
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Organization (WTO). This proposal was perceived as a possible transfer of sovereignty in the field of 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).27 Unfortunately, this discussion focused on the question of 
the exercise of competence, and the idea of the EU as a single actor (legal person) does not prejudge the 
powers of the EU in, say, the common foreign and security policy. 
At Maastricht, it was not possible for Member States to accomplish a common foreign and 
security policy in the framework of the traditional mechanisms of Community institutions and 
Community law.28 The second pillar29 of the EU does not presently provide for a real supranational 
decision-making by majority voting. It utilizes unanimity as a decision-making system with the 
possibility of common positions30 (Article 12 TEU)31 and joint actions32 (Article 13 TEU).33 
Europeo 2002, 393-432. 
27 Garbagnati Ketvel, “The Jurisdiction of the ECJ in Respect of the CFSP,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 77 
(2006); Thym, “Beyond Parliament’s Reach? The Role of the European Parliament in the CFSP,” European Foreign Affairs 
Review 109 (2006). 
28 These mechanisms are known in the Community institutions as those of the First Pillar. 
29 The so-called “second pillar” refers to the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the EU. 
30 The common position in the context of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) is designed to make cooperation 
more systematic and improve its coordination. The EU Member States are required to comply with and uphold such positions 
which have been adopted unanimously at the Council. 
For reasons of simplification, the EU Constitutional Treaty which is in the process of being ratified restricts CFSP instruments 
to European decisions and international agreements. Once the EU Constitutional Treaty enters into force, common positions 
and their implementation will be based on European decisions (non-legislative instruments) adopted by the Council of 
Ministers.  
31 Article 12 TEU reads: 
 
The Union shall pursue the objectives set out in Article 11 by: 
defining the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, 
- deciding on common strategies, 
- adopting joint actions, 
- adopting common positions, 
- strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy. 
32 Joint action, which is a legal instrument under Title V of the Treaty on European Union (common foreign and security 
policy, CFSP), means coordinated action by the EU Member States whereby all kinds of resources (human resources, know-
how, financing, equipment, et cetera) are mobilized in order to attain specific objectives set by the Council, on the basis of 
general guidelines from the European Council. 
For reasons of simplification, the EU Constitutional Treaty, which is in the process of being ratified, restricts CFSP 
instruments to European decisions and international agreements. Once the EU Constitutional Treaty enters into force, joint 
actions and the implementation of such action will therefore be based on European decisions (non-legislative instruments) 
adopted by the Council of Ministers. 
33 Article 13 TEU reads: 
 
1.   The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, 
including for matters with defence implications. 
2.   The European Council shall decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where the Member 
States have important interests in common. 
Common strategies shall set out their objectives, duration and the means to be made available by the Union and the Member 
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It is the Treaty of Amsterdam which attempts to strengthen these mechanisms without implying 
major changes in this respect.34 One major change is that the Council of the EU may adopt joint actions or 
common positions by qualified majority if they are based on a common strategy decided upon by the 
European Council.35 However, in adopting a common strategy, the European Council36 must be 
unanimous, which diminishes the practical importance of this innovation. In addition to that, any Member 
State can declare that for “important and sated qualified reasons of national policy” it will oppose the 
adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, in which case such decision shall not be taken. 
Another important change at Amsterdam is that the Secretary-General of the Council will assist 
the Presidency of the Council in matters dealing with the common foreign and security policy (Article 
18.3 TEU37).38 It is still unknown whether the High Representative for the common foreign and security 
policy will bring more coherence to the EU. One wonders how much coherence can be found in a system 
in which the Presidency will continue to assert its own role, the High Representative wishes to play an 
important role, and the Commission continues to be the representative of the EC in the first pillar,39 as 
well as fully associated with the second pillar, and therefore has its own voice.  
The Amsterdam Treaty also implies that parts of the third pillar40 have been transferred to the first 
pillar.41 This means that Community competence and supranational Community law are growing. The 
 
States. 
3.   The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing the common foreign and security policy on 
the basis of the general guidelines defined by the European Council. 
The Council shall recommend common strategies to the European Council and shall implement them, in particular by adopting 
joint actions and common positions. 
The Council shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union. 
34 See Monar, J. “The European Union’s Foreign Affairs System after the Treaty of Amsterdam: A “Strengthened Capacity for 
External Action”?”, 2 European Foreign Affairs Review 1997, pp. 413-436. In this article, on page 434 the author concludes 
that, for the EU’s foreign affairs system, the Treaty of Amsterdam “brings only fragments of a reform.” 
35 Rosas, A. “The External Relations of the European Union: Problems and Challenges” in The Forum for US-EU Legal-
Economic Affairs, The Mentor Group, 1998, p. 62. 
36 Not to mix with the Council of the EU. The European Council consists of the Head of State and Government of the 25 EU 
Member States. 
37 Article 18.3 TEU reads: The Presidency shall be assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council who shall exercise the 
function of High Representative for the common foreign and security policy. 
38 See European Union. Selected Instruments Taken from the Treaties, Book I, Volume I, 1999, in http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/treaties/dat/treaties_en.pdf (last visited September 3, 2005). 
39 This is the so-called Community pillar.  
40 The so-called "third pillar" refers to matters of police and judicial cooperation in the EU. 
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matters transferred from the third to the first pillar cover the entry of third-country nationals (visas, 
asylum, and immigration policy). This shows that, although the transfer of the second pillar to the first 
may still seem remote, a gradual merger in one form or another of the two pillars seems inevitable for the 
construction of Europe. 
Instead of being faced with two “international organizations” (the remaining two Communities), 
and the EU as an umbrella concept for these organizations as well as the second and third pillars, third 
States are now facing two organizations (the Communities) and a third legal (?) person (the EU), which 
appears as a different entity from the Communities. This situation hardly corresponds to the basic 
institutional principles of the TEU, such as Article 1.3 TEU42 or Article 3.2 TEU.43 From this, we can 
deduce that there is a need for clarification and for more coherence to the institutional image of the EU in 
the outside world.44 
41 The first pillar contains Title IV on “Visas, Asylum, Immigration and Other Policies Related to Free Movement of Persons.” 
42 Article 1.3 TEU predicates that “The Union shall be founded on the European Communities”. 
43 Article 3.2 TEU reads that “The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole”. 
44 There is a vast body of literature on this matter, especially the work of the European Convention on the future of Europe, 
Working Group III on the EU’s legal personality, guided by Professor Amato. Other literature, Rama Montaldo M., 
International Legal Personality and Implied Powers of International Organizations, in BYIL 1970, 111; What follows is a non-
exhaustive indication of readings I have come across in the field of EC external trade relations: Allen, J.J., The European 
Common Market and the GATT, The University Press of Washington, D. C., 1960; Bekemans, L. & Tsoukalis, L. (eds.) 
Europe and Global Economic Interdependence, College of Europe and European University Press, 1993; Bourgeois, J.H.J. 
“The EC in the WTO and Advisory Opinion 1/94: an Echternach Procession”, Common Market Law Review 32, 1995, pp. 763-
787; Dashwood, A. “External Relations Provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty,” Common Market Law Review 35, 1998, pp. 
1019-1045; Da Fonseca-Wollheim, H. & Krenzler, H. “Die Reichweite der gemainsamen Handelspolitik nach dem Vertrag 
von Amsterdam- eine Debatte ohne Ende”, Europarecht 1998, pp. 223 ff.; Demaret, P. Relations extérieures de la 
Communauté européenne et marché intérieur: aspects juridiques et fonctionnels, Story-Scientia, 1986; Heidensohn, K. Europe 
and World Trade, Pinter, 1995; Henig, S. External Relations of the European Community. Associations and Trade 
Agreements, Chatham House: PEP, 1971; Torrent, R. Droit et Pratique des Relations Economiques Exterieures dans l'Union 
Europeenne, in http://www.ub.es/dpecp/ep/livreTorrent.html, 1998; Pescatore, P. “Opinion 1/94 on “Conclusion” of the WTO 
Agreement: is there an Escape from a programmed Disaster?”, Common Market Law Review 36, 1999, pp. 387-405; 
Petersmann, E.-U. “Application of GATT by the Court of Justice of the European Communities”, Common Market Law 
Review 20, 1983, pp. 397-437; Piris, J.-C. “La Capacité de l’Union Europeenne de s’engager et d’agir en Matiere de Relations 
Economiques Exterieures: l’example de l’OMC”, Florence, Academy of European Law, Coference given by Jean-Claude Piris, 
Jurisconsult of the Council of the European Union, on the 15th July 1998; Völker, E.L.M. Barriers to External and Internal 
Community Trade, Kluwer, 1993; Völker, E.L.M., (ed.) Protectionism and the European Community, Kluwer Law and 
Taxation Publishers, 1987; Woolcock, S. Market Access Issues in EC-US Relations. Trading Partners or Trading Blows?,
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991. 
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A. On Foreign Policy45
Under international law, international organizations can have international personality, that is, rights and 
duties under the Public International system of law.46 In this respect, the major international law 
precedent on the international personality of public international law institutions is the Reparations for 
injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations case.47 Since the EC is an “international 
organization,” it can be given explicit legal personality by a treaty which has created it. Concerning third 
States, what counts is the international practice of the organization and the links that such an organization 
creates with these third States.48 This practice and its links will (or will not) create the organization’s 
international legal personality.  
In September 1948, Count Bernadotte was the Chief United Nations Truce Negotiator in 
Jerusalem. He was killed by a gang of private terrorists. The United Nations General Assembly asked for 
an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice to bring an international claim concerning 
injuries suffered by its employees in circumstances involving the responsibility of a State.49 Although the 
UN Charter does not expressly confer legal personality on the United Nations Organization, the Court 
examined the Charter as a whole and concluded that the UN was an international entity holding 
international rights and obligations, and capable of maintaining its rights by bringing international claims. 
The Court pronounced itself as follows: 
 
45 Wessel, The European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy: A Legal Institutional Perspective, Kluwer Law International, 
1999; Denza, E. The Intergovernmental Pillars of the EU, Oxford University Press, 2000; Tizzano, A. “The Foreign Relations 
Law of the EU: between supranationality and intergovernmental model,” in Cannizzaro, E. (ed.) The European Union as an 
Actor in International Relations, Kluwer Law International, 2002; Hill, C. “The EU’s Capacity for Conflict Prevention,” 6 
European Foreign Affairs Review, 315 (2001); Soetendorp, Foreign Policy in the European Union: Theory, History and 
Practice, Longmans, 1999; Timmermans, “The EU and Public International Law,” 4 European Foreign Affairs Review 181 
(1994). 
46 See Schermers, H.G. & Blokker, N. M., International Institutional Law: Unity within Diversity, 3rd edn, The Hague, Nijhoff, 
1995, pp. 976-82; White, N. The Law of International Organisations, Manchester University Press, 1996. 
47 Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 174. For an explanation on the Reparations Case, see McGoldrick, D. International 
Relations Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997, pp. 26-8. 
48 See Jennings, R.Y. & Watts, A. (eds.) Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th edition, Harlow, Longman, 1992, specifically pp. 
117-329. 
49 McGoldrick, D. International Relations Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997, at p. 27. 
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Accordingly, the Court has come to the conclusion that the Organisation is an international 
person. That is not the same as saying that it is a State, which it certainly is not, or that its legal 
personality and rights and duties are the same as those of a State…Whereas a State possesses the 
totality of international rights and duties recognised by international law, the rights and duties of 
an entity such as the Organisation must depend upon its purposes and functions as specified or 
implied in its constituent documents and developed in practice.50 
So the question is: what, then, is the European Union? For the time being, it is just the institutional 
and political framework in which all EC's and certain (and only certain) Member States' competences are 
exercised. In the near future, once the EU Constitutional Treaty is implemented – or a similar legal 
document, if the Constitutional Treaty will never see the light of day - the Union will be more than just a 
simple framework and, therefore, will become an actor with its own legal personality and competences. 
Let me try to explain this argument by giving the example of former Yugoslavia.  
Firstly, if we think of sending military forces, then we are dealing with the 25 Member States of the 
Union acting outside the institutional system of the Union. However, one should not exclude the 
possibility that sending troops to former Yugoslavia may have a link with the common foreign and 
security policy. The borderline between Member States acting on their own, outside the institutional 
framework of the Union, and Member States acting within the political and institutional framework of the 
Union is not very clear. Secondly, if we refer to the "European Administration" of the town of Mostar, 
then we are dealing with Member States' competences in the framework of the EU. Thirdly, if we look at 
the commercial regime applicable to the republics of former Yugoslavia, then we are dealing with the 
EC's competences. 
These examples should illustrate the danger of an indiscriminate use of the expression “the 
European Union does...” Such an expression does not let us know who really does what: what does the 
EC as such do? What do the 25 Member States together do in the framework of the Union? What do both 
Member States and the Community together do? Obviously it would be even worse to use the expression 
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“European Union” when making reference to the Member States outside the EU’s institutional 
framework. Again, knowing the precise answer to these questions is vital, since the nature, as well as the 
legal and political consequences of this action, is completely different, depending on who acts.51 To 
defend this argument, allow me to suggest two examples: 
Example 1: "The European Union reacts to the Helms-Burton52 and d'Amato Acts.53" This statement 
could mean: 
a.- that the Community and the Member States both react to these two legislations, each with their 
own legal and political means; or 
b.- that Member States cede their responsibilities to appear behind a single action conducted by the 
Community. As a matter of fact, the Community has very limited competences regarding such issues as 
the Helms-Burton or d'Amato Acts. Therefore, its action has very little effect or repercussion. 
Example 2: “Agreements between the European Union and Mercosur,54 and the European Union 
and the Andean Community.55”
This expression does not reveal the main difference between both agreements. The agreement 
with Mercosur is an agreement signed between the EC and the Member States on the European side, and 
Mercosur and its Member States on the South American side, whereas the agreement with the Andean 
Pact and its Member States has been signed only by the European Community on the European side. In 
other words, EC Member States have not participated in this second agreement. Therefore, the first 
 
50 Reparations Case: Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations [1949] ICJ Rep. pp. 179-80. 
51 Torrent, R. Droit et Pratique des Relations Economiques Exterieures dans l'Union Europeenne,
http://www.ub.es/dpecp/ep/livreTorrent.html, 1998, chapter 1, subtitle 1.1. 
52 The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (better known as the Helms-Burton Act) is a United 
States law which strengthens and continues the United States embargo against Cuba. 
53 The d'Amato Act refers to the economic embargo by the U.S. government against companies of third countries investing in 
gas or oil in Iran and Libya. 
54 MERCOSUR stands for Mercado Comun del Sur (Common Market of the Southern Cone) and is composed of Brazil, 
Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. On 9 December 2005, Venezuela was accepted as a new member, but it will be officialized 
in late 2006. It was founded in 1991 by the Treaty of Asuncion, which was later amended and updated by the 1994 Treaty of 
Ouro Preto. Its purpose is to promote free trade and the fluid movement of goods, peoples, and currency. 
55 The Andean Community is a trade bloc comprising until recently 5 South American countries: Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, 
Ecuador and Bolivia. In 2006, Venezuela announced its withdrawal, reducing the Andean Community to 4 member states. The 
trade bloc was called the Andean Pact until 1996, and came into existence with the signing of the Cartagena Agreement in 
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agreement has a greater scope than the second one. The same difference exists between the 
Euromediterranean Agreements of the EC and its Member States with Tunisia,56 Morocco, Israel and 
other countries, as well as the Euromediterranean Agreement with the PLO (Palestinian Liberation 
Organization).57 The latter agreement was signed by only the EC (and not the EC and its Member States), 
and has a lesser scope than the former agreements, since the EU Member States do not participate in the 
agreement. 
It is thus of vital importance to make certain linguistic clarifications which will ease the 
understanding of what we are trying to explain: 
a.- the expression “The Union does humanitarian work” actually means “The Community and/or 
its Member States, acting together in the framework of the European Union, do humanitarian work;” 
b.- the expression “The Union and its Member States” is rather confusing since the Union includes 
the Member States; however, we can speak of “the Community and its Member States.” Here we mean 26 
different legal entities, each one of them having legal personality; 
c.- we can use the expression “The Union and its Member States act individually;” by this we 
understand activities carried out within the framework of the Union (by the Community and/or the 
Member States acting together), and activities carried out by the Member States outside the framework of 
the Union. 
That said, the success of the EU on unity in commercial policy seems to be inextricably linked to 
its success with a coherent foreign policy.58 In fact, as is evidenced in the famous bananas and hormones 
 
1969. Its headquarters are located in Lima, Peru. 
56 OJ L 97/1998, p. 1. 
57 OJ L 187/1997, p. 1. 
58 See generally Koutrakos, P. Trade, Foreign Policy and Defence, Hart, 2001, chapters 2-7; Tietje, “The Concept of 
Coherence in the TEU and the CFSP,” 2 European Foreign Affairs Review, 211 (1997); Paarsivirta, E. & Rosas, A. 
“Sanctions, Countermeasures and Related Actions in the External Relations of the EU: A Search for Legal Frameworks,” in 
Cannizzaro, E. (ed.) The European Union as an Actor in International Relations, Kluwer Law International, 2002; Pavoni, 
“UN Sanctions in EU and National Law: The Centro-Com Case,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 582 (1999); 
Monar, J. “The European Union’s Foreign Affairs System after the Teaty of Amsterdam: A ‘Strengthened Capacity for 
External Action’?” 2 European Foreign Affairs Review 413 (1997); Wessel, “The International Legal Status of the EU,” 2 
European Foreign Affairs Review 109 (1997); Wessel, “Revisiting the International Legal Status of the EU,” 5 European 
Foreign Affairs Review 507 (2000); Neuwahl, N. “A Partner with a Troubled Personality: EU Treaty-Making in Matters of 
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disputes, both the political and economic aspects of the EU’s external relations are inseparable. At what 
was called the European Summit59 in The Hague in December 1969, the heads of State and Government 
of the six original Member States asked their ministers of foreign affairs to study how progress could best 
be made in the area of political unification. 60 Their report was a proposal for cooperation in the area of 
foreign policy, which became the basis of what, for 25 years, would be called European Political 
Cooperation (EPC).61 The procedure was purely intergovernmental and based on unanimity, a constraint 
reflecting a strong belief that foreign policy decisions remained under the sovereign competence of 
national governments.62 
John Peterson and Helene Sjursen argue that the move from European Political Cooperation 
(EPC) -in retrospect, a strikingly anodyne construction- to the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) was propelled by ambitions to create a “common” EU foreign policy analogous to, say, the 
common agricultural policy or common commercial policy.63 Yet, French national foreign policy 
decisions to test nuclear weapons in the Pacific, send troops to Bosnia, or propose a French candidate to 
head the European Central Bank could be viewed as far more momentous and consequential than 
anything agreed upon within the CFSP between 1995 and 1997. It is plausible to suggest, as David Allen 
does, that the EU simply does not have a “foreign policy”64 in the accepted sense of the term. Going one 
step further, the CFSP may be described, perhaps dismissed, as a “myth.”65 It does not, as the Maastricht 
 
CFSP and JHA after Amsterdam,” 3 European Foreign Affairs Review 177 (1998). 
59 European (or EU) Summits are the meetings of heads of State and government (i.e., presidents and/or prime ministers, 
depending on what their national constitutions indicate) of all EU countries, plus the President of the European Commission. In 
today's EU politics, summits are embodied in the European Council, which meets, in principle, four times a year to agree upon 
overall EU policy and to review progress. The European Council is the highest-level policy-making body in the European 
Union, which is why its meetings are often called “summits.” 
60 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND CHANGING PERSPECTIVES IN EUROPE 
(Walter Carlsnaes & Steve Smith eds., 1994). 
61 For a description and analysis of such foreign policy co-ordination, see EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION IN 
THE 1980S: A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY FOR WESTERN EUROPE? (Alfred Pijpers et al. eds., 1988). 
62 L’UNION EUROPEENNE ET LE MONDE APRES AMSTERDAM (Marianne Dony ed., 1999). 
63 Peterson, J. & Sjursen, H. “Conclusion. The Myth of the CFSP?”, in PETERSON, J. & SJURSEN, H. (EDS.) A COMMON 
FOREIGN POLICY FOR EUROPE? COMPETING VISIONS OF THE CFSP, Routledge, 1998, p. 169. 
64 Allen, D, `Who speaks for Europe? The search for an effective and coherent foreign policy' in Peterson, J. and Sjursen, H. 
(eds), A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY FOR EUROPE? COMPETING VISIONS OF THE CFSP, London, Routledge, 1998. 
65 Id.
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Treaty promises, cover “all areas of foreign and security policy.”66 Obviously, it is not always supported 
“actively and unreservedly by its Member States in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity.”67 
That said, and knowing that the presumption in the European Union is to have collective action, is 
there really a “common” European interest? If so, is this interest so great as to assume that in certain 
circumstances Member States will act with a single voice? Do Member States have enough proximity in 
their national interests to act with one voice in the international sphere? 
Following the same authors,68 the European Union has not yet reached its apogee in terms of its 
ability to act with power and unity in international affairs. However, some competences are exclusively of 
the European Community. Customs duties and protective non-tariff barriers (NTBs)69 such as quantitative 
limits, safety norms, health, and hygiene standards, were and are fixed by the Union as a whole, not by 
the individual Member States. 
 Although the Single European Act in 1987 established a legal basis for EPC, it remained largely 
unchanged and intergovernmental. Only when the EC faced the challenge of Central and Eastern Europe 
and the Iraqi crisis in 1990 and 1991 was more thought given to increasing cooperation in foreign policy. 
The result was the “implementation of a common foreign and security policy including eventual framing 
of a common defence policy . . .” (Article B TEU).70 The fact that Title V of the Treaty on the European 
Union brought foreign policy under the umbrella of the EU represents a step forward in clarity. Having 
more transparent instruments is the result of requiring Member States to conform to common positions of 
the Council of Ministers.71 Through joint actions, the Member States are committed to acting in support 
of these common positions. Finally, provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty give the CFSP a clearer 
 
66 Id.
67 Id.
68John Peterson & Helene Sjursen. 
69 NTBs are government measures or policies other than tariffs that restrict or distort international trade. Examples are import 
quotas, discriminatory government procurement practices, technical and scientific barriers related to plant health, 
environmental labelling, codes and standards, inter alia.
70 Official Journal C 191 of 29 July 1992. 
71 A Council common position is the provisional position agreed by the EU Council after the first reading stage of legislation, 
that is, after taking account of any amendments proposed or opinions offered by the European Parliament. 
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character by creating a High Representative of EU foreign policy (Title V of the consolidated version of 
the Treaty on European Union), assisted by a new policy planning and early warning unit in the 
Secretariat of the EU Council.72 
The whole purpose of creating the CFSP was to enable the EU Member States to speak with one 
voice by creating a new entity which would do this on their behalf.73 The Amsterdam Treaty brought 
limited majority voting for implementing foreign policy once it has been agreed to in outline by 
unanimity (Title V of the consolidated version of the Treaty of Amsterdam),74 and the definition and 
implementation of a foreign policy position have been helped further along by the existence of EC policy 
instruments, in particular, the budget.75 For example, the EC instruments advanced external policy with 
respect to the Mediterranean and to the New Transatlantic Agenda76 between the EU and the U.S., and 
enhanced cooperation with Asia through the ASEAN Initiative (Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
Declaration, of August 8, 1967).77 In addition, the EU’s political relations with Central and Eastern 
Europe have been focused through Europe Agreements negotiated under the EC’s competence.78 
72 Treaty of Amsterdam, declaration on the establishment of a policy planning and early warning unit, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1, 
132. 
73 Wessel, R. “The Multi-Level Constitution of European Foreign Relations,” EUI Workshop Paper, April 2002, pp. 1-35, at 
22. 
74 TEU Title V. 
75 For more details, see Nuttall, European Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, 2000; Schmalz, “The Amsterdam 
Provisions on External Coherence: Bridging the Union’s Foreign Policy Dualism?” 3 European Foreign Affairs Review 421 
(1998); Crowe, “Some Reflections on the CFSP,” 3 European Foreign Affairs Review 319 (1998); Canor, “The Relationship 
Between International Law and European Law: The Incorporation of UN Sanctions Against Yugoslavia into EC Law Through 
the Perspective of the ECJ,” 35 Common Market Law Review 137 (1998); Cremona, M. “The Common Foreign and Security 
Policy of the European Union and the External Relations Powers of the European Community,” in O’Keeffe, D. & Twomey, P. 
(eds.) Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty, Chichester, Wiley Chancery, 1994; Regelsberger & Wessels, R. “The CFSP 
Institutions and Procedures: A Third Way for the Second Pillar,” 1 European Foreign Affairs Review 29 (1996); Ginsberg 
“Conceptualising the EU as an International Actor,” 37 Journal of Common Market Studies 429 (1999); Zielonka, J. (ed.) 
Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy, Kluwer, 1998; Curtin & Dekker “The EU as a ‘Layered’ International Organization: 
Institutional Unity in Disguise,” in Craig, P. & de Burca, G. (eds.) The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford University Press, 1999; 
Kronenberger, V. & Wouters (eds.) The European Union and Conflict Prevention – Policy and Legal Aspects, Asser Press, 
2004. 
76 The New Transatlantic Agenda, U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 6, No. 49, 894-96 (December 4, 1995). 
77 Association of Southeast Asian Nations Declaration, Aug. 8, 1967, 6 I.L.M. 1233. 
78 Kennedy & Webb, “The Limits of Integration: Eastern Europe and the European Communities,” 30 Common Market Law 
Review 1095 (1993); Maresceau & Montaguti, “The Relations Between the EU and Central and Eastern Europe: A Legal 
Appraisal,” 32 Common Market Law Review 1327 (1995); Volkai, J. “The Application of the European Agreement and 
European Law in Hungary: the Judgment of an Activist Constitutional Court on Activist Notions,” Jean Monnet Working 
Paper No. 8/99, 1999, available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/990801.html#fn0 (last visited August 30, 
2006); Inglis, “The Europe Agreements compared in the light of their pre-accession reorientation,” Common Market Law 
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The EC’s achievements in assisting other nations have been significant. Under the CFSP in 1995, 
the EU gave Russia U.S.$ 1.5 billion to assist its transition to democracy. In 1996 European humanitarian 
aid totaled almost U.S.$ 2 billion. Because Member States have proved reluctant to contribute to CFSP 
action from national budgets, EC financing has become the norm, which means that de facto, there is an 
indirect communitarization of CFSP as the Commission presents the budget, and the European Parliament 
decides non-obligatory expenditures. In theory, CFSP has augmented the EU’s competence to act in 
external matters. In practice, without the political will necessary to adapt the decision-making machinery 
or to use it effectively, CFSP has done more to raise and to disappoint expectations, than it has to enhance 
the EU’s international role.79 
However, unity in foreign policy is a dramatic step forward and has made it easier for the EC to 
unify on commercial issues. As mentioned earlier, there are several areas where this cohesion is likely to 
spill over and impact the international arena. One example is that of competition policy, an area in which 
the Commission has been active since the early 1960s. With increasing worldwide economic 
interdependency and the emergence of global markets for a large number of products, more competition 
cases involve actions that take place outside of the EU,80 like the Boeing and McDonnell Douglas merger. 
In this respect, the EC-U.S. Cooperation Agreement (which provides the background for the McDonnell 
Douglas case) is worth mentioning. Competition authorities on both sides of the Atlantic examined the 
issue, and came to different conclusions. This case shows that even in carrying out policies that have 
traditionally been domestic, the EU is increasingly influencing economic matters in other parts of the 
world. 
 
Review 1173 (2000); Weiss, “The Chapter on Establishment in the Europe Agreements,” 6 European Foreign Affairs Review 
243 (2001). 
79 The Treaty of Amsterdam: Text and Commentary (Andrew Duff ed., 1997). 
80 PIET EECKHOUT, THE EUROPEAN INTERNAL MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 
(1994). 
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In addition, nowhere is the effect of domestic policies likely to be as relevant as with the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).81 The EMU is essentially a domestic issue. However, EC 
authorities hope that the Euro will benefit international trade, having a major impact both on international 
markets, and on the weight attributed to the EU as an international actor. That said, the variable geometry 
of the EMU with its ins and outs poses a challenge for the unity of external representation in the 
economic sphere.82 To better understand the implications of the unitary character of the EU (or lack 
thereof), we must look at the legal interpretation of its role and responsibility. 
 
B.- The Case of External Economic Relations
It is also important to say a few words about what Torrent calls the "fourth pillar" of the EU's institutional 
structure. If the reader studies the Maastricht Treaty,83 he or she will perceive that the CFSP has a very 
large scope, and that it covers the actions of EU Member States in the areas of external economic 
relations.84 In fact, 
1. Article 12 (ex-Article J.2) of the Maastricht Treaty refers to "any matter of foreign and security 
policy" and to "actions in international organisations and at international conferences" without 
exception (therefore, without excluding economic conferences);85 
81 PAUL BRETON ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A EUROPEAN TEXT (1997). 
82 NICHOLAS EMILIOU & DAVID O´KEEFFE, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND WORLD TRADE LAW: AFTER TH 
GATT URUGUAY ROUND (1996). 
83 The numbering of the Maastricht Treaty Articles is not the original one, but follows the changes made by the post-
Maastricht Intergovernmental Conferences. 
84 Winter, J., Curtin, D., Kellermann, A. & de Witte, B. (eds.) Reforming the Treaty on European Union. The Legal Debate, 
Kluwer Law International, 1996. 
85 Article 12 (ex-Article J.2) of the Maastricht Treaty reads: 
 
1. Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of 
general interest in order to ensure that their combined influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and 
convergent action.  
2. Whenever it deems it necessary, the Council shall define a common position.  
Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions.  
3. Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations and at international conferences. They shall 
uphold the common positions in such fora.  
In international organizations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those which do take 
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2. Article 13 of the Maastricht Treaty also has a general scope;86 and finally, 
3. Article 3 of the Maastricht Treaty establishes that "the Union shall in particular ensure the 
consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, 
economic and development policies."87 
However, no one has given such a broad interpretation of the CFSP. Why is this so? An authentic 
interpretation of the CFSP is one that addresses in the best of all possible ways, the interests of those civil 
servants who had to put the CFSP in action: 
1. from the point of view of the EU's national Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the idea was to "keep" 
the CFSP for them, even if they did not like it so much; 
2. from the point of view of the Commission, there was only one strategy concerning the external 
economic relations, i.e., to extend the exclusive competence of the European Community as far 
as possible. This strategy was incompatible with an efficient co-ordination of the external 
economic policies of the Member States in the framework of the CFSP. 
 
part shall uphold the common positions. 
86 Article 13 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union reads: 
 
1.   The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, 
including for matters with defence implications. 
2.   The European Council shall decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where the Member 
States have important interests in common. 
Common strategies shall set out their objectives, duration and the means to be made available by the Union and the Member 
States. 
3.   The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing the common foreign and security policy on 
the basis of the general guidelines defined by the European Council. 
The Council shall recommend common strategies to the European Council and shall implement them, in particular by adopting 
joint actions and common positions. 
The Council shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union. 
87 Article 3 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union reads: The Union shall be served by a single 
institutional framework which shall ensure the consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain its 
objectives while respecting and building upon the acquis communautaire. 
 
The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, 
security, economic and development policies. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such 
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It is this restrictive interpretation of the CFSP which necessarily provokes the development of 
what Torrent calls the "fourth pillar" of the EU.88 The term restrictive does not suggest a possible 
inclination of the CFSP toward the EC competences, but rather toward the side of the Member States 
acting outside the institutional framework of the EU. The so-called "fourth pillar" shows how within the 
institutional framework of the EU, the de facto common exercise of Member States' competences is 
mainly, but not exclusively, on issues of external economic relations. We may illustrate this with two 
very significant examples taken from multilateral and bilateral relations: 
1. when dealing with the management of the World Trade Organization Agreements, it is the 
Council of Ministers of the European Union which acts not only on behalf of the EC, but also on 
behalf of the Member States in the matters in which they are competent; 
2. the Association Agreements with the republics of the former Soviet Union deal mainly with the 
agreed treatment to the enterprises. This issue reveals Member States' competences. Proof of it 
lies in Opinion 2/92 of the European Court of Justice of 24 March 1995,89 which deals with the 
competence of the Community or of one of its institutions to participate in the third revised 
decision of the Council of the OECD90 concerning national treatment. These agreements have 
been negotiated and are integrally managed after their conclusion by the Council of the 
European Union and the European Commission. 
 
Torrent justifies the existence of a fourth pillar by saying that the exercise of Member States' 
external economic competences within the institutional framework of the EU does not show signs of 
 
consistency and shall cooperate to this end. They shall ensure the implementation of these policies, each in accordance with its 
respective powers. 
88 One interesting point by Professor Torrent is the fact that making reference to the "fourth pillar" of the Union shows how the 
language of "three pillars" does not let us comprehend correctly the nature of the European Union. 
89 ECR I-521. 
90 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is a forum of 30 countries for discussion of 
economic policies between industrialized market economies, sharing a commitment to democratic government and the market 
economy. 
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being part of the "third pillar," "second pillar,"91 or "first pillar."92 Therefore, we must speak of a fourth 
pillar, if we wish to continue the linguistic usage of pillars.  
However, there are at least three comments to make regarding what has been said so far: 
- first comment: a clear distinction between the scope of EC competences and the range of 
application of the EC Treaty must be made. Let us make use of two examples in order to explain this 
distinction.  
Example one: Articles 149, 150 (education, vocational training, and youth), 151 (culture),93 and 
152 EC (public health)94 limit the Community's competence. Any kind of harmonization of legal 
provisions of the Member States is excluded from the scope of these Articles. However, this limitation 
does not mean that the national legislations in culture, education or health exceed the range of application 
of the treaties. They must respect the general principle of non-discrimination based on nationality, and its 
specific translation in the field of the four freedoms in EU law.95 
Example two: concerning the criminal legislation of Member States, the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) has established that Member States must respect the general principles of EC law. If, for example, 
an infraction to customs regulations, before 1st January 1993 –date of completion of the internal 
market- was liable to a fine applicable to intra-Community trade, it should respect the principle of 
 
91 Even less so in the second pillar if we take into account the restrictive interpretation which has been given to the CFSP, 
which is the second pillar. 
92 It could not be part of this pillar since we are dealing precisely with the exercise of Member States' competences, and not 
with that of the Community's. 
93 In cultural policy, the EC must contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the EU Member States, while respecting their 
national and regional diversity and bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore. 
94 The EC action, which complements national policies, must be directed toward improving public health, preventing human 
illness and diseases, as well as obviating sources of danger to human health. 
95 Let us remember for the non-specialized reader that the four freedoms are the free movement of goods, the free movement of 
persons, the free movement of capital and the freedom to provide services. This is certainly one of the great achievements of 
the EU, which has been able to create a frontier-free area within which people, goods, services and money can all move around 
freely. 
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proportionality. The conclusions by the Advocate-General Van Gerven in the case 212/8896 have a 
general appreciation for he Court's decisions over this issue. 
The distinction made by these two examples shows that Community treaties have two different 
functions. On the one hand, the typical function of an international treaty, i.e., to limit the exercise of the 
competences of the contracting parties (in other words, of the Member States when they are competent). 
On the other hand, the specific function of transferring a competence to the Community. This function of 
transferring competences to the Community is very specific, but not exclusive of Community treaties. 
The fact of not making this distinction has generated very generalized mistakes in the analysis of the 
distribution of external competences between the Community and its Member States. There was no 
distinction between the range of application of the treaties and the scope of EC competences. This 
mistake had terrible consequences when combined with the also mistaken thesis by which non-exclusive 
EC competences become exclusive competences when there is a need to act at the international level. The 
combination of these two mistakes was the genesis of the thesis by which all the Agreements of the 
Uruguay Round were exclusive EC competence. 
- second comment: it should be underlined that there is a fine line between what EU Member 
States do outside and inside the institutional system of the EU. The earlier example of former Yugoslavia 
is helpful here. Certain EU Member States decided to send troops outside the institutional system of the 
Union. But to what extent have the diplomatic initiatives from the various EU Member States been inside 
or outside the framework of the CFSP? And who pays for what in this same example? The same case 
would apply mutatis mutandis to participation in the Middle Eastern peace process. The best example of 
Member States' activities which are borderline with the Union's institutional system is the EU's 
participation in the UN. 
- third comment: when analyzing the Schengen Agreement, we can observe how this agreement 
used to be based outside the institutional framework of the EU. Nowadays, it is inside the institutional 
 
96 Ruling of the ECJ of 26 October 1989, ECR p. 3523. 
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framework of the EU. The issues dealt with in the Schengen Agreement are, therefore, treated inside 
the institutional framework of the EU, as Member States’ competences. Some of these issues are also 
treated as Community competence.97 This is a very important point when it comes to external relations: 
very often a specific problem of international politics can be treated in various ways. The fact of being 
treated in one way or another has not only legal but also political consequences. The means taken and 
the foreseeable results are different. 
 Experience has proven that one of the bigger mistakes of the usage of pillars is that it prevents 
the same issue from being used in different ways. With the system of pillars in mind, people tend to ask 
to which pillar a specific issue belongs. Since a good number of national administrations (and certain 
services of the EU institutions) is organized by pillars instead of by issues, it is no surprise that this 
question causes internal conflicts of power and jealousy. This is why it is almost evident for national 
and Community civil servants that the political dialogue with third States belongs to the second pillar. 
However, joint declarations, which create this political dialogue, do not limit their scope to questions 
which, inside the Union, are treated within the framework of the CFSP.98 How can we then pretend to 
avoid third States form raising questions which relate to EC exclusive competence in the framework of 
this dialogue? 
 It should not be necessary to underline that the right approach is precisely the opposite of the 
one that comes from asking the question to what pillar a certain issue belongs. The issue must be 
analyzed from all possible angles in order to obtain the best solution. When various possible angles 
give different ways of action, then this approach implies a difficulty, namely that it has to guarantee 
coherence among the various ways of action. But politicians, senior civil servants, and jurists are paid 
by taxpayers to resolve these kinds of difficulties and not to find the way (intellectually easy but the 
wrong way) of putting each issue in only one of the potential ways of action. 
 
97 Budge, I., Newton, K. et al. The Politics of the New Europe, Longman, 1997. 
98 Hill, C. (ed.) The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy, Routledge, 1996. 
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B.1.- The European Community In The World Trade Organization: An Overview99 
Let us start with a historical introduction of the WTO and its evolution. “At times it seemed doomed to 
fail. But in the end, the Uruguay Round brought about the biggest reform of the world’s trading system 
since GATT was created at the end of World War II. And yet, despite its troubled progress, the Uruguay 
Round did see some early results. Within only two years, participants had agreed on a package of cuts in 
import duties on tropical products — which are mainly exported by developing countries. They had also 
revised the rules for settling disputes, with some measures implemented on the spot. And they called for 
regular reports on GATT members’ trade policies, a move considered important for making trade regimes 
transparent around the world.”100 
There are three main purposes to the WTO: “the system’s overriding purpose is (i) to help trade 
flow as freely as possible — so long as there are no undesirable side-effects. That partly means removing 
obstacles. It also means ensuring that individuals, companies and governments know what the trade rules 
are around the world, and giving them the confidence that there will be no sudden changes of policy. In 
other words, the rules have to be “transparent” and predictable.”101 Because the agreements are drafted 
and signed by the community of trading nations, often after considerable debate and controversy, one of 
the WTO’s most important functions is (ii) to serve as a forum for trade negotiations. A third important 
side to the WTO’s work is (iii) dispute settlement. It is a fact that in international trade negotiations there 
 
99 Farrell, M. EU and WTO Regulatory Frameworks: Complementarity or Competition?, Kogan Page European Dossier 
Series, 1999; Sack, “The EC’s Membership of International Organisations,” 32 Common Market Law Review 1227 (1995); 
Reich, “Judge-made ‘Europe a la carte’: some remarks on recent conflicts between European and German constitutional law 
provoked by the bananas litigation,” Europan Journal of International Law 103 (1996); Kuijper, P.J. “The Conclusion and 
Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results by the EC,” 6 European Journal of International Law, 222 (1995); Everling, 
“Will Europe Slip on Bananas? The Bananas judgments of the ECJ and national courts,” 33 Common Market Law Review 401 
(1996); Cottier, T. & Schefer, “The Relationship Between World Trade Organization Law, National and Regional Law,” 1 
Journal of International Economic Law 83 (1998); Pescatore, P. “Opinion 1/94 on ‘Conclusion’ of the WTO Agreement: is 
there an escape from a programmed disaster? 36 Common Market Law Review 387 (1999); Princen, S. “EC Compliance with 
WTO Law: The Interplay of Law and Politics,” 15 European Journal of International Law, 555-74 (2004). 
100 See World Trade Organization, “Understanding the WTO: Basics. The Uruguay Round,” in 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm (last visited November 24, 2004). 
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is unequal balance of power between smaller states and bigger states.102 “Trade relations often involve 
conflicting interests. Contracts and agreements, including those painstakingly negotiated in the WTO 
system, often need interpreting. The most harmonious way to settle these differences is through some 
neutral procedure based on an agreed legal foundation. That is the purpose behind the dispute settlement 
process written into the WTO Agreements.”103 
“The WTO began life on 1 January 1995, but its trading system is half a century older. Since 
1948, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) had provided the rules for the system. Before 
long it gave birth to an unofficial, de facto international organization, also known informally as GATT, 
and over the years GATT evolved through several rounds of negotiations. The latest and largest round, 
was the Uruguay Round which lasted from 1986 to 1994 and led to the WTO’s creation. Whereas GATT 
had mainly dealt with trade in goods, the WTO and its Agreements now cover trade in services, and in 
traded inventions, creations and designs (intellectual property).”104 
As for the EC in the world trading system, it suffices to say that the EC was one of the signatories 
to the Uruguay Round trade Agreement. Thus the EC was committed to make certain changes to the 
policies operating in the EC. The text of the Uruguay Round Agreement, which in itself relates to 
tightening up the rules on preferential trade agreements,105 offers more scope for conflict between the 
 
101 Id.
102 This unequal balance of power is rectified in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, where both parties have equal 
wait before the WTO Panel or Appellate Body and the party with stronger legal arguments (regardless of its negotiating 
capacity) will win the case. For a detailed analysis on the matter, see Andrew T. Guzman and Beth A. Simmons, "POWER 
PLAYS & CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS: THE SELECTION OF DEFENDANTS IN WTO DISPUTES" (February 7, 2005). 
International Legal Studies Program. International Legal Studies Working Papers Series. Paper 6.  
http://repositories.cdlib.org/ils/wp/6 (last visited December 13, 2005). 
103 World Trade Organization, “Understanding the WTO: Basics. What is the World Trade Organization?,” in 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited July 27, 2005). 
104 Id.
105 Peers, S. “Banana Split: WTO Law and Preferential Agreements in the EC Legal Order,” 4 European Foreign Affairs 
Review 195 (1994); Berkey, “The European Court of Justice and Direct Effect for the GATT: A Question Worht Revising,” 
Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper 3/98; Cremona, M. “EC External Commercial Policy after Amsterdam: Authority and 
Interpretation within Interconnected Legal Orders,” in Weiler, J.H.H. (ed.) Towards a Common Law of International Trade? 
The EU, the WTO and the NAFTA, Oxford University Press, 2000; Griller, S. “Judicial Enforceability of WTO Law in the 
Europena Union: Annotation to case C-149/96 Portugal v Council,” 3 Journal of International Economic Law 441 (2000); Van 
den Broek, “Legal Persuation, Political Realism and Legitimacy: The European Court’s Recent Treatment of the Effect of the 
WTO Agreements in the EC Legal Order,” 4 Journal of International Economic Law 411 (2001); Eeckhout, P. “Judicial 
Enforcement of WTO Law in the European Union – Some further reflections,” 5 Journal of International Economic Law 91 
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WTO and the EC than do any other areas for the agreement bearing more directly on individual EC 
policies, since it challenges the essence of the EU.106 
When looking at the history of the EC external trade relations, one sees that the EC was not a 
contracting party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (GATT). European countries such 
as France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (but not Italy and Germany) 
were founding contracting parties to GATT 1947. Subsequently, all EC Member States became full 
members of such an institution. Over the years, the EC has become a full member and a contracting party 
to the GATT/WTO. Accession protocols and trade agreements negotiated in the GATT framework 
provided in their final provisions that the agreements were open for acceptance by contracting parties to 
the GATT and by the EC. In addition, the substantive and procedural provisions of these agreements treat 
the EC like a GATT contracting party. 
Furthermore, since 1970, most agreements negotiated in the framework of GATT were accepted 
by the EC alone, without acceptance by EC Member States. The only exceptions are two agreements at 
the end of the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations and the part of the Tariff Protocol relating 
to European Coal and Steel Communty (ECSC) products.107 The EC exercised all rights and fulfilled 
almost all obligations under GATT law in its own name like a GATT contracting party. Since the 1960s 
all GATT contracting parties had accepted such exercise of rights and fulfillment of obligations by the EC 
and had asserted their own GATT rights, even in dispute settlement proceedings relating to measures of 
 
(2002); Eeckhout, P. “The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreements: Interconnecting Legal Systems,” 34 Common 
Market Law Review 11 (1997); Denza, E. “The Community as a member of international organisations,” in Emiliou & 
O’Keeffe, D. (eds.) The European Union and World Trade Law after the GATT Uruguay Round, Wiley, 1996; Cremona, M. 
“Rhetoric and Reticence: EU External Commercial Policy in a Multilateral Context,” 38 Common Market Law Review 359 
(2001); Snyder, F. “The Gatekeeprs: The European Courts and the WTO,” 40 Common Market Law Review 313 (2003). 
106 Mary Farrell, EU AND WTO REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS: COMPLENTARITY OR COMPETITION?, Kogan 
Page, 1999, p. 13. 
107 Jaques H.J. Bourgeois, “The Tokyo Round Agreements on Technical Barriers and on Government Procurement,” 19 CML 
Rev 5, 22 (1982). 
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individual EC Member States, almost always against the EC.108 The EC has replaced, with the consent of 
other GATT contracting parties, its Member States as bearers of rights and obligations under the GATT. 
Years later came the Agreement establishing the WTO, which recognizes the EC's membership 
alongside the EU Member States. Under Article XI of the WTO Agreement, the EC and its Member 
States became original members to the WTO of their own right.109 The EC is, without a doubt, a major 
actor in the WTO, thanks to speaking with a single voice in the world trading system and in the WTO. 
Facts speak for themselves: the EC of 15 represented the world’s largest trading bloc. In 2002, it 
amounted to 37.3% of exports and 34.9% of imports in world merchandise trade. With respect to services 
trade, the EC accounted for 43.2% of exports and 41.6% of imports. With the 2004 EU enlargement to 25 
members, these figures have increased.110 
In relation to voting rights inside the WTO – voting de facto never happens, since decisions in the 
WTO are taken by consensus - the EC has a number of votes equal to the number of its Member States.111 
The vote in areas of exclusive EC competence should not pose a problem in principle, whereas 
difficulties may arise in areas of shared competence, especially in the absence of a common position 
among the EU Member States together with the EC. 
 
108 E.U. Petersmann, The EEC as a GATT Member –Legal Conflicts between GATT law and European Community Law, in 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT 23 at 37-8 (M. Hilf, F.G. Jacobs & E.U. Petersmann, 1986). 
109 Article XI of the WTO Agreement reads: 
 
1.The contracting parties to GATT 1947 as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement, and the European Communities, 
which accept this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements and for which Schedules of Concessions and 
Commitments are annexed to GATT 1994 and for which Schedules of Specific Commitments are annexed to GATS shall 
become original Members of the WTO.  
 
2.The least-developed countries recognized as such by the United Nations will only be required to undertake commitments and 
concessions to the extent consistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs or their administrative and 
institutional capabilities. 
110 See Cottier, T. & Oesch, M. International Trade Regulation. Law and Policy in the WTO, the European Union and 
Switzerland. Cases, Materials and Comments, Cameron May, 2005, p. 235. 
111 Article IX of the Agreement Establishing the WTO reads: “[W]here the European Communities exercise their right to vote, 
they shall have a number of votes equal to the number of their member States which are Members of the WTO.” 
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B.2.- The Diagnosis: Polycephalous (and Polyphonic?) Anatomy of the EC in the WTO
During the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, the EC was faced with the issue of the 
scope of its authority under the EC Treaty in the field of international economic relations, particularly 
with respect to trade in services112 and intellectual property rights.113 Negotiations were conducted 
according to the normal procedures for GATT negotiations, albeit that the European Commission 
negotiated on behalf of both the EC and its Member States.114 By creating the WTO as an international 
organization, formal international consequences emerged in several respects: first of all, the fact that the 
EC would become a member of the WTO; second of all, the EC would replace the EU Member States.  
With regard to the latter point, two constraints of a political nature led the European Commission 
not to stand up. The first constraint was the fact that the matter was discussed in a meeting of the EU 
Council in November 1993, after the Maastricht Treaty had entered into effect with some difficulty and it 
was thought wise not to push this issue at that stage. The second political constraint was that around this 
time, the Council had not yet approved the Uruguay Round and Sir Leon Brittan thought it was preferable 
not to put on the table another contentious issue. A result was the creation of Article XI of the Marrakesh 
Agreement establishing the WTO, which states that the contracting parties to GATT 1947 and the 
European Communities shall become original Members of the WTO.115 
This dual membership of the EC and its Member States in the WTO (which creates a European 
polycephalous approach to the WTO, i.e., 25 EU Member States and the European Communities, but not 
polyphonic, since by the time they reach the WTO, European nations have found a common position to 
speak with a single voice) may be an open door for abuse by other WTO members, and a handicap for 
 
112 Mengozzi, P. “Trade in Services and Commercial Policy,” in Maresceau, M. (ed.) The European Community’s Commercial 
Policy after 1992, pp. 223-47, (1993). 
113 See Govaere, I. “Intellectual Property Protection and Commercial Policy,” in Maresceau, M. (ed.) The European 
Community’s Commercial Policy after 1992, pp. 197-222, (1993); Demiray, P. “Intellectual Property and the External Power 
of the European Community: The New Dimension,” 16 Michigan Journal of International Law, pp. 187-239, (1994). 
114 P. van den Bossche, The European Community and the Uruguay Round Agreements, in IMPLEMENTING THE 
URUGUAY ROUND, 23 at 56-7 (John H. Jackson & A. Sykes eds., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997). 
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both the EC and its Member States.116 The fact that the EC Member States are WTO Members together 
with the EC poses questions in relation to the position of the European Court of Justice to the WTO law. 
As far as GATT 1947 was concerned, and as a result of the substitution of the EC for the Member States 
in relation to commitments under GATT, the European Court of Justice would have the final word on the 
interpretation of the GATT provisions, even in relation to the compatibility of Member States legislation 
with GATT.117 However, this argument is no longer possible. In accordance with Article XI of the 
Agreement establishing the WTO, both the EC and its Member States signed the Final Act. 
The European Court of Justice has stated that the division of powers between the EC and its 
Member States is a domestic question in which third parties have no need to intervene.118 In the minutes 
of the Council meeting 7/8 March 1994, the Commission relied on this argument by saying that: “The 
Final Act...and the Agreements thereto fall exclusively within the competence of the European 
Community.”119 This argument does not allow the a sensu contrario inference that because the Member 
States and the EC are formally WTO Members, it is irrelevant for the division of powers within the EC 
legal system. On the contrary, the Agreement establishing the WTO and the agreements that form part of 
it were approved by the Council on behalf of the EC expressly “as regards matters within its 
competence.”120 Therefore, the need for a useful raison d’etre regarding the joint WTO membership of 
the EC and the Member States is inevitable. It must have something to do with the division of powers 
within the EC. 
Certain trade agreements deal with matters in respect of which both the Community and its 
Member States have competence. In these cases, the Court of Justice has stressed the duty of cooperation 
 
115 World Trade Organization, The Uruguay Round Results. The Legal Texts. (Geneva,1995), 6. 
116 See generally Footer, M.E. “The EU and the WTO Global Trading System,” in Laurent, P.-H. & Maresceau, M. (eds.) The 
State of the European Union Vol. 4. Deepening and Widening, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. 
117 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Società Petrolifera Italiana (SPI) and SpA Michelin Italiana (SAMI) 1983 
E.C.R. 801, paras 15 and 17. 
118 Ruling 1/78, 1978 E.C.R. 2151, para. 35. 
119 Cited in the ECJ Opinion 1/94, 1994 E.C.R. I-5267, para. 5. 
120 Council Decision of 22 December 1998 (OJ 1994 L 336/1). 
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that exists between the Community and the Member States. I shall explore some of the problems that this 
raises in practice. 
 
III. Allocation of Competences between the EC and its Member States121 
The issue of allocation of competences is an internal question for the EC.122 Leaving aside trade policy 
(where the EC competences should be co-extensive with the WTO) and human rights (where the EC 
should be given a general competence to adopt any measure which would increase the protection of 
human rights within the sphere of application of EC law),123 the EC does not require any increase in its 
substantive jurisdiction. The issue of allocation of competences is nevertheless a central concern and 
 
121 For a general overview on division of powers, see Simeon, R. Division of Powers and Public Policy, University of Toronto 
Press, 1985. 
122 Freeman, E. “The Division of Powers Between the European Communities and the Member States,” 30 Current Legal 
Problems, pp. 159-73 (1977). 
123 Alston, P. & Weiler, J.H.H. “An ‘Ever Closer Union’ in Need of a Human Rights Policy: The European Union and Human 
Rights,” in Alston, P. (ed.) The EU and Human Rights, Oxford University Press, 1999. For further analyses on the external 
dimension of EU human rights policy, see Fierro, The EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice, Nijhoff, 
2003; Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, Polity Press, 2003, chapter 5; Cremona, M. “Human 
Rights and Democracy Clauses in the EC’s Trade Agreements,” in Emiliou, N. & O’Keeffe, D. The European Union and 
World Trade Law. After the GATT Uruguay Round, Wiley, 1996; Cremona, M. “The EU and the External Dimension of 
Human Rights Policy,” in Konstadinidis (ed.) EC – International Law Forum III, Dartmouth Press, 1998; Smith, “The Use of 
Political Conditionality in the EU’s Relations with Third Countries: How Effective?” 3 European Foreign Affairs Review 253 
(1998); Brandtner & Rosas, A. “Human Rights and the External Relations of the European Community: An Analysis of 
Doctrine and Practice,” 9 European Journal of International Law 468 (1998); Ward, “Frameworks for Cooperation between 
the European Union and Third States: A Viable Matrix for Uniform Human Rights Standards?” 3 European Foreign Affairs 
Review 505 (1998); McGoldrick, D. “The EU after Amsterdam: An Organisation with General Human Rights Competence?” 
in O’Keeffe, D. & Twomey (eds.) Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty, Hart, 1999; Brandtner & Rosas, A. “Trade 
Preferences and Human Rights,” in Alston, P. (ed.) The EU and Human Rights, Oxford University Press, 1999; Reidel & Will, 
“Human Rights Clauses in External Agreements of the EC,” in Alston, P. (ed.) The EU and Human Rights, Oxford University 
Press, 19999; Dev-Chin Horng, “The Human Rights Clause in the EU’s External Trade and Development Agreements,” 9 
European Law Journal 677 (2003); Kuyper, P.J. “Trade Sanctions, Security and Human Rights and Commercial Policy,” in 
Maresceau, M. (ed.) The European Community’s Commercial Policy after 1992: The Legal Dimension, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1993; Cullen, “The Limits of International Trade Mechanims in Enforcing Human Rights: The Case of Child 
Labour,” 7 International Journal of Children’s Rights 1 (1999); Clapham, “Where is the EU’s Human Rights Common 
Foreign Policy…?” in Alston, P. (ed.) The EU and Human Rights, Oxford University Press, 1999; Alston, P. & Weiler, J.H.H. 
“An ‘Ever Closer Union’ in Need of a Human Rights Policy: The European Union and Human Rights,” Jean Monnet Working 
Paper 1/99, 1999, available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/990101.html (last visited August 31, 2006); 
Weiller, J.H.H. & Fries, S.C. “A Human Rights Policy for the European Community and Union: The Question of 
Competences,” Jean Monnet Working Paper 4/99, 1999, available at 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/990401.html (last visited August 31, 2006); Youngs, “European Union 
Democracy Promotion Policies: Ten Years On,” 6 European Foreign Affairs Review 355 (2001); Cottier, T. “Trade and 
Human Rights: A Relationship to Discover,” 5 Journal of International Economic Law 111 (2002). 
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enflames high emotion among the general public,124 who fear the encroachment of supranational action 
into areas of national heritage, power, and tradition.125 As suggested by Griller and Weidel, it is “another 
manifestation of the struggle for power between the EC and its Member States.”126 Third States should 
not mind, but practice demonstrates that they do: it is more difficult to speak with 26 voices (25 EU 
Member States) than with one single voice (the EC). Additionally, as argued by Lukaschek and Weidel, 
the “complicated system [of allocation of competences in the EU] is hardly ascertainable for the outside 
world and might entail uncertainty and confusion for third countries about the identity and authority of 
their negotiation partner.”127 Furthermore, being divided but united can give the EC an edge in 
international bargaining. It is well-known that foreign trade policy and internal market policies require 
close coordination. However, in the case of the EC, its nature makes this obviousness more challenging 
 
124 Authors such as Joseph Weiler believe that the issue of competences in the EU remains highly sensitive. The post-
Maastricht public debate demonstrated a clear public distrust in the ability of the EU institutions to guarantee the limits to EU 
influence on public life. Many people have tried to nail down EC competences. At the same time, efforts have been made to 
increase public confidence in the jurisdictional limits of the EC and EU. See Weiler, J.H.H. “The Division of Competences in 
the European Union,” European Parliament, Directorate General for Research, Working Paper, Political Series, W-26, 1997, p. 
i. 
125 Interestingly, German constitutional Judge Siegfried Bross has called for a separate court to judge on disputes over 
competences. In his opinion, the European Court of Justice cannot do this as it may not rule on national constitutional law, and 
the equivalent national courts may not do it as they cannot rule on interpretation of European law. Cases on economics law, 
competition law or health law will become more common in the future when the EU will claim more and more competences 
for itself. The subsidiarity principle – which says that the EU should only act if the goal cannot be better achieved by the EU 
Member States – offers no relief to the competence confusion, according to Judge Bross. This is so because once the EU 
Member States transfer powers to the supranational level, they implicitly acknowledge that it is better done at the EU level and 
cannot invoke the subsidiarity principle at a later stage. For instance, monetary policy in the EU. 
 Joseph Weiler and Franz Mayer have also proposed a similar idea: the creation of a Constitutional Council for the EU, 
modeled on its French namesake. The Constitutional Council would have jurisdiction only over issues of competences 
(including subsidiarity) and would decide cases submitted to it after a law was adopted, but before coming into force. It could 
be seized by any EU institution, any EU Member State or by the European Parliament acting on a majority of its members. Its 
President would be the President of the European Court of Justice and its members would be sitting members of the 
constitutional courts or their equivalents in the EU Member States. Within the Constitutional Council, no single EU Member 
State would have a veto power. The composition would also underscore that the question of competences is fundamentally one 
of national constitutional norms, but still subject to a Union solution by a Union institution. Although this idea of creating a 
Constitutional Council for the EU may seem as an attack on the ECJ, Weiler claims that such a view is myopic and fails to 
appreciate that the issue of competences is already bringing a shift in the position of the ECJ. See Weiler, J.H.H. “The Division 
of Competences in the European Union,” European Parliament, Directorate General for Research, Working Paper, Political 
Series, W-26, 1997, pp. iii and 62. 
126 See Griller, S. & Weidel, B. “External Economic Relations and Foreign Policy in the European Union,” in Griller, S. & 
Weidel, B. (eds.) External Economic Relations and Foreign Policy in the European Union, Springer, 2002, p. 15. 
127 See Lukaschek, A. & Weidel, B. “Exclusive External Competence of the European Community,” in Griller, S. & Weidel, 
B. (eds.) External Economic Relations and Foreign Policy in the European Union, Springer, 2002, p. 140. 
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from a constitutional viewpoint.128 The separation of powers between the EC and its Member States, and 
among the EU institutions, remains an unsolved issue in external trade regulation. Oftentimes, the EU’s 
institutional and structural peculiarities are more of a constraint than a strategic advantage. 
 
A.- Principal-Agent Theory and International Negotiations
The delegation of competences in the EC can be explained through the Principal-Agent theory. This 
theory has only recently been applied to the context of negotiations.129 According to this theory, agency 
costs can be due, inter alia, to information asymmetries. In other words, agents know more about their 
duties than their principals do. In the context of negotiations, we would speak of agency costs because the 
negotiator knows more than the principal about the constraints of external negotiations.130 Often, agency 
costs also may occur because the agent’s interests may not be the same as those of her or his principals. 
The challenge is to create institutional arrangements to minimize such agency costs.131 
The question to analyze is who should speak for the EC in international trade negotiations. 
According to Meunier and Nicolaïdis, the answer depends on the kind of relationship which has been 
established between the spokesperson (European Commission) and its principals (EU Member States) as 
well as on the phase at which the negotiation is.132 For the study of the allocation of EC competences in 
trade policy-making, we will first make a brief note on the evolution of EC trade policy, and then apply 
 
128 See Cremona, M. “The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union and the External Relations Powers of 
the European Community,” in O’Keeffe, D. & Twomey, P. (eds.) Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty, London, 1994, pp. 
247-58. 
129 Sophie Meunier & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Who Speaks for Europe? The Delegation of Trade Authority in the EU, 37/3 J. 
COMMON MKT. STUDIES 477-501 (1999) and R. MNOOKIN, L. SUSSKIND & P. FOSTER (eds.) NEGOTIATING ON 
BEHALF OF OTHERS, (London, Sage) (1999). 
130KALIPSO NICOLAÏDIS, Minimizing Agency Costs in Two-Level Games: The Controversies over Trade Authority in the 
United States and the European Union, in R. MNOOKIN ET AL. NEGOTIATING ON BEHALF OF OTHERS, (London, 
Sage) (1999). 
131 Sophie Meunier & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, “EU Trade Policy: The Exclusive versus Shared Competence Debate,” in The State 
of the European Union. Risks, Reform, Resistance and Revival, Vol. 5, 327 (Maria Green Cowles & Michael Smith eds., 2000), 
at p. 328. 
132 Sophie Meunier & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, “EU Trade Policy: The Exclusive versus Shared Competence Debate,” in Maria 
Green Cowles & Michael Smith (eds.) The State of the European Union. Risks, Reform, Resistance and Revival, Vol. 5, 327 
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the principal-agent theory to understand the modes of control and the difference between exclusive and 
shared competence in the EU. 
There is no definition in the Treaties as to the areas that do lie within exclusive EC competence. 
Defining the respective boundaries of competence is compounded by the fact that in a number of areas 
the EC shares competence with its Member States. This difficulty of allocating competences is further 
compounded by the presence of the implied powers provision which appears in Article 308 EC133 and the 
liberal construction given to this by the European Court of Justice.134 Also when one considers the 
division of competence between the EC and its Member States from an explicitly normative perspective, 
the difficulty becomes even more marked.135 The criteria which ought to govern this issue,136 and its 
institutional ramifications,137 are controversial. 
 
B.- Legislative Competence
If it had been ratified by the EU Member States, the EU Constitutional Treaty would have brought 
significant changes to the system of competences in the EU. It would have looked like a competence 
catalogue, with the main advantage of being less vague than the current situation of not knowing clearly 
who does what. This catalogue approach would have resembled the German Constitution system.138 The 
 
(2000). 
133 Former Article 235 EC. For an analysis of Article 308 EC, see Kramer, L. EC Treaty and Environmental Law, 2nd edition, 
London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1994; Close, G. “Harmonisation of Laws: Use or Abuse of the Powers under the EEC Treaty?” 3 
European Law Review, pp. 461-81, (1978). 
134 Joseph Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, (1991) 100 YALE LAW JOURNAL 2403, 2445-2446; Barav, A. “The 
Division of External Relations Powers between the European Community and the Member States in the Case-Law of the Court 
of Justice,” in Timmermans & Voelker (eds.) Division of Powers between the European Communities and their Member States 
in the Field of External Relations, Deventer, Kluwer, 1981, pp. 29-64. 
135 Paul Craig, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and the European Union, EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 7, No. 2, June 
2001, pp. 125-150, at 143. 
136 Contrast F. Vibert, “How not to Write a Constitution-The Maastricht/Amsterdam Treaties” (1999) 10 CONSTITUTIONAL 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 152, with Weiler, J.H.H. “The Division of Competences in the European Union,” European 
Parliament, Directorate-General for Research, Working Paper, Political Series W 26, 1997. 
137 J. Weiler, “European Constitutionalism: In Search of Foundations for the European Constitutional Order” (1996) XLIV 
Political Studies 517. 
138 In Germany, Article 73 of the Constitution enumerates the competences of the federal legislator. In addition, there is a 
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EC enjoys only those powers conferred on it by the Treaties (Article 5 EC).139 Four types of legislative 
competence140 are conferred upon the EC: exclusive, shared, complementary, and national competence. 
Since the EC Treaty does not provide a definition, these may be defined as follows: 
 
B.1.- Exclusive EC Competence
The EC enjoys exclusive competence when it alone is able to adopt rules in an area. Any intervention by 
the Member States is excluded unless it has the authorization of the EU institutions or where there is a 
lacuna needing to be filled. The areas where the EC has exclusive competence are the following: common 
commercial policy (to the extent existing prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice); living marine 
resources in the zones covered by the Treaty; establishment of the common customs tariff;141 monetary 
policy for the twelve Member States in the euro area;142 in addition, those areas which become areas of 
 
catalogue of concurring competences and frame competences. Furthermore, there is a structural principle laid down in Article 
72 of the Constitution. Concurring competences in the German model means that the Laender have competence so long as the 
federal legislator has not taken action. The catalogue of concurring competences is combined with a structural principle: the 
federal power is only allowed to take action in order to enhance economic and legal unity, as well as uniformity of social 
conditions (Article 72 of the German Constitution). The catalogue of concurring competences has to be read in conjunction 
with the rule that federal law overrules state law. 
139 Article 5 EC reads:  
 
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it 
therein. 
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle 
of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. 
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty. 
140 Legislative competence refers to the adoption of legislative texts in the literal sense or the creation of legal obligations by 
the EU institutions (“secondary legislation”) based directly on the Treaties of the European Communities (“primary 
legislation”). 
141 Usher, J. “Consequences of the Customs Union,” in Emiliou & O’Keeffe, D. The European Union and World Trade Law 
after the GATT Uruguay Round, Wiley, 1996; Vermulst & Waer, “EC Rules of Origin as Commercial Policy Instruments?” 3 
Journal of World Trade 55 (1990); Vander Schueren, “Tariff Classification: An Instrument of EC Trade Policy,” 2 European 
Foreign Affairs Review 255 (1997). 
142 Zilioli, C. & Selmayr, M. “The External Relations of the Euro Area: Legal Aspects,” 36 Common Market Law Review, 289 
(1999); Dutheil de la Rochere, J. “Constitutional Aspects and External Representation,” 19 Yearbook of European Law, 441 
(1999-2000); Hermann, C.W. “Monetary Sovereignty over the Euro and External Relations of the Euro Area: Competences, 
Procedures and Practice,” 7 European Foreign Affairs Review, 18 (2002). 
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exclusive competence because the EC legislates extensively in the area concerned on the basis of its 
shared competence.143 
Although the EC competence is in principle allocated to it explicitly by the Treaties, the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) has taken the view that in some cases competence flows implicitly from the EC 
Treaty texts or their general structure.144 These tend to be cases in which competence is necessary to 
implement aims set by the Treaties, especially in the field of external relations.145 The EC only has the 
powers accorded to it under the Treaties.146 All other powers thus reside with the Member States. A 
clause to this effect, redolent of that to be found in the U.S. Constitution,147 could then be included within 
a European Constitution. This could undoubtedly be done. It would however only serve to mask, or push 
further back, the issues that really serve to define the powers of the EU and the Member States.148 
The idea of giving certain competences exclusively to the EC was a creation of the ECJ’s case-
law.149 The Court has specified that EU Member States were no longer allowed to adopt legislative 
measures or to independently conclude treaties with third countries since the EC power was exclusive. 
However, in other cases, the ECJ held that certain competences were not exclusive EC competences, 
which means that it did not prevent EU Member States from acting.150 This said, it is fair to acknowledge 
 
143 The European Convention, The Secretariat, Discussion Paper: “Delimitation of Competence between the European Union 
and the Member States. –Existing System, Problems and Avenues to be Explored, CON 47/02, kin/MM/ac, p. 6. 
144 Bengoetxea, J. The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice: Towards a European Jurisprudence, Oxford 
University Press, 1993. 
145 The European Convention, The Secretariat, Discussion Paper: “Delimitation of Competence between the European Union 
and the Member States. –Existing System, Problems and Avenues to be Explored,” CON 47/02, kin/MM/ac, p. 9. 
146 A. Dashwood, The Limits of European Community Powers (Cambridge Centre for European Legal Studies, 1995). 
147 United States Constitution, 10th Amendment: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” 
148 Paul Craig, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and the European Union, EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 7, No. 2, June 
2001, pp. 125-150, at 143. 
149 Among the authors that have studied this issue are: Pescatore, P. “External Relations in the Case Law of the ECJ,” 16 
Common Market Law Review, p. 615, 1979; Groux, J. “Le Parallelisme des Competences Internes et Externes de la CE,” 
Cahiers de Droit Europeen, p. 1, 1978; Kovar, “Contribution de la Cour de Justice au developpement de la condition 
internationale de la Communaute europeenne,” Cahiers de Droit Europeen, p. 527, 1978; Boulois, J. “La Jurisprudence de la 
Cour de Justice des Communautes europeennes relative aux relations exterieures des Communautes,” 160 Hague Recueil, pp. 
333-93, 1978 II. 
150 See in this debate Emiliou, “The Death of Exclusive Competence?” 21 European Law Review, 294 (1996); Weiler, J.H.H. 
“The External Legal Relations of non-unitary Actors: Mixity and the Federal Principle,” in Weiler, J.H.H. The Constitution of 
Europe: Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?,” Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 130-87; O’Keeffe, D. “Community 
and Member State Competence in External Relations Agreements of the EU,” 4 European Foreign  Affairs Review, 7 (1994); 
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that the list of exclusive EC competence is very limited.151 In any case, the debate in the legal literature 
over the meaning of exclusive EC competence seems to be inconclusive to date.152 
Since the then European Economic Community (EEC) founding fathers153 chose a customs union 
as the way to proceed towards a unified Europe,154 a common trade policy vis-à-vis the rest of the world 
was inevitable.155 The Community has retained exclusive competence in almost all issues in this field, 
and the European Commission acts on behalf of the EC with a qualified majority vote from the Council. 
However, on some trade issues, Member States have competence (despite the “exclusive” EC competence 
in commercial policy). For example, in the concluding phases of the Uruguay Round (General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade, of October 30, 1947),156 the full stature of the EC in global trade affairs was 
displayed for the first time as the world spotlight fell on the EC and the U.S. hammering out the final 
deal.157 
It was at that moment that an internal debate arose between the EU Member States and the 
European Commission about the coverage of the existing commercial policy provisions of Article 133 
EC158 in the areas of intellectual property and services. The Commission negotiated the Uruguay Round 
and the competence issue between the EC and its Member States had been bracketed. As we will see later 
 
Timmermans, “Organizing Joint Participation of EC and Member States,” in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. (eds.) The General 
Law of EC External Relations, Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, p. 239 ff; Hyett, S. “The duty of cooperation: A flexible concept,” in 
Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. (eds.) The General Law of EC External Relations, Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, p. 248 ff; Govare, 
Capiau & Vermeersch, “In-Between Seats: The Participation of the EU in International Organisations,” 9 European Foreign 
Affairs Review, 155 (2004). 
151 Pescatore, P. “Les Relations Exterieures des Communautes Europeennes,” 103 Recueil des Cours, pp. 1-244, (1961-II). 
152 For a larger debate on the issue, see G. de Burca, “Reappraising subsidiarity’s significance after Amsterdam,” Harvard 
Jean Monnet Working Paper 7/1999, http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org. 
153 In the years following World War II, people like Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman dreamed of uniting the peoples of 
Europe in lasting peace and friendship. Over the following fifty years, as the EU was built, their dream became reality. That is 
why they are called the “founding fathers” of the European Union. 
154 A customs union, or CU, can be defined as full trade liberalization between two countries/regions, plus a single external 
tariff. The customs union is one of the key components of the European Union, whereby non-EU countries exporting products 
to the EU are charged the same tariff regardless of which EU country is importing the goods. This made life simpler for traders 
and cut down their paperwork. The EU also concluded a customs union with Turkey in 1995, aiming at the free circulation of 
manufactured goods between the EU and Turkey. 
155 NEIL MACCORMICK, BEYOND THE SOVEREIGN STATE, 56 Mod. L. Rev. 1 (1993). 
156 General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, TIAS No. 1700, 55 UNTS 187. 
157 Rosas, A. “The External Relations of the European Union: Problems and Challenges” in The Forum for US-EU Legal-
Economic Affairs, The Mentor Group, 1998, pp.59-71. 
158 TEC Article 133, as amended by the TEU. 
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in greater detail, when the European Court of Justice was consulted, it stated in Opinion 1/94 that only 
certain aspects of the two sectors could be considered as falling under Article 133 EC, and thereby under 
the EC’s exclusive competence.159 During the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) that produced the 
Treaty of Amsterdam,160 the Commission, reacting against Opinion 1/94, made a proposal to enlarge the 
scope of the relevant treaty provisions to explicitly include services and intellectual property.161 The 
Member States refused because they still wanted their participation in international trade agreements.162 
In this respect, one can argue that Opinion 1/94 represents a step backwards in what had been, until then, 
the successful development of the EC common commercial policy. 
 The Community as a whole is greater than the sum of its parts. According to Mavroidis, even 
Germany, the EC’s leading economy, has much more weight as part of the EC than it would by itself in 
international economic relations.163 The general assumption seems to be that the EC combined as a single 
voice would be more powerful than divided into 26 voices164 (one from the European Commission acting 
on behalf of the EU institutions and 25 other voices from each of the EU Member States).165 A sensu 
contrario, the old and successful military strategy “divide and conquer”166 should be a sign for the EU to 
 
159 Opinion 1/94, 1994 E.C.R. I-5267, I-5401; [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 205, 316. 
160 The Treaty of Amsterdam is the result of the Intergovernmental Conference launched at the Turin European Council on 29 
March 1996. It was adopted at the Amsterdam European Council on 16 and 17 June 1997 and signed on 2 October 1997 by the 
Foreign Ministers of the then fifteen EU Member States. It entered into force on 1 May 1999 (the first day of the second month 
following ratification by the last Member State) after ratification by all the Member States in accordance with their respective 
constitutional requirements. 
161 Alan Dashwood, External Relations Provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty, 35 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1019 (1998). 
162 For a general discussion on this issue, see Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, The EC in the WTO and Advisory Opinion 1/94: An 
Echternach Procession, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. (1995). 
163 Mavroidis, P. “Lexcalibur: The House that Joe Built”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 38, 2000, Number 3, 
at p. 674. 
164 President Lincoln’s injunction “United we stand, divided we fall” can be extrapolated for the case of the EC's external trade 
relations to illustrate my argument. Abraham Lincoln used this idea in a speech before the American Civil War, when he 
referred to a Biblical statement that a house divided against itself cannot stand. Pascal Lamy often used this injuction when he 
was EU trade commissioner to justify a larger delegation of trade competence by the EU Member States to the EU 
supranational level. It implies that institutional rules, which allow the EU Member States to make decisions more quickly and 
the Commission to represent Member States internationally in a united manner, give the collective entity an edge ini 
international bargaining. 
165 The same argument is expressed by Leivo in Leivo, K. “The Need for an Exclusive External Competence of the European 
Community with Regard to International Trade in Services,’ Working Papers, College of Europe, European University Press, 
Brussels, 1996. 
166 Derived from the Latin saying divide et impera, it can mean in politics a strategy to gain or maintain power by breaking up 
larger concentrations of power into chunks that individually have less power than the one implementing the strategy. In reality, 
it often refers to a strategy where small power groups are prevented from linking up and becoming more powerful, since it is 
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avoid disunity. The tendency in trade policy seems to be toward exclusive EC (“EU” after the 
Constitutional Treaty) competence with the changes brought by the EU Constitutional Treaty. 
One important mechanism for coordinating a single voice is the creation of European “policy 
units.”167 Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, initiated this idea. Academics from various 
European countries including Germany, France and Spain have been asked to participate in this initiative. 
This shows that Britain is still committed to Europe. Authors such as Peter Mandelson and Bodo 
Hombach believe that collaboration will increase the likelihood of a European federal superstate. In the 
same line, Mark Leonard believes that the EU needs to have a single debate in the European Union rather 
than 25 separate national debates, one for each Member State. 
That said, the progressive centralization of European Community trade policy and its generally effective 
pursuit in international negotiations has not disguised vigorous differences of policy and priorities among 
the Member States. These differences do not make the European Community an easy partner in 
negotiations.168 
B.2.- Shared Competence
Shared competence covers areas where Member States may legislate until such time and insofar as the EC 
has not yet exercised its powers by adopting rules. Once the EC has legislated in such an area, Member 
States may no longer legislate in the field covered by this legislation, except to the extent necessary to 
implement it, and the legislative rules adopted have priority over those of the Member States. EC 
competence thus becomes exclusive through its exercise.169 With respect to shared competence, Meny 
 
difficult to break up existing power structures. Effective use of this technique allows those with little real power to control 
those who collectively have a lot of power (or would have much power, if they could get united). 
167 See “London is Capital of Third Way,” in The Independent, on Sunday, 10 January 1999, p. 2. 
168 See Johnson, M. The European Community Trade Policy and the Article 113 Committee, London, Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1998. 
169 The European Convention, The Secretariat, Discussion Paper: “Delimitation of Competence between the European Union 
and the Member States. –Existing System, Problems and Avenues to be Explored,” CON 47/02, kin/MM/ac, p. 7. 
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argues that “since the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the number of shared compentencies –often 
benefiting the Union- has increased considerably, to the point that this is often seen as a creeping 
expropriation of the Member States’ powers.”170 
The EC’s legislative action in those areas is subject to compliance with the principles of 
subsidiarity171 and proportionality.172 Most EC powers fall within this category:173 citizenship of the EU; 
agriculture and fisheries (except for the part under exclusive EC competence); the four freedoms (free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital);174 visas, asylum and immigration;175 transport;176 
170 Y. Meny, ‘The External and Internal Borders of the Great Europe,’ in THE INTERNATIONAL EXPECTATOR, 2/2002, 
pp. 19-25, at. 22. 
171 The principle of subsidiarity regulates the exercise of powers. It is intended to determine whether, in an area where there is 
shared competence, the EC can take action or should leave the matter to the Member States. The principle of subsidiarity hence 
means that EC decisions must be taken as closely as possible to the citizen, and argues, as can be seen in Article 5 EC, that the 
EC should take action only if, and insofar as, the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States and can therefore be better achieved at the EC level. In other words, the EC does not take action (except on 
matters for which it alone is responsible), unless EC action is more effective than action taken at national, regional or local 
level. The subsidiarity principle hence limits Community interventions. The implementation of this principle is subject to ex 
ante control through the assent procedure of national parliaments, but also ex post through the judicial remedy (paragraph 7 of 
the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality). A protocol annexed to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam sets the conditions and application criteria of the subsidiarity and proportionality principles. This protocol 
specially provides for: 
the obligation to justify and legislative proposal by proving its compliance with the subsidiary principles; 
guidelines; 
the obligation to present an annual report; and  
a procedure of verification by the Council and European Parliament. 
In order to take better account of the subsidiarity principle, the Commission set out several rules it its annual reports “To Better 
Legislate” (1997-1999), in particular regarding consultation of interested parties, improvement in the drafting quality of texts, 
and simplification of existing legislation. The report “To Better Legislate 2000” introduced the implementation of principles 
on subsidiarity. 
172 The principle of proportionality implies that any action by the EC should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of the EC Treaty. It should not be confused with the principles of subsidiarity, which enables the resolution of the 
considered action’s level (national of Community level), while the principle of proportionality concerns the size of the action. 
This principle has appeared in Court decisions since 1956, for example Coal Federation of Belgium –judgment of November 
26, 1956. 
173 The extent of the powers conferred on the EC by the relevant chapters of the EC Treaty varies depending on the area. 
174 For further analysis, see Eeckhout, P. “Constitutional Concepts for Free Trade in Services,” in de Burca, G. & Scott, J. 
(eds.) The EU and the WTO-Legal and Constitutional Issues, Hart, 2001. 
175 Peers, S. “The Visa Regulation: Free Movement Blocked Indefinitely?” European Law Review 150 (1996); Castro 
Oliveira, “Immigrants from Third Countries under EC External Agreements: The Need for Improvement,” 4 European 
Foreign Affairs Review 215 (1994); Peers, S. “Buildinig Fortress Europe: The Development of EU Migration Law,” 35 
Common Market Law Review 1235 (1998); Martin & Guild (eds.) Free Movement of Persons in the EU, Butterworths, 1996;  
Guild (ed.) The Legal Framework and Social Consequences of Free Movement of Persons in the EU (Part II), Kluwer, 1999; 
Hailbronner, Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy of the European Union, Kluwer, 2000; Hedemann-Robinson, “An 
Overview of Recent Legal Developments at Community Level in Relation to Third Country Nationals Resident Within the 
European Union, with Particular Reference to the Case Law of the ECJ,” 38 Common Market Law Review 525 (2001); Peers, 
S. “Towards Equality: Actual and Potential Right of Third Country Nationals in the EU,” 33 Common Market Law Review 7 
(1996); Eisl, “Relations with the Central and Eastern Countries in Justice and Home Affairs: Deficits and Options,” European 
Foreign Affairs Review 351 (1997); Hakura, “External EU Immigration Policy: The Need to Move Beyond Orthodoxy,” 3 
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competition; taxation; social policy; the environment;177 consumer protection; trans-European networks 
(interoperability and standards); economic and social cohesion; energy, civil protection and tourism.178 
Regarding the Treaty on European Union, its Title V which deals with the common foreign and 
security policy, with the exception of defense, also falls within this category.179 Lastly, Title VI of the 
TEU (police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters) falls within this category as well, apart from the 
provisions relating to the setting up of joint bodies. 
In fact, authors such as Alfonso Mattera180 claim that there is only one type of competence, that of 
shared competence, with different degrees of interference, depending on the policy. In this sense, Member 
States might interfere actively in cultural policy, but only minimally in common commercial policy.181 
The fundamental principles of democratic and political accountability cannot be achieved if the 
constitutional order is fragmented and requires the use of metaphors to describe the interrelations of its 
 
European Foreign Affairs Review 115 (1998); Petrov, “Rights of Third Country/Newly Independent States’ Nationals to 
Pursue Economic Activity in the EU,” 4 European Foreign Affairs Review 235 (1999); Meloni, Visa Policy within the 
European Union Structure, Springer, 2005; Guild, Immigration Law in the European Community, Kluwer, 2001; Peers, S. 
“Implementing Equality? The Directive on long-term resident nationals,” European Law Review 437 (2004); Monar, J. 
“Justice and Home Affairs in the Treaty of Amsterdam: Reform at the Price of Fragmentation,” 23 European Law Review 320 
(1998); Hailbronner, “European Immigration and Asylum Law under the Amsterdam Treaty,” 35 Common Market Law 
Review 1047 (1998); O’Keeffe, D. “Can the Leopard Change its Spots? Visas, Immigration and Asylum following 
Amsterdam,” in O’Keeffe, D. & Twomey, (eds.) Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty, Hart, 1999; Kuijper, P.J. “Some Legal 
Problems Associated with the Communitarization of Policy of Visas, Asylum and Immigration under the Amsterdam Treaty 
and Incorporation of the Schengen Acquis,” 37 Common Market Law Review 345 (2000); Phuong, “Enlarging Fortress Europe: 
EU Accession, Asylum and Immigration in Candidate Countries,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 641 (2003); 
Lambert, “The EU Asylum Qualification Directive, its Impact on the Jurisprudence of the UK and International Law,” 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 161 (2006); Guild, The Developing Immigration and Asylum Policies of the 
European Union, 1996; Guild & Harlow (eds.) Implementing Amsterdam: Immigration and Asylum Rights in EC Law, Hart, 
2001; Boccardi, Europe and Refugees: Towards an EU Asylum Policy, Kluwer, 2002. 
176 Balfour, J. “Freedom to Provide Air Transport Services in the EEC,” 14 European Law Review, pp. 30-46, (1989); Close, 
G. “External Relations in the Air Transport Sector: Air Transport Policy in the Common Commercial Policy?,” 27 Common 
Market Law Review, pp. 108-27, (1990); Haanappel, P. “The External Aviation Relations of the European Economic 
Community and of EEC Member States into the Twenty-First Century,” 14 Air Law, pp. 122-46, (1989). 
177 For a further analysis of external competence in environmental matters, see Jans, J.H. European Environmental Law, (2nd 
edition, Europa Law Publishing, 2000), chapter 2. 
178 The EC Treaty does not contain a specific legal basis covering the fields of energy, civil protection and tourism. The EC 
can therefore act only on the basis of Article 308 EC. 
179 Title V of the TEU provides for consultation, cooperation or coordination of Member States’ action in certain areas, as well 
as adoption by the EU Council of common actions and common positions. 
180 Mr Mattera was Special Advisor to former President of the European Commission Romano Prodi, and Professor at the 
College of Europe, Brugges. 
181 Information gathered from a conference at the Europaeische Rechtsakademie, Trier (Germany), on 10-11 April 2003. 
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parts.182 Could one then argue that non-exclusive EC competence (i.e., shared competence) is translated 
as de iure and de facto EC fragmentation? From a national perspective, Schuppert argues that unity of 
administration is based on the unity of democratic origin of all sovereign power.183 Hesse claims that all 
public authority originates with the people. With the enactment, continuation, and development of the 
constitution, this authority is passed on to the various organs within the constitutional framework. All 
bodies exercising sovereign power continue to be dependent on the unifying origin of that power.184 Can 
these arguments be made from a supranational perspective? Would they be valid for the purposes of the 
EC’s common commercial policy? 
Shared competence between the EC and its Member States implies the fragmentation of unity in 
the international representation of the European Community and translates into less power for the EC in 
the international arena. On the other hand, EC exclusive competence facilitates international negotiations, 
since the European Commission is the only competent actor in any given matter. Experience has shown 
that mixed agreements can and do cause delays, which can actually worsen negotiating situations.185 
However, at present the implementation and conclusion of mixed trade agreements is done at the national 
level. Therefore, a system in which both the EC and its Member States are involved seems to be an 
optimal situation in terms of efficiency. 
With the new balance between Brussels and national institutions and, to some extent, between 
national institutions and regional and local authorities, some kind of rebellion has started in Europe. As 
Meny rightly points out, “any attribution of powers is arbitrary and therefore political; in fact, even if 
some criteria of efficiency and rationality are taken into account, it is mainly on the basis of political 
 
182 Armin von Bogdandy, “The Legal Case for Unity: The European Union as a Single Organization with a Single Legal 
System,” in COMMON MKT. L. REV., 36: 887-910, 1999, at p. 909. 
183 Schuppert, “Die Einheit der Verwaltung als Rechtsproblem,” (1987) DoV, 757, at p. 760. 
184 Hesse, Grundzuege des Verfasssungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, (19th ed. 1993), note 27. 
185 Information gathered from an interview in June 2001 with Richard Wyatt, First Minister of the Delegation of the European 
Commission to the UN. 
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criteria that powers are distributed among the various decision-making […] levels.”186 Even if there are 
expectations for eliminating overlap in competences between the EC and its Member States, one should 
not forget that economic and social reality is so complex that the hope of reaching a clear separation of 
powers is an illusion.187 It is therefore important to establish the methods and instruments for exercising 
those competences. In all existing constitutional texts, even in those based on a catalogue of powers, gray 
areas exist and constitutional courts are called to resolve questions relating to the resultant conflicts of 
competence.188 
Trade is one of the areas where EU Member States have politically agreed to delegate 
representation. However, EU Member States have started to question the transfer of sovereignty to the EC 
level, especially on issues such as services, investment, and intellectual property rights.189 The famous 
Opinion 1/94190 of the ECJ clearly acknowledged that the EC and the EU Member States actually share 
competence in these areas. A few years later, the Amsterdam Treaty reinforced restrictions to transfers of 
sovereignty to the EC level in the area of trade by allowing EU Member States to decide what 
competence to delegate on a case-by-case basis at the end of a negotiation. 
As mentioned before, in the field of external trade relations of the European Community, there are 
many examples where the Community’s and the Member States’ competence is shared; for instance, in 
 
186 Meny, Y. ‘The External and Internal Borders of the Great Europe,’ in THE INTERNATIONAL EXPECTATOR, 2/2002, 
pp. 19-25, at. 22 
187 Id.
188 The European Convention, The Secretariat, Discussion Paper: “Delimitation of Competence between the European Union 
and the Member States. –Existing System, Problems and Avenues to be Explored,” CON 47/02, kin/MM/ac, p. 11. 
189 Intellectual property is a special example of shared competence. Schermers, in International Institutional Law, 2nd edition, 
para. 1557, comments of international organizations in general: “The competence of international organizations to make 
agreements is related to the competence of their members to do so. Both may be competent at the same time. The best example 
is the case of a copyright convention to which an international organization accedes solely to protect its own publications. It 
then acts for the specific interests of the organization which are not at the same time covered by any legal provisions of the 
members.” This category of shared competence may also extend to agreements establishing rules of international law, such as 
UNCLOS III or the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations and between 
International Organizations. The rules in such law-making agreements should be equally applicable to the Member States and 
the Communities as subjects of international law; the competence of one does not displace or undermine the competence of the 
other. In theory, the EC and its Member States sould all be able to become parties to such agreements. 
190 [1994] ECR I-5267. 
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the Food and Agriculture Organization, where Case 25/94,191 Commission v Council, can be used as 
evidence. In this case, the ECJ made its most significant input on the duty of cooperation.192 Competences 
in the EC are joint because Member States prefer not to allow Community competence and, instead, 
preserve their national competence.193 This approach, which became apparent in the Court’s Opinion 2/91 
on the International Labor Organization (ILO),194 weakens the constitutional position of the Community 
in the field of external relations. On the other hand, shared competence increases the leverage of the most 
protectionist EU countries. Shared competence also would imply a strong voice if the polyphonic “choir” 
(all the EU Member States and the Commission) sings. This will give the choir strength and 
independence. 
With respect to shared competence, the second subparagraph of paragraph 6 of Article 133 of the 
Nice Treaty removes certain sectors from the scope of the first subparagraph of paragraph 5 of Article 
133 of the Nice Treaty.195 The areas included are cultural and audiovisual services, educational services, 
 
191 [1996] ECR I-1469, para. 48. 
192 For a legal analysis of Case 25/94, see Heliskoski, J. “The Internal Struggle for International Presence: The Exercise of 
Voting Rights Within the FAO,” in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. (eds.) The General Law of EC External Relations, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2000, pp. 79-99. 
193 Editorial Comments, “The Aftermath of Opinion 1/94 or how to ensure unity of representation for joint competencies”, 32 
COMMON MKT. L. REV., 386 (1995). 
194 Opinion 2/91, 1993 E.C.R. I-1061. 
195 Article 133 EC reads: 
 
1.   The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly in regard to changes in tariff rates, the 
conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy and 
measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies. 
2.   The Commission shall submit proposals to the Council for implementing the common commercial policy. 
3.   Where agreements with one or more States or international organisations need to be negotiated, the Commission shall 
make recommendations to the Council, which shall authorise the Commission to open the necessary negotiations. The Council 
and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring that the agreements negotiated are compatible with internal Community 
policies and rules. 
The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a special committee appointed by the Council to assist 
the Commission in this task and within the framework of such directives as the Council may issue to it. The Commission shall 
report regularly to the special committee on the progress of negotiations. 
The relevant provisions of Article 300 shall apply. 
4.   In exercising the powers conferred upon it by this Article, the Council shall act by a qualified majority. 
5.   Paragraphs 1 to 4 shall also apply to the negotiation and conclusion of agreements in the fields of trade in services and the 
commercial aspects of intellectual property, in so far as those agreements are not covered by the said paragraphs and without 
prejudice to paragraph 6. 
By way of derogation from paragraph 4, the Council shall act unanimously when negotiating and concluding an agreement in 
one of the fields referred to in the first subparagraph, where that agreement includes provisions for which unanimity is required 
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and social and human health services. According to Krenzler and Pitschas, “as the Community may not 
adopt any measures under Articles 150 IV, 151 IV c) and 152 EC that result in the harmonization of 
national laws or regulations in these services sectors, the Community does not have exclusive 
competence.”196 This means that the competence is shared between the EC and its Member States. The 
second subparagraph of paragraph 6 of Article 133 of the Nice Treaty refers to it by using the locution 
“shared competence.” This is the first time that this locution appears in the Treaty text. However, the 
concept of shared competence has existed for a very long time. Agreements in these services sectors must 
be concluded as mixed agreements, and only enter into force after ratification by all EU national 
parliaments.197 The legal ramification of shared competence explains the efforts made by the Commission 
and scholars to bring about exclusive EC competence to avoid the potential risk of Europaralysis. Yet, 
many trade agreements are signed as mixed agreements. 
In mixed agreements, if there is more than one negotiator other than the European Commission, 
then the EC’s negotiating position is being weakened, though not necessarily that of the Member 
 
for the adoption of internal rules or where it relates to a field in which the Community has not yet exercised the powers 
conferred upon it by this Treaty by adopting internal rules. 
The Council shall act unanimously with respect to the negotiation and conclusion of a horizontal agreement insofar as it also 
concerns the preceding subparagraph or the second subparagraph of paragraph 6. 
This paragraph shall not affect the right of the Member States to maintain and conclude agreements with third countries or 
international organisations in so far as such agreements comply with Community law and other relevant international 
agreements. 
6.   An agreement may not be concluded by the Council if it includes provisions which would go beyond the Community's 
internal powers, in particular by leading to harmonisation of the laws or regulations of the Member States in an area for which 
this Treaty rules out such harmonisation. 
In this regard, by way of derogation from the first subparagraph of paragraph 5, agreements relating to trade in cultural and 
audiovisual services, educational services, and social and human health services, shall fall within the shared competence of the 
Community and its Member States. Consequently, in addition to a Community decision taken in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of Article 300, the negotiation of such agreements shall require the common accord of the Member States. 
Agreements thus negotiated shall be concluded jointly by the Community and the Member States. 
The negotiation and conclusion of international agreements in the field of transport shall continue to be governed by the 
provisions of Title V and Article 300. 
7.   Without prejudice to the first subparagraph of paragraph 6, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may extend the application of paragraphs 1 to 4 to international 
negotiations and agreements on intellectual property in so far as they are not covered by paragraph 5. 
196 Krenzler, H.G. & Pitschas, C. ‘Progress or Stagnation?: The Common Commercial Policy After Nice,’ European Foreign 
Affairs Review 6, 2001, pp. 291-313, at 309. 
197 Id.
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States.198 This is because as long as the external competence has not become exclusively EC competence, 
Member States, even acting collectively, remain free to enter into multilateral treaty relations.199 The 
tensions created by the mixture of competences between the EC and its Member States are seen as an 
obstacle to the achievement of Community interests as a whole, and are a problem for Europe’s trade 
partners. Even though Article 133 EC gives exclusive competence in commercial policy to the EC, the 
treaty also limits this competence.200 
According to Jean Groux, for third States it is preferable to have a mixed procedure because they 
are not familiar with dealing with the European Community, the competences and responsibilities of 
which they know but imperfectly.201 For example, in the case of a third party like the U.S., if it has 
complete information about the Member States’ position, then it is easier to accept that the EC act with a 
single voice. In this sense, there are, at least, three variables to take into consideration:  
1) secrecy;  
2) physical difficulty for a third party to obtain information; and 
 3) institutional processes.  
In the case of the first variable, this would mean that having a single representation of the EC in 
international agreements obscures information about the Member States’ actual position. Therefore, there 
is less transparency and, consequently, it might be more difficult to reach an agreement. With regard to 
the second variable, it is very much linked to the first one in the sense that having a single voice in the EC 
makes it harder to negotiate for a third party, since there is less transparency. As for institutional 
processes, it refers to the fact that sometimes exclusive EC competence involves various Directorates-
General of the European Commission. 
 
198 Information gathered from an interview with John Richardson in June 2001, Head of the Delegation of the European 
Commission to the UN. 
199 Even if de iure this is a plausible situation, de facto it has never happened. 
200 Treaty establishing the European Community, February 7, 1992, OJ C 224/1, at p. 44 (1992). 
201 Groux, J. in O´Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. (eds.) Mixed Agreements, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983. 
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However, what has been the attitude of third States when the European Community has entirely 
taken over the responsibilities of the Member States in certain areas? It is only in the last case that third 
States overtly put pressure on the Community to use the mixed negotiation technique. Here one may cite 
the example of the negotiations begun in 1975 between the EEC and the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA, or commonly known as Comecon)202 with a view to normalizing the relations of the 
Community with the East European countries. These countries, which were in fact somewhat reluctant to 
envisage an official recognition of the Community, had much difficulty in accepting the decision of the 
Council of the Communities that the negotiations would be conducted by the Commission alone, and they 
tried in vain to ensure the participation also of the Member States.203 As a matter of fact, the EC was not 
recognized as an international organization by Comecon until 1988.204 This position adopted by Comecon 
was rectified shortly before Comecon was dissolved.  
That said, and knowing that the presumption in the EC is to have collective action, is there really a 
“common” European interest? If so, is this interest so great as to assume that in certain circumstances 
Member States will act with a single voice? Do Members States have enough proximity in their national 
interests to act with one voice in the international sphere? 
 
B.3.- Complementary Competence 
It covers areas where EC competence is limited to supplementing or supporting Member States’ action, or 
coordinating Member States’ action. The power to adopt legislative rules in these areas remains part of 
 
202 Comecon was an economic organization from 1949 to 1991, linking the USSR with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, East Germany (1950–1990), Mongolia (from 1962), Cuba (from 1972), and Vietnam (from 1978), with 
Yugoslavia as an associated member. Albania also belonged between 1949 and 1961. Its establishment was prompted by the 
Marshall Plan. Comecon was formally disbanded in June 1991. It was agreed in 1987 that official relations should be 
established with the European Community, and a free-market approach to trading was adopted in 1990. In January 1991 it was 
agreed that Comecon should be effectively disbanded. See 
http://www.tiscali.co.uk/reference/encyclopaedia/hutchinson/m0006083.html (last visited June 30, 2005). 
203 O´Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. (eds.) Mixed Agreements, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983. 
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the Member States and intervention by the EC cannot have the effect of excluding intervention by the 
Member States.205 
The fields where the Member States have exclusive competence to legislate, and the EC has no 
power to interfere upon their work are: economic policy; employment; customs cooperation; education, 
vocational training and youth; culture; public health; trans-European networks (excluding the 
interoperability of networks and technical standards); industry; research and technological development, 
defence policy (Title V of the TEU),206 and development cooperation.207 
B.4.- Exclusive EU Member States’ Competence 
204 Council Decision 88/345, [1988] OJ L 154/34; see also Morawiecki, W. “Actors and Interests in the Process of 
Negotiations between the CMEA and the EEC,” 1989/2, Legal Issues of European Integration, pp. 1-38. 
205 The European Convention, The Secretariat, Discussion Paper: “Delimitation of Competence between the European Union 
and the Member States. –Existing System, Problems and Avenues to be Explored,” CON 47/02, kin/MM/ac, p. 8.  
206 For further details in the subject, see Wessel, R. “The State of Affairs in EU Security and Defence Policy: The 
Breakthrough in the Treaty of Nice,” 8 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 265 (2003); Keane, “European Security and 
Defence Policy: From Cologne to Sarajevo,” 19 Global Society 89 (2005); Naert, “European Security and Defence in the EU 
Constitutional Treaty,” 10 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 187 (2005); Editorial, “The CFSP under the EU Constitutional 
Treaty – Issues of depillarization,” 42 Common Market Law Review 325 (2005); Toje, “The 2003 European Security Strategy: 
A Critical Appraisal,” European Foreign Afffairs Review 117 (2005); Scannel, “Finnancing ESDP Military Operations,” 
European Foreign Affairs Review 529 (2004); Howorth, “The European Draft Constitutional Treaty and the Future of the 
European Defence Agency: A Question of Flexibility,” European Foreign Affairs Review 483 (2004); Trybus, “The Limits of 
EC Competence for Defence,” European Foreign Affairs Review 189 (2004); Biscop, “Able and Willing? Assessing the EU’s 
Capacity for Military Action,” 9 European Foreign Affairs Review 509 (2004); Salomon & Shepherd, Towards a European 
Army: A Military Power in the Making?, 2003; Howorth & Keeler, Defending Europe: NATO and the Quest for European 
Autonomy, 2005; Gnesotto, N. (ed.), EDU Security and Defence Policy: the first five years (1999-2004), Paris, August 2004, 
available at http://www.iss-eu.org, under publications/books (last visited August 29, 2006); Soetendorp, Foreign Policy in the 
European Union, Longman, 1999; Nicoll, W. & Salmon, T. Understanding the European Union, Longman, 2000; Duke, S. 
“CESDP: Nice’s Overtrumped Success,” European Foreign Affairs Review 155 (2001); Missiroli, “European Security Policy: 
The Challenge of Coherence,” European Foreign Affairs Review 177 (2001); Missiroli, “Ploughshares into Swords? Euros for 
European Defence,” European Foreign Affairs Review 5 (2003); Treacher, “From Civilian Power to Military Actor: The EU’s 
Resistible Transformation,” European Foreign Affairs Review 49 (2004); Gegout, “Causes and Consequences of the EU’s 
Military Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Realistic Explanation,” European Foreign Affairs Review 427 
(2005); Whitman, “NATO, the EU and ESDP: an Emerging Division of Labour,” 25 Contemporary Security Policy (2004); 
Reichard, “Some Legal Issues Concerning the EU-NATO Berlin Plus Agreement,” 73 Nordic Journal of International Law 37 
(2004); Wessel, R. “The EU as a Black Widow: devouring the WEU to give birth to an European Security and Defence 
Policy,” in Kronenberger, V. (ed.) The European Union and the International Legal Order: Discord or Harmony? p. 405 
(2001). 
207 McMahon, The Development Cooperation Policy of the EC, Kluwer Law International, 1998; Shihata, “Development 
Democracy,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 635 (1997); McMahon, “International Agricultural Trade Reform 
and Developing Countries: The Case of the European Community,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 632 
(1998); Santiso, “Reforming European Foreign Aid: Development Cooperation as an Element of Foreign Policy,” European 
Foreign Affairs Review 401 (2002); Orbie, “EU Development Policy Integration and the Monterrey Process: A Leading and 
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This covers areas not referred to in the EC Treaty and therefore not within the competence of the EC. It 
remains within the Member States’ areas, where the Treaties expressly exclude EC competence, or 
expressly recognize the competence of Member States, as well as areas where the EC Treaty forbids the 
EC to legislate.208 
The areas within the EU Member States’ competence are: 1) those that are not within the EC 
competence and therefore remain Member States’ competence, such as the internal organization of States, 
national identity, national military structure inter alia; 2) areas expressly reserved to the Member States 
by the EC Treaty,209 such as public order and public security, the enforcement of criminal law and the 
administration of justice,210 the right to strike and the right of association, the supply of health services 
and medical care, rules dealing with the system of property ownership; 3) areas where the EC Treaty 
forbids the EC to legislate: education, vocational training, culture, employment and health.211 
The hypothesis of exclusive EU Member States’ competence is somehow difficult to conceive in 
the framework of the EC external trade relations, at least from a conceptual viewpoint. The fact that we 
are dealing with the EC external trade relations explicitly implies the participation and inclusion of a 
supranational entity, i.e., the EC. Therefore, this hypothesis has very little or no foundation at all on 
which to base the question whether there will be more legal coherence by having exclusive EC 
competence on all issues of EC trade policy. One could foresee, though, a situation where there is no 
polyphonic choir among the EU Member States. They would therefore be in danger of losing their 
sovereignty but they would still keep their independence. 
 
Benevolent Identity?” 8 European Foreign Affairs Review 395 (2003). 
208 In some cases, the EC Treaty limits the exercise of Member States’ competence by imposing obligations upon them. For 
example, the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality or the prohibition on granting State aids incompatible with 
the common market. 
209 The EC Treaty grants Member States various derogations from the four freedoms of movement on grounds of public order, 
public safety or other considerations of general interest. 
210 Peers, S. EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, Longman, 2000; Papagianni, G. “Free Movement of Persons in the Light of 
the New Title IV TEC: From Intergovernmentalism Towards a Community Policy,” 21 Yearbook of European Law, 107 
(2002). 
211 The European Convention, The Secretariat, Discussion Paper: “Delimitation of Competence between the European Union 
and the Member States. –Existing System, Problems and Avenues to be Explored,” CON 47/02, kin/MM/ac, p. 9. 
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C.- Non-legislative or Executive Competence
Competence to implement and apply legislation in accordance with their respective constitutional rules 
rests with the Member States,212 subject to monitoring by the Commission, national courts and the ECJ.213 
The EC exercises such competence in a subsidiarity capacity only.214 
C.1.- Implementation of Legislative Acts215 
This concerns the drafting of normative rules. Its purpose is to apply legislative acts. It will only be 
necessary for the EC to adopt regulations if the aims of the planned action cannot be adequately achieved 
by the MS. Should it be the case for the EC to adopt regulations, then the power of implementation by the 
EC of its legislative acts is conferred on the Commission by the European Parliament and the Council in 
the case of codecision and by the Council in other cases.216 
C.2.- Administrative, Material or Budgetary Implementation of Community Acts
This concerns administrative implementing measures, sanctions to ensure compliance with EC law, etc. 
The adoption of such measures is a matter for EU Member States, which determine the proper bodies, 
procedures and conditions for ensuring the correct implementation of EC law. The EC may nevertheless 
 
212 The European Convention, The Secretariat, Discussion Paper: “Delimitation of Competence between the European Union 
and the Member States. –Existing System, Problems and Avenues to be Explored,” CON 47/02, kin/MM/ac, p. 9. 
213 Article 10 EC; Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality annexed to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (see Selected Instruments, Book I, Col. I, p. 567) and Declaration No. 43 annexed to the Final Act of the 
Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference relating to that Protocol. 
214 Articles 202 & 211 EC. 
215 See Liisberg, J.B. “The EU Constitutional Treaty and its Distinction between Legislative and Non-legislative Acts – 
Oranges into Appels?,” Jean Monnet Working Paper 01/06, pp. 11-26. 
216 See Article 202 EC. 
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intervene in the implementation of EC acts where the Treaty or the EC legislator give the EC the power to 
do so. 
 
D.- Criteria for Evaluating the Distribution of Powers and its Compliance
Delimitation of competences is absolutely necessary in a federal217 or a quasi federal set-up nature, which 
I think is the case of the EU, depending on what policy we are analyzing – and that is certainly the case of 
trade policy - for the simple reason that if there were no such delimitation, there would be chaos within 
the system, with no clarity among citizens as to who does what. That said, I do not think that the rationale 
of traditional States can be applied directly to the Union, as the Union is itself a Union of sovereign 
States. A clear example of this is the fact that defence and foreign policy have not been clearly stated by 
the EU Constitutional Treaty to be within the Union’s exclusive competence, which would be necessary 
in the traditional federal set-up.   
Below is an analysis of the four main and non-exhaustive criteria for evaluating the distribution of 
powers: 1) efficiency; 2) transparency and clarity; 3) coherence/consistency; and 4) accountability. 
 
1.- Efficiency in international trade negotiations 
 
One criterion is that of effective functioning. Power should be exercised by an authority at a level where 
it can be exercised most effectively. Since the distribution of powers is vague, it leaves immense scope 
 
217 Broadly speaking, European federalism means any system of government where several states form a unity and yet remain 
independent in their internal affairs. People who are in favor of this system are often called “federalists.” A number of 
countries around the world –such as Australia, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States– have federal models of 
government, in which some matters (such as foreign policy) are decided at the federal level, while others are decided by the 
individual states. However, the model differs from one country to another. The European Union is not based on any of these 
models: it is not a federation but a unique form of union in which the Member States remain independent and sovereign 
nations while pooling their sovereignty in many areas of common interest. This gives them a collective strength and influence 
on the world stage that none of them could have on their own. Part of the debate about the future of Europe is the question of 
whether the EU should or should not become more 'federal.' 
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for disputes between the Union and its Member States, which cannot but hamper an efficient Union. The 
EC has become a more important and difficult trading partner. It started with six homogeneous Member 
States, and then was enlarged to 9, 10, 12, 15, and finally 25 countries. Soon it is expected to have 27+ 
Member States. When demands are presented in the WTO by the EC as a common front, these inevitably 
carry more weight within the WTO than would be the case if an individual country were making the 
case.218 As an example we have the EC’s mandate for the Services Agreement negotiations prepared for 
the Seattle Ministerial Conference in October 1999. This mandate included various cultural exceptions for 
individual EU Member States, which originated from the French delegation. The French had concerns 
about their audio-visual services area. They wanted the EC to defend their national interests in the WTO.  
 The reverse situation could also happen: demands from small EU Member States without much 
trade clout may not be heard in the WTO forum. These demands can be lost as a result of the functioning 
of the EC and thereby never emerge in the WTO arena. An example would be the lack of action on the 
part of the EC on behalf of Member States in relation to agriculture. 
 After negotiating the agreement, it must be ratified. Any EU Member State can prevent an 
agreement from being finalized. WTO Agreements are subject to adoption by the EU Council of 
Ministers and, sometimes also by the European Parliament, as well as ratification by national parliaments. 
This means that it is quite possible to have a delay in presenting ratification to parliament. 
 
2.-Transparency and Clarity 
 
Another criterion is transparency.219 In the Trade Policy Review of the WTO, it was impossible to discern 
who in the EC was responsible for negotiations, who made the actual decisions and with whom 
 
218 R. Senti, “The Role of the EU as an Economic Actor within the WTO,” in EUROPEAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW;7, 
pp. 111-117 at 113. 
219 The term 'transparency' is often used in a broad sense to mean openness in the way the Member States’ and EU institutions 
work. The EU institutions are committed to greater openness. They are taking steps to improve public access to information, 
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negotiations had to be conducted. With EU enlargement, the current situation will deteriorate.220 Thus, 
from the point of view of the WTO, the EC has become both a powerful but also a difficult negotiating 
partner.221 
Given the lack of transparency of the current democratic system, accountability of the governing
forces depends on their respective competences. In a proper democratic forum, it is therefore imperative
for the populace to know the competences of the governments. There is a difference of competences in
the national and the transnational level. There needs to be a clear transparent mechanism whereby the
people are in a position to understand which government to hold accountable for which action.
As for clarity, any set-up which involves an exercise of power at two levels –national and 
supranational - by numerous bodies requires clarity and precision with which the powers have been 
delineated. By this I do not mean that all overlap be avoided at all times, which is hardly possible, but that 
all efforts be made to avoid clashes which can be foreseen. In my opinion, the division as it stands in the 
Nice Treaty fails on this criterion miserably. There are no provisions in the treaties describing the 
principles governing the allocation of competence between the EC and its Member States. Furthermore, 
the treaties are drafted in a complex manner, as a result of political compromises. Moreover, there is 
misunderstanding and false ideas about the extent of the EU’s legislative competence because of lack of 
clarity. Along these lines, the French Government has initiated an internet campaign to explain in a clear 
manner what the EU process of integration is about.222 
and they are working to produce clearer and more readable documents. This includes better drafting of laws and, ultimately, a 
single, simplified EU Cosntitutional Treaty. 
220 On general scholarly discussions about enlargement of the EU, see notably Burghardt & Cameron, “The Next Enlargement 
of the European Union,” 2 European Foreign Affairs Review 7 (1997); Lippert & Becker, “Structured Dialogue Revisited: The 
EU’s Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion,” 3 European Foreign Affairs Review 341 (1998); Grabbe & Hughes, Enlarging the 
EU Eastwards, Royal Institute of Internatioonal Affairs, London, 1998; Cremona, M. (ed.) The Enlargement of the European 
Union, Oxford University Press, 2002; Hillion, C. “Enlargement of the European Union: A Legal Analysis,” in Arnull, 
&Wincott (eds.) Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union, Oxford University Press, 2002; Williams, 
“Enlargement of the EU and Human Rights Conditionality: A Policy of Distinction,” 25 European Law Review 601 (2000); 
Inglis, “The Union’s fifth accession treaty: New means to make enlargement possible,” 41 Common Market Law Review 937 
(2004). 
221 Senti, R. “The Role of the EU as an Economic Actor within the WTO,” EUROPEAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW; 7, 
pp. 111-117, at 114. 
222 For more detailed information on the French proposal, see Euractiv, “France to launch internet site dedicated to Europe,” 
EC Polycephalous Anatomy  Rafael Leal-Arcas 
 
54
The steady evolution of the EU has resulted in a complex organization of competences in the 
treaties. The legal provisions covering the distribution of EC competences are dispersed over the EC 
Treaty. This renders the system opaque and difficult to understand. In turn, this lack of clarity hampers 
democratic control, as it is unclear where political responsibility lies. This is perhaps due to lack of 
political will. Political responsibility and democratic control would be made easier if power were not so 
dispersed.  
The Nice and Laeken European Councils requested that the delimitation of competence between 
the EC and its Member States be examined in order to respond to criticism that the EC should take less 
action in certain areas and more in others. The EC has a tendency to legislate in areas in which it is not 
competent or in which it is not appropriate for the EC to do so. At the moment, the system of delimitation 
of competences between the EC and its Member States lacks clarity for various reasons: a) amendments 
to the EU Treaties of provisions drafted in a complex manner, as a result of political compromises; b) the 
fact that neither the system for delimiting powers, nor the principles governing such a delimitation, nor 
the types of competence available to the EU and the areas covered by each type of competence are clearly 
defined by the EC Treaty; and finally, c) the new methods of coordination, which set objectives without 
taking into account the allocation of powers.  
All these reasons contribute to the lack of clarity and give the impression that the EC’s powers are 
very broad, when in fact this is not the case. Thus, misunderstandings and false ideas about the extent of 
the EC’s legislative competence often exist.223 The competences today appear in the EU Constitutional 
Treaty in a vague form. The concepts of exclusive and concurrent competences could be more clearly 
defined. This would clarify the fields for which the principle of subsidiarity applies (i.e., only concurrent 
 
January 18, 2006, available at http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-151644-16&type=News (last visited January 
22, 2006). Other related articles are: Euractiv, “Transparency Initiative,” June 8, 2005, available at 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/pa/transparency-initiative/article-140650 (last visited July 18, 2006); Euractiv, “French civil 
society jumps into the transparency debate,” June 19, 2006, available at http://www.euractiv.com/en/pa/french-civil-society-
jumps-transparency-debate/article-156200 (last visited July 18, 2006). 
223 The European Convention, The Secretariat, Discussion Paper: “Delimitation of Competence between the European Union 
and the Member States. –Existing System, Problems and Avenues to be Explored,” CON 47/02, kin/MM/ac, p. 12. 
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competence).224 It can be envisaged to combine this exercise with a re-ordering of the treaties along 
logical lines. This could increase the clarity of the text, making it easier to locate responsibility. In this 
respect, another main problem is the failure to comply with the principle of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. One should conceive the principle of subsidiarity as a mechanism to regulate the 
implementation of the EC’s non-exclusive powers. Interestingly, the principle of loyal cooperation was 
not taken into account during the distribution of competences between the Union and its Member States at 
the time of the drafting of the EU Constitutional Treaty. However, the principles of subsidiarity, 
proportionality and the attribution principle do appear in the Constitutional Treaty (Article I-9).225 
3.- Coherence/Consistency 
 
There is lack of precision of certain provisions of the EC Treaty: a minority has requested that the 
existing system be replaced by a “catalogue” of competences.226 A large majority, however, argues for 
keeping the evolution of competences flexible and dynamic. Also, a transfer of activities from the 
national to the supranational level would increase the coherence/consistency of the EC’s position in world 
trade negotiations. Another way to explain the lack of coherence is the fact that the EC’s powers do not 
match citizens’ expectations: citizens want the EC to play a greater role in certain areas, but also find that 
the EC intervenes too much in other areas. 
 
224 For Community action to be justified, both aspects of the subsidiarity principle shall be met: the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the EU Member States’ action in the framework of their national constitutional 
system, and these objectives can therefore be better achieved by action on the part of the European Community. The following 
guidelines can be used when examining whether these two conditions are fulfilled: 1) the isse under consideration has 
transnational aspects that cannot be satisfactorily regulated by Member States’ actions; 2) actions by Member States alone 
would significantly damage Member States’ interests; and 3) action at the supranational level would produce clear benefits by 
reason of its scale or effects compared with action at the national level. Of course, when speaking of benefits, one wonders: 
benefits for whom? The supranational elites? Or the national citizens? And how to prove this benefit objectively? 
225 “The limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral.” This means that Union competences are 
strictly conferral, they are laid down in the Constitutional Treaty, or they are established according to a specified procedure. 
Without this principle, “competences not conferred upon the Union in the Constitution remain with the Member States.” 
(Article I-9 [2]). 
226 For an analysis against the creation of a rigid competence catalogue, see Swenden, W. “Is the European Union in Need of a 
Competence Catalogue? Insights from Comparative Federalism,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 2004, Vol. 42, No. 2, 
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4.- Accountability 
 
Legitimacy (or accountability) and efficiency tend to go hand-in-hand. Ideally, each government should 
be able to make its policies in its own spheres of activity, without referring too much to other 
governments’ activities. Each government would be accountable to its own electorate, and each voter 
would know precisely which government deserves the credit or blame for a particular output of public 
policy. However, and unfortunately, many practical reasons prevent this ideal from being achieved. This 
means, for practical purposes, that in certain circumstances accountability must be sacrificed for the sake 
of other criteria. A high request of accountability would reduce the margin of maneuver of EC trade 
negotiators and complicate their ability to conclude complex international agreements. So is there a 
political and institutional mechanism whereby efficiency and accountability, two sides of the same coin, 
are complementary of each other?  
In relation to checking the delimitation of competences, there is a poor system of ensuring compliance 
with the delimitation of competences: at present, political monitoring of compliance with the delimitation 
of competences is exercised mainly by the EU institutions. Legislative bodies at the national level 
(national parliaments) exercise that monitoring to a lesser degree. We offer two types of checks to ensure 
compliance with the delimitation of competences:  
1. Political control: it rests with the EU institutions which participate in the legislative process. Each 
institution must act in accordance with the powers allocated to it. National governments, national 
parliaments, and public opinion also exercise such a control to the extent that they control the 
positions adopted by their government representatives in the Council; and 
2. Judicial control: by appeal to the ECJ or national courts. 
 
pp. 371-92. 
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After analyzing the criteria for the evaluation of the distribution of powers and its compliance, we ask 
why we have a delimitation of competences. In the current system of EU foreign policy, we find several
constitutional problems:227
1. Inadequate parliamentary control: The EU has constitutionally weak governance structures. The EC’s 
integration policy raises problems of democratic legitimacy to the extent that it is not effectively 
controlled by parliaments (for example, in the foreign trade policy area), and focuses more on the 
protection of powerful interest groups than on the general interests and equal rights of EU citizens (for 
example, consumers and tax-payers). So the question araises: is it in the interest of the EU citizens to 
have a common commercial policy without a parliamentary control? 
2. Constitutional limitations of government powers by rule of law, fundamental rights, separation of 
powers and democratic participation are not effectively applied in foreign policy powers. Therefore, the 
rights of domestic citizens are less effectively protected against abuses of foreign policy powers of 
governments (for instance, Article 133 EC) than vis-à-vis their domestic policy powers. Certainly, these 
power-oriented EU foreign policies can undermine the rule of law within the EU. It is relevant to mention 
in this respect the limited role of the European Parliament in the EC’s common commercial policy. Hence 
the importance of EU institutional reforms.228 
3. The division between private powers of EU citizens and government powers seems to be more 
important than the division between national and EU government powers.  
 
IV. Definition of Mixed Agreements229 
227 Petersmann, E.-U. “The Foreign Policy Constitution of the European Union: A Kantian Perspective,” in 
Immenga/Moeschel/Reuter (eds.) Festschrift fuerErnst-Joachim Mestmaecher (Nomos, 1996), pp. 433-447, at 435. 
228 It was at the Nice IGC that the then 15 EU Member States established framework guidelines in order to pursue EU 
institutional reforms. The European Council of Stockholm in March 2001 already reaffirmed this objective, and the various 
modalities were established in Laeken in December 2001 with the Declaration on the Future of Europe, and the decision to call 
for a Convention. 
229 In 1961, Pierre Pescatore spoke of “accords mixtes, mi-gouvernementaux, mi-communautaires, conclus conjointement par 
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Mixed agreements are agreements where both the EC and its Member States are contracting parties, on 
the European side, to an international agreement with a third party. The notion of mixed agreement is not 
normally understood to cover a situation where an agreement falls within the competence of the EC and 
partly within that of the Member States, but rather a situation where Member States are in a position to 
become parties to it.230 In such a case, the EC competence may be exercised through the medium of the 
Member States acting jointly in the interest of the EC.231 While it may be largely unknown to the general 
public, mixity (or mixed agreements) has become part of the daily life of the EC external relations. 
Mixity has also been a very complex topic for scholarly debate.232 
Interestingly enough, mixed agreements, important as they are, were not foreseen in the Treaty of 
Rome. However, the concept does appear in the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community,233 and is incidentally inscribed in the Nice Treaty in Article 133 (6). As Granvik correctly 
 
les Etats membres et la Communaute,” 103 Hague Recueil 1961/II p. 104. 
230 The possibility of mixed agreements is expressly recognized in Article 102 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community (EURATOM). The expression “mixed agreements” has been used by the Court of Justice, e.g.,, in Case 
12/86 Demirel [1987] ECJ 3719 at 3751 (paragraph 8). See also O´Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. (eds.) Mixed Agreements,
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983; Dolmans, M. J. F. M. Problems of Mixed Agreements: Division of Powers within 
the EEC and the Right of Third States, Asser Instituut, The Hague, 1985; Neuwahl, N. “Joint Participation in International 
Treaties and the Exercise of Powers by the EEC and Its Member States: Mixed Agreements,” (1991) 28 COMMON 
MKT.L.REV., pp. 717-740; MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, pp. 142-164. 
231 See Opinion 2/91 [1993] E.C.R. I-1061, para. 5 on the ILO Convention No. 170 on Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work, 
which is only open to Members of the ILO (Art. 21). 
232 Most of the relevant literature is in the more general context of the EC external relations; see, Timmermans, C. & Völker, E. 
(eds.) Division of Powers between the European Communities and their Member States in the Field of External Relations,
Kluwer, 1981; O´Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. Mixed Agreements, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983; Dolmans, 
M.J.F.M. Problems of Mixed Agreements: Division of Powers Within the EEC and the Right of Third States, Asser Instituut, 
1985; Groux & Manin, The European Communities in the International Order, Commission of the European Communities, 
1995, pp. 57-88; Conze, A. Die voelkerrechtliche Haftung der Europaeischen Gemeinschaft, Nomos, 1987, pp. 73-87; 
Neuwahl, “Joint Participation in International Treaties and the Exercise of Powers by the EEC and its Member States: Mixed 
Agreements,” Common Market Law Review, 28, 1991, pp. 717-740; idem, “Shared Powers or Combined Imcompetence? More 
on Mixity,” Common Market Law Review, 33, 1996, pp. 667-687; Frid, R. The Relations between the EC and International 
Organizations. Legal Theory and Practice, Kluwer Law Inernational, 1995, pp. 111-116; Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. 
The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, pp. 142-164; Kaniel, M. The Exclusive 
Treaty-Making Power of the European Community up to the Period of the Single European Act, Kluwer, 1996, pp. 145-174; 
McGoldrick, D., International Relations Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997, pp. 78-88; Bourgeois, J., Dewost, J. & 
Gaiffe, M. La Communauté européenne et les accords mixtes, Quelles perspectives?, Presses Interuniversitaires Européennes, 
1997; Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) International Law Aspects of the European Union, Kluwer Law International, 1998, notably 
articles written by Dashwood (pp. 113-123), Rosas (pp. 125-148) and Granvik (pp. 255-272). 
233 It is precisely in Article 102, which reads: “Agreements or contracts concluded with a third State…to which, in addition to 
the Community, one or more Member States are parties, shall not enter into force until the Commission has been notified by all 
the Member States concerned that those agreements or contracts have become applicable in accordance with the provisions of 
their respective national laws”. 
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asserts, “the very same article [Article 102 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community] has later been accepted [by EC law-makers] as a suitable model for the EC.”234 In this same 
line of thought, Macleod et al. point out that there is no doubt about the existence and legal validity of the 
concept of "mixed agreement". Proof of this is Article 102 of the Euratom Treaty,235 where “a form of 
mixed agreement is recognized and which [Art 102] makes explicit provisions for treaties which are to be 
concluded by the Community and one or more Member States."236 It is, nevertheless, unfortunate that the 
Constitutional Treaty did not take into account the express recognition of mixed agreements in the legal 
text. 
The legal phenomenon of mixed agreements poses various complex issues, such as the fact that 
these agreements must be ratified by all the EU national parliaments of the countries which are 
contracting parties to that given mixed agreement. Consequently, this creates uncertainty as to the liability 
of the EC and its Member States to third parties,237 as well as the limits of the ECJ’s competence to 
interpret such agreements. In addition to what has been said above, there are various important 
clarifications to be mentioned in this subtitle in order to facilitate the understanding of the issue. Here are 
some of them: 
 
1. Since the early 1960s, the mixed procedure as a legal phenomenon has been used in a wide field 
of policy areas ranging from commercial policy to environmental policy,238 from cooperation to 
 
234 Granvik, L. Incomplete Mixed Environmental Agreements of the Community and the Principle of Bindingness, in 
Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Kluwer Law International, 1998, 
p. 256. 
235 Article 102 Euratom reads: 
 
Agreements or contracts concluded with a third State, an international organisation or a national of a third State to which, in 
addition to the Community, one or more Member States are parties, shall not enter into force until the Commission has been 
notified by all the Member States concerned that those agreements or contracts have become applicable in accordance with the 
provisions of their respective national laws. 
236 MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, pp. 143-4. 
237 See heading infra “Implications of Mixed Agreements for Third Parties.” 
238 Koutrakos, P. “I need to hear you say it: Revisiting the Scope of the CCP,” Yearbook of European Law 407 (2003); Van 
Calster, “The EU, Trade, Environment and Unilateralism: Passing the Buck,” European Foreign Affairs Review 9 (2000); 
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the management and conservation of the resources of the sea. The general trend towards the use of 
the mixed formula both in the multilateral and bilateral239 contexts seems to be continuing.240 
2. There should be no doubt about the general validity or actual practical significance of the mixed 
procedure since important EC and Member States’ policy areas of international relations are 
organized based on the mixed agreements technique. This, as a matter of principle, is not 
contested on any legal grounds any more.241 
3. The European Court of Justice has recognized in its Ruling 1/78, Opinion 1/78, Opinion 2/91 and 
Opinion 1/94 (Re WTO Agreement) inter alia that some agreements require the participation of 
both the Community and the Member States.242 From here one can deduce that not all Community 
competence is exclusive.243 Furthermore, in the everyday practice of the Community institutions 
we see that the concept of mixed agreement is a well-established part of EC law.244 An example of 
 
Scott, J. EC Environmental Law, Longmans, 1998; Demaret, “Environmental Policy and Commercial Policy: The Emergence 
of Trade-Related Environmental Measures (TREMS) in the External Relations of the European Community,” in Maresceau. 
M. (ed.) The European Community’s Commercial Policy after 1992: The Legal Dimension, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993; 
Geradin, “Trade and Environmental Protection in the context of World Trade Rules: A View from the EU,” 2 European 
Foreign Affairs Review 33 (1997); Scott, J. “On Kith and Kine (and Crustaceans): Trade and Environment in the EU and 
WTO,” Jean Monnet Working Paper 3/99, available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/990301.html (last visited 
August 29, 2006); Ward, “Common but Differentiated Debates: Environment, Labour and the WTO,” 45 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 592 (1996); Schoenbaum, “International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The 
Continuing Search for Reconciliation,” 91 American Journal of International Law 268 (1997); Qureshi, “Extraterritorial 
Shrimps, NGO’s and the WTO Appellate Body,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 199 (1999); Eggers & 
Mackenzie, “The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety,” 3 Journal of International Economic Law 525 (2000); Krenzler & 
MacGregor, “GM Food: The Next Major Transatlantic Trade War?” 5 European Foreign Affairs Review 287 (2000); 
Francioni, F. (ed.) Environment, Human Rights and International Trade, Hart, 2001; Dillon, International Trade and 
Economic Law and the European Union, Hart, 2002, chapter 5. 
239 Almost all the EC’s association agreements under article 310 EC have been concluded as mixed agreements, being the only 
exceptions the agreements with Cyprus and Malta. See OJ L 133 [1973] p.2 (Republic of Cyprus) and OJ L 61 [1971] p. 2 
(Malta). 
240 Heliskoski, J. Mixed Agreements as a Technique for Organizing the International Relations of the European Community 
and its Member States, Kluwer Law International, 2001, pp. 2-3. 
241 Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, pp. 
143-144. For previous criticism, see Testa, G. “L’intervention des Etats membres dans la procedure de conclusion des accords 
d’association de la Communaute economique europeenne,” 2 CDE (1966) p. 502 et seq. and Costonis, J. “The Treaty-Making 
Power of the European Economic Community: The Perspective of a Decade,” V CMLRev. (1967-1968), pp. 451-453. 
242 Ruling 1/78, 1978 E.C.R. 2151; Opinion 1/78 [1979] ECR 2871; Opinion 2/91, [1993] ECR I-1061 at para. 5; and Opinion 
1/94 [1995]. 
243 See Opinion 2/91 [1993] E.C.R. I-1061, para. 5 on the ILO Convention No. 170 on Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work, 
which is only open to Members of the ILO (Art. 21). 
244 MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 
1996, at 144. 
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this is Case 12/86, Demirel v. Stadt Schwaebisch Gmuend,245 in which the European Court of 
Justice used the term "mixed agreement" to describe the Association Agreement between the 
Community and the Member States on the one hand and Turkey on the other. 
4. It is a fact of life that mixed agreements raise difficult and interesting legal and political issues 
about the role of the Communities and the Member States in the international arena. Despite the 
legal uncertainties, in practice the Community and the Member States participate together 
effectively in various international agreements.246 It is precisely in the field of international treaty 
law that mixed agreements show the changes that international law has undergone through the 
establishment of entities such as the EC.247 
5. In this same line of thought, Allan Rosas argues that: 
“the European Union being a hybrid conglomerate situated somewhere between a 
State and an intergovernmental organization, it is only natural that its external relations in 
general and treaty practice in particular should not be straightforward. The phenomenon of 
mixed agreements [...] offers a telling illustration of the complex nature of the EU and the 
Communities as an international actor”.248 
We speak of complex nature since the circumstance which has to occur is to have an agreement 
which is a Community and a national agreement at the same time. This means that Europe has 25 
voices (one for each Member State) plus one more voice coming from any of the European 
Communities. 
6. The phenomenon of mixed agreements is, therefore, not only deeply interrelated to EC law and its 
division of powers doctrine but it is also interrelated to public international law. As for the 
division of powers, McGoldrick points out that “each international agreement will require 
consideration of its subject matter to determine the allocation of competence between the EC and 
 
245 1987 E.C.R. 3719 at 3751, paragraph 8. 
246 MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S, The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 
1996, at 144. 
247 Tomuschat, C. Liability for Mixed Agreements, in O’Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. MIXED AGREEMENTS, Kluwer Law 
and Taxation Publishers, 1983, pp. 125-32. 
248 Rosas, A. Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements, in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 125. 
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the Member States, and the nature of that competence.”249 This allocation of competence can 
evolve over the lifetime of an agreement [this is so even during the drafting of an agreement, 
being an example of it Case C-24/95, Commission v UK (FAO Fisheries Agreement)]250 or series 
of agreements. This has been the case with the GATT.251 According to public international law, 
the rights and obligations which derive from an agreement form an undivided entity. This, 
however, does not necessarily mean that the EC and its Member States cannot respect the internal 
division of competence according to EC law.252 
V. Inadequate Explanation of Mixed Agreements 
 
In his book Mixed Agreements as a Technique for Organizing the International Relations of the European 
Community and its Member States,253 Heliskoski rightly points out the lack of adequate contextual legal 
principles among legal scholars who pursue legal analyses of mixed agreements.254 
If the EC and its Member States both participate in international agreements, it is due to the 
limited scope of the EC’s competence in international relations.255 The international rights and obligations 
 
249 MCGOLDRICK, International Relations Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997, at 78-9. 
250 1996 E.C.R. nyr. 
251 For further detail, see Petersmann, E.-U. Participation of the European Communities in the GATT: International Law and 
Community Law Aspects, in O’KEEFFE, D. & SCHERMERS, H. MIXED AGREEMENTS, Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers, 1983, pp 167-98. See also MCGOLDRICK, International Relations Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997, 
at 118 and 121. 
252 Gaja, G. The European Community’s Rights and Obligations under Mixed Agreements, in O’KEEFFE, D. & 
SCHERMERS, H. MIXED AGREEMENTS, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983, pp 133-140. 
253 Heliskoski, J. Mixed Agreements as a Technique for Organizing the International Relations of the European Community 
and its Member States, Kluwer Law International, 2001, p. 7. 
254 See as examples which denounce this fact works by Stein, K. D., Der gemischte Vertrag im Recht der Aussenbeziehungen 
der Europaeischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Duncker & Humbolt, Berlin, 1986, and Dolmans, M. Problems of Mixed 
Agreements, Asser Instituut, The Hague, 1985. 
255 The scope of the common commercial policy has been subject of political and legal debate for a long time: Ehlermann, C.-
D. “The Scope of Article 113 of the EEC Treaty,” in Melanges Offerts a Pierre-Henri Teitgen, Paris, Pedone, 1984, pp. 148-
69; Bourgeois, J. “The Common Commercial Policy: Scope and Nature of the Powers,” in Voelker, E.L.M. (ed.) Protectionism 
and the European Community, 2nd edition, Kluwer, 1986; Cremona, M. “The Completion of the Internal Market and the 
Incomplete Commercial Policy of the European Community,” 15 European Law Review, 283-97, (1990); Maresceau, M. (ed.) 
The European Community’s Commercial Policy after 1992: The Legal Dimension, Nijhoff, 1993; Eeckhout, P. The European 
Internal Market and International Trade, Clarendon Press, 1994; Chalmers, D. “Legal Basis and External Relations of the 
European Community,” in Emiliou, N. & O’Keeffe, D. (eds.) The European Union and World Trade Law – After the GATT 
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of an institution such as the EC depend on its functions and purposes. The EC is based on general and 
limited attribution of legal authority laid down by the EC Treaty.256 Often times, a particular international 
agreement goes beyond the EC’s competence or legal authority to act. In such cases, Member States 
assume the remainder of treaty commitments. This is the legal reason for having recourse to the mixed 
procedure.257 
Quite frequently, the justification for the conclusion of an agreement as mixed relates to the nature 
of the EC’s competence. The ECJ recognizes that EC competence does not necessarily exclude that of 
Member States’ and it may be up to Member States to take part in the agreement together with the EC.258 
Most legal scholars tend to rely on non-contextual general principles when dealing with mixed 
agreements. This means that the criterion for the division of powers between the EC and its Member 
States has turned into a scheme of interpretation by which the different legal questions arising in relation 
to mixed agreements such as implementation, responsibility,..., could be addressed. This means that the 
practice of mixed agreements is not analyzed since the conception is purely non-contextual.259 
When giving a legal analysis of mixed agreements, one should also incorporate the EC’s and 
Member States’ treaty partners. Legal scholars have admitted that the various rules and principles to be 
applied do not only emanate from EC and national law but also from international law.260 Why is it so 
important to include third parties when trying to reach a proper conception of the mixed procedure? 
Simply because without them there would be no international agreement. Any conception of mixed 
 
Uruguay Round, Wiley, 1996; Cremona, M. “Neutrality or Discrimination? The WTO, the EU and External Trade,” in de 
Burca, G. & Scott, J. (eds.) The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues, Hart Publishing, 2001. 
256 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations Case, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports, 1949, p. 180; 
Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL 1964 E.C.R. 585, p. 593. 
257 Dolmans, M. Problems of Mixed Agreements, Asser Instituut, The Hague, 1985, p. 95. 
258 Dashwood, A. & Heliskoski, J. “The Classical Authorities Revisited” in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. (eds.) The General 
Law of EC External Relations, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2000, p. 17. See also Heliskoski, J. Mixed Agreements as a 
Technique for Organizing the International Relations of the European Community and its Member States, Kluwer Law 
International, 2001, pp. 36-46. 
259 Stein, K. D., Der gemischte Vertrag im Recht der Aussenbeziehungen der Europaeischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Duncker 
& Humbolt, Berlin, 1986, p. 61 et seq. and Dolmans, M. Problems of Mixed Agreements, Asser Instituut, The Hague, 1985, p. 
15 et seq. 
260 The international law aspect clearly appears in the contributions by Phillip Allott (p. 97), Christina Tomuschat (p. 125), 
Giorgio Gaja (p. 133) and Albert Bleckmann (p. 155) in O´Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. Mixed Agreements, Kluwer Law and 
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agreements without taking into account third parties would be a partial approach and, therefore, an 
inadequate explanation of this legal phenomenon. 
 On the international law front, we perceive that neither the EC Treaties, nor Community 
legislation, nor the ECJ’s case-law is binding on the other contracting parties. If the practice of mixed 
agreements is neglected, then one could argue that the general principles of international law261 seem to 
be transplanted to the specific context of the EC and Member States’ external relations in general and 
mixed agreements in particular. In this line of thought, we can quote Albert Bleckmann: “in order to find 
a solution to [the] problem [of judicial positions of the different parties to a mixed agreement], we have 
necessarily to refer to the general principles of interpretation of public international law.”262 That said, the 
scope of such principles tends to be unclear and controversial. Quoting again Bleckmann, “[the] general 
principles to which we refer have not, as yet, been clearly established by public international law.”263 The 
general principles might “...be excluded if an analysis of interests of the parties regulated by the treaty 
indicates a different solution.”264 
When dealing with legal analyses of mixed agreements, this is the current state of the art. It is, 
therefore, important to clarify the unlimited number of questions concerning the legal implications of the 
mixed procedure which constantly arise in the actual practice of the EC’s external relations. 
 
VI. Typology of Mixed Agreements265 
Taxation Publishers, 1983. However, there is no international law treatise on the topic. 
261 Be them, effet utile, good faith, equality among others. 
262 Bleckmann, A., in O´Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. Mixed Agreements, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983, p. 157. 
263 Id.
264 Id., p. 160. 
265 Schermers, H. A Typology of Mixed Agreements, in O’KEEFFE, D. & SCHERMERS, H. MIXED AGREEMENTS, Kluwer 
Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983, pp. 22-33; DOLMANS, M. J. F. M. PROBLEMS OF MIXED AGREEMENTS: 
DIVISION OF POWERS WITHIN THE EEC AND THE RIGHT OF THIRD STATES, Asser Instituut, The Hague, 1985, p. 
25, 39-42; Rosas, A. Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements, in KOSKENNIEMI, M. (ed.) INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF 
THE EUROPEAN UNION, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 125-148 at 128-133; MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, 
S. The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, at 143; Tognazzi G., Nozione e 
classificazione degli accordi misti, in Dir. Com. Sc. Int. 1994, 590. 
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Since there are many different types of mixed agreements, depending on how they are categorized, the 
answer to the question they raise may vary dramatically. Let us, then, see some ways of classification. 
Allan Rosas makes a basic distinction between parallel and shared competences:266 
A.- Type of Competence
The terminology used in the doctrine is very unclear: non-exclusive, shared, parallel, joint, concurrent, 
and divided competence of the EC. These terms are used here to describe the same phenomenon, i.e. the 
potential powers which the EC may exercise if the Council so decides and which, when exercised, may 
turn into exclusive EC competence.267 However, as we will see later, it is inappropriate to use the locution 
“parallel competence” to refer to a situation where non-exclusive EC competence turns out to be 
exclusive EC competence. Again, the doctrine is imprecise in its terminology.268 
A.1.- Parallel Competences
Parallel competences “implies that the Community may adhere to a treaty, with full rights and obligations 
as any other Contracting Party, this having no direct effect on the rights and obligations of Member States 
being parties to the same treaty.”269 However, this situation might have indirect effect on the rights and 
 
266 Rosas, A. “Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements” in KOSKENNIEMI, M. (ED.) INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF 
THE EUROPEAN UNION, Kluwer Law International, 1998, pp. 128-33. 
267 The fundamental principle of EC law is the principle that the EC’s powers are attributed to the EC by the Member States. 
On this, see Kapteyn, P.J.G. & VerLoren van Themaat, P. Introduction to the Law of the European Communities, 2nd edition, 
1989, chapter IV, 1.3; For a discussion on the principle, see Barents, R. “The Internal Market Unlimited: some observations on 
the legal basis of Community legislation,” 30 Common Market Law Review, p. 85, 1993. 
268 To make the terminological confusion ever greater, while international law uses the term power or jurisdiction, EC law has 
usually adopted the term competence. Furthermore, the ECJ has used both competence and power interchangeably. See 
Tridimas, T. & Eeckhout, P. “The External Competence of the Community and the Case-Law of the Court of Justice: Principle 
versus Pragmatism,” 14 Yearbook of European Law, pp. 143-77, at 144, (1995); Neuwahl, N. “Joint Participation in 
International Treaties and the exercise of power by the EEC and its Member States: Mixed Agreements,” 28 Common Market 
Law Review, pp. 717-40, at 718, (1991); Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations of the European 
Communities: A Manual of Law and Practice, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 38-9. 
269 As far as parallel competence is concerned, Schermers, H. G. notes in “A Typology of Mixed Agreements” IN O´KEEFFE, 
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obligations of the Member States.270 For example, the Agreement establishing the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD),271 which is open to States and the EC alike,272 obliges “each 
Contracting Party to provide financial resources as a loan or grant to a third State or international fund 
(assuming that the participation of the EC would be covered by the Community budget).”273 The given 
situation can be more complex if financial assistance does not come from the Community budget but 
from a separate fund, consisting of Member States’ contributions and based on a separate internal 
agreement between or among the Member States. An example of it could be Case C-316/91 Parliament v
Council274 as well as Opinion 1/78 (Re Draft International Agreement on Natural Rubber).275 
Another example could well be the adherence to the 1989 Protocol Relating to the Madrid 
Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, prompted by the need to protect the 
Community trademark.276 According to Article 10 of the Madrid Protocol, each Contracting Party, 
 
D. & SCHERMERS, H. MIXED AGREEMENTS, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983, that such treaties, which are 
covered by a formal (as distinct from a substantial) definition of mixed agreements, are “inherently…not of a mixed nature”. 
270 For a discussion on the conclusion of external international agreements and their effect on Community law and the law of 
the EU Member States, see Neuwahl, N. “Individuals and the GATT: Direct Effect and Indirect Effects of the GATT in 
Community Law,” in Emiliou & O’Keeffe, D. The European Union and World Trade Law after the GATT Uruguay Round,
Wiley, 1996; Lee & Kennedy, “The Potential Direct Effect of the GATT 1994 in EC Law,” 30 Journal of World Trade 67 
(1996); Leigh, Blakeslee & Ederington (eds.) National Treaty Law and Practice (ASIL 1999). 
271 Founded in 1991, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) uses the tools of investment to help 
build market economies and democracies in 27 countries from central Europe to central Asia. The EBRD is owned by 60 
countries and two intergovernmental institutions. Despite its public sector shareholders, it invests mainly in private enterprises, 
usually together with commercial partners. The EBRD provides project financing for banks, industries, and businesses, both 
new ventures and investments in existing companies. It also works with publicly-owned companies to support privatization, 
restructuring state-owned firms, and improvement of municipal services. The EBRD’s mandate stipulates that it must only 
work in countries that are committed to democratic principles. The EBRD is directed by its founding agreement to promote, in 
the full range of its activities, environmentally sound and sustainable development. For more information on the EBRD, see 
MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 
1996, at 187-89. 
272 1990 OJ L372/1. 
273 MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 
1996, at 129. 
274 1994 E.C.R. I-625. 
275 1979 E.C.R. 2871. 
276 Commission Proposal for a Council decision approving the accession of the EC to the Protocol, COM (96) 367 final of July 
22, 1996. 
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including the EC, has one vote.277 This implies that the EC and its Member States may have altogether 26 
votes, a principle contested by the United States, which has so far refused to adhere to the Protocol.278 
A.2.- Shared Competences
As for shared competences, they imply some division of the rights and obligations in the agreement 
between the Community and the Member States. According to Dolmans, one can distinguish between 
 
277 Article 10 of the 1989 Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks 
reads: 
 
(1)  
(a) The Contracting Parties shall be members of the same Assembly as the countries party to the Madrid (Stockholm) 
Agreement. 
(b) Each Contracting Party shall be represented in that Assembly by one delegate, who may be assisted by alternate delegates, 
advisors, and experts. 
(c) The expenses of each delegation shall be borne by the Contracting Party which has appointed it, except for the travel 
expenses and the subsistence allowance of one delegate for each Contracting Party, which shall be paid from the funds of the 
Union. 
(2) The Assembly shall, in addition to the functions which it has under the Madrid (Stockholm) Agreement, also 
(i) deal with all matters concerning the implementation of this Protocol; 
(ii) give directions to the International Bureau concerning the preparation for conferences of revision of this Protocol, due 
account being taken of any comments made by those countries of the Union which are not party to this Protocol; 
(iii) adopt and modify the provisions of the Regulations concerning the implementation of this Protocol; 
(iv) perform such other functions as are appropriate under this Protocol. 
(3)  
(a) Each Contracting Party shall have one vote in the Assembly. On matters concerning only countries that are party to the 
Madrid (Stockholm) Agreement, Contracting Parties that are not party to the said Agreement shall not have the right to vote, 
whereas, on matters concerning only Contracting Parties, only the latter shall have the right to vote. 
(b) One–half of the members of the Assembly which have the right to vote on a given matter shall constitute the quorum for 
the purposes of the vote on that matter. 
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (b), if, in any session, the number of the members of the Assembly having 
the right to vote on a given matter which are represented is less than one–half but equal to or more than one–third of the 
members of the Assembly having the right to vote on that matter, the Assembly may make decisions but, with the exception of 
decisions concerning its own procedure, all such decisions shall take effect only if the conditions set forth hereinafter are 
fulfilled. The International Bureau shall communicate the said decisions to the members of the Assembly having the right to 
vote on the said matter which were not represented and shall invite them to express in writing their vote or abstention within a 
period of three months from the date of the communication. If, at the expiry of this period, the number of such members 
having thus expressed their vote or abstention attains the number of the members which was lacking for attaining the quorum 
in the session itself, such decisions shall take effect provided that at the same time the required majority still obtains. 
(d) Subject to the provisions of Articles 5(2)(e), 9sexies(2), 12 and 13(2), the decisions of the Assembly shall require two–
thirds of the votes cast. 
(e) Abstentions shall not be considered as votes. 
(f) A delegate may represent, and vote in the name of, one member of the Assembly only. 
(4) In addition to meeting in ordinary sessions and extraordinary sessions as provided for by the Madrid (Stockholm) 
Agreement, the Assembly shall meet in extraordinary session upon convocation by the Director General, at the request of one–
fourth of the members of the Assembly having the right to vote on the matters proposed to be included in the agenda of the 
session. The agenda of such an extraordinary session shall be prepared by the Director General. 
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mixed agreements with coexistent competence and mixed agreements with concurrent competence.279 Let 
us start with the latter case. 
 
A.2.a.- Concurrent Competences
A mixed agreement with concurrent competences implies that the agreement in question forms a certain 
whole or totality which is indivisible or cannot be separated into two parts. P. Allot, when referring to 
concurrent competence, speaks of mixed agreements “in the strong sense”, meaning that the Community 
and Member States participation is “inextricably confused”.280 Such a truly shared-competences situation 
may arise principally if there is a non-exclusive Community competence covering the whole and entire 
agreement. Articles 111, paragraph 5 (agreements relating to economic and monetary policy), 174, 
paragraph 4 (environmental agreements) and 181 paragraph 2 (agreements relating to development 
cooperation) of the EC Treaty provide that not only the Community, but also the Member States, may 
negotiate in international bodies and conclude international agreements. Nevertheless, according to a 
Declaration on Articles 111, 174 and 181 EC contained in the Final Act of the TEU, this (non-exclusive) 
competence is subject to the European Road Transport Agreement (ERTA) judgment of the European 
Court of Justice, that is to say, the principle by which the adoption of common rules by the Community 
may create exclusive Community competences also on the fields covered by the said Articles. 
There are also other areas where the Community may have a non-exclusive competence to 
conclude agreements if it has a corresponding competence to establish internal rules and this specific 
competence has not yet been used. In this respect, we have as examples the joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76 
 
278 Rosas, A. “The European Union and Mixed Agreements,” in DASHWOOD, A. & HILLION, C. (eds.) THE GENERAL 
LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS, 2000, p. 203. 
279 DOLMANS, M. J. F. M. PROBLEMS OF MIXED AGREEMENTS: DIVISION OF POWERS WITHIN THE EEC AND 
THE RIGHT OF THIRD STATES, Asser Instituut, The Hague, 1985, p. 25, 39-42, 97. 
280 Allot, P "Adherance and Withdrawal from Mixed Agreements" in O´KEEFFE, D. & SCHERMERS, H. (EDS.) MIXED 
AGREEMENTS, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983, p. 118-9. 
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Kramer,281 as well as Opinion 2/91 (ILO Convention No. 170)282 and Opinion 2/92 (OECD National 
Treatment Instrument).283 According to A. Rosas, even if this specific competence has been used, "the 
external competence may rest at least partly non-exclusive if the common internal rules are considered as 
minimum rules only284 ...[as an example we have Opinion 2/91 (ILO Convention No. 170)285]... or [if the 
common internal rules] do not cover the whole area regulated in the international agreement.286"287 An 
example of the latter case is Opinion 1/94 (WTO Agreement). 
 
A.2.b.- Coexistent Competences
As for mixed agreements with coexistent competence, since the agreements contain provisions which fall 
under the exclusive competence of the Community and/or the Member States, respectively,288 it is “in 
principle possible to divide it into two separate parts, for which either the Community or the Member 
States are responsible.”289 Rosas suggests, as an example of this, a treaty containing one chapter on trade 
in goods and another on military defence. This situation could be seen as if we were dealing with two 
different treaties presented in one document.290 In this respect, P. Allot notes that for such mixed 
agreements “in the weak sense” it should not be possible to separate completely the Community and 
 
281 1976 E.C.R. 1303 at 1308-1309 (paragraphs 19-34). See Koers, A.W. “The External Authority of the EEC in Regard to 
Marine Fisheries,” 14 Common Market Law Review, pp. 269-301, (1977). 
282 1993 E.C.R. I-1061 at 1076-1077 (paragraphs 7, 12). 
283 1995 E.C.R. I-521 at 558-560. 
284(footnote original) Opinion 2/91 at 1078-1080 and MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. The External Relations of 
the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, at 66. 
285 1993 E.C.R. I-1061 at 1078-1080. 
286 (footnote original) See notably Opinion 1/94 (WTO Agreement) [1994] ECR I-5267. 
287 Rosas, A. “Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements” in KOSKENNIEMI, M. (ed.) INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 131. 
288 Cremona, M. “The Doctrine of Exclusivity and the Position of Mixed Agreements,” 2 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 393 
(1982); Cremona, M. “External Relations and External Competence: The Emergence of an Integrated Policy,” in Craig, P. & 
de Burca (eds.) The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 137-75; Koutrakos, P. “The Interpretation of 
Mixed Agreements under the Preliminary Reference Procedure,” 7 European Foreign Affairs Review, 25 (2002). 
289 Rosas, A. “Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements” in KOSKENNIEMI, M. (ED.) INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF 
THE EUROPEAN UNION, Kluwer Law International, 1998, pp. 128-33, at 129. 
290 Rosas, A. “The European Union and Mixed Agreements,” in DASHWOOD, A. & HILLION, C. (eds.) THE GENERAL 
LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS, 2000, p. 204. 
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Member States parts of the agreement.291 In the book by Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External 
Relations of the European Communities, (1996), the authors mention as an example the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material Convention discussed in Ruling 1/78 (See Ruling 1/78, Re the Draft 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Facilities and Transports).292 
If there are real national competences involved which "coexist" with EC competences, then the 
nature of the agreement may make it difficult to separate the agreement into two parts.293 In this respect, 
the ECJ has said that the Community and the Member States share competence where an agreement 
covers both matters within the exclusive competences of the Member States and matters within the 
exclusive competence of the EC.294 An example which gives evidence of this is the Natural Rubber 
Opinion 1/78, which addressed a scheme where, under a commodity agreement,295 Member States would 
have directly financed the agreement, with the pertinent implications for its decision-making procedures, 
even if the essential policy of such an agreement came within the Community's exclusive competence 
under Article 133 EC.296 On the relevance of Member State financing of the agreement, see Opinion 1/94 
(Re WTO Agreement)297 and Case C-316/91, Parliament v. Council298 and Opinion of Advocate-General 
Jacobs, paragraphs 55-59. This Natural Rubber case is related to Community participation in 
commodities agreements in pursuance of the common commercial policy. 
In the case of coexistent competence, there is what Rosas calls a presumed "horizontal" (sectorial) 
distribution of competences (commercial policy, due to trade in goods, and defence policy, due to military 
 
291 Allot, P. "Adherence to and Withdrawl from Mixed Agreements" IN O´KEEFFE, D. & SCHERMERS, H. (eds.) MIXED 
AGREEMENTS, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983, pp. 97-121 at pp. 118-119. 
292 1978 E.C.R. 2151. 
293 MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 
1996, at 131. 
294 MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 
1996, at 65. 
295 On commodity agreements, see Garden-Ashworth, F. International Commodity Control: A Contemporary History and 
Appraisal, London: Croom-Helm, 1984; Ernst, E. International Commodity Agreements: The System of Controlling the 
International Commodity Market, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982; Khan, Kabir-ur-Rahman The Law and Organization of 
International Commodity Agreements, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982. 
296 See 1979 E.C.R. 2871, at 2917-2918 (paragraphs 57-60); 1978 E.C.R. 2151, at 2180 (paragraph 36); MACLEOD, I., 
HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, at 65. 
297 1995 1 COMMON MKT. L. REV., 205 at paragraphs 19 and 20. 
EC Polycephalous Anatomy  Rafael Leal-Arcas 
 
71
policy). One can also imagine a more "vertical" distribution of competences. By this, we mean a situation 
in which "the Community would be competent to conclude the main substantive parts of the agreement, 
while Member State participation would be deemed necessary because of the nature of its obligations 
relating to the implementation and enforcement of those substantive parts." 299 As an example we can take 
into account the agreement considered in Ruling 1/78 (Re the Draft Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Materials, Facilities and Transports), in which, as far as its provisions on penal 
sanctions and extradition were concerned, Member State participation was required.300 
One more example could be that of the 1995 UN Agreement Relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. This agreement, mainly 
because of its provisions on compliance and enforcement (Part VI), has been defined by the Council of 
the EU as a mixed agreement. Following this line of argument, in an EC Declaration submitted upon 
signature in accordance with Article 47,301 it is noted that, while the Community has exclusive 
 
298 1994 E.C.R. I-625. 
299 Rosas, A. “Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements” in KOSKENNIEMI, M. (ed.) INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 130. 
300 Ruling 1/78, 1978 E.C.R. 2151, at 2180 (paragraph 36). 
301 Article 47 of the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks reads: 
 
1. In cases where an international organization referred to in article 1 of Annex IX to the Convention does not have 
competence over all the matters governed by this Agreement, Annex IX to the Convention shall apply mutatis mutandis to 
participation by such international organization in this Agreement, except that the following provisions of that Annex shall not 
apply:  
(a) article 2, first sentence; and  
(b) article 3, paragraph 1.  
2. In cases where an international organization referred to in article 1 of Annex IX to the Convention has competence over all 
the matters governed by this Agreement, the following provisions shall apply to participation by such international 
organization in this Agreement:  
(a) at the time of signature or accession, such international organization shall make a declaration stating:  
(i) that it has competence over all the matters governed by this Agreement;  
(ii) that, for this reason, its member States shall not become States Parties, except in respect of their territories for which the 
international organization has no responsibility; and  
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competence with respect to the conservation and management of living marine resources, including the 
regulatory competence granted under international law to the flag State in this respect, measures such as 
refusal, withdrawal or suspension of authorization to serve as masters and other officers of fishing 
vessels, as well as certain enforcement measures relating to the exercise of jurisdiction by the flag State 
over its vessels on the high seas, are within the competence of the Member States.302 
However, in many cases the provisions relating to possible "coexistent" Member States 
competences may be of such a limited relevance that they should be seen as ancillary (subsidiary) to the 
essential objectives of the agreement.303 The ECJ has cases on subsidiary provisions, which are often 
related to Article 133 EC on common commercial policy. I would like to illustrate one case and two 
opinions from the ECJ as examples of what has been previously said: Opinion 1/78 (Re Draft 
International Agreement on Natural Rubber),304 Opinion 1/94 (Re WTO Agreement)305 and Case C-
268/94 Portugal v. Council.306 In this last case, the ECJ concludes in its paragraph 77 as follows: 
 
Furthermore, with regard to the linking of Article 10 of the Agreement [Cooperation 
Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of India on Partnership 
and Development] to commercial policy, it is sufficient to point out that the Community is 
entitled to include in external agreements otherwise falling within the ambit of Article 133 
ancillary provisions for the organization of purely consultative procedures or clauses 
calling on the other party to raise the level of protection of intellectual property (see, to 
that effect, Opinion 1/94, paragraph 68). 
 
(iii) that it accepts the rights and obligations of States under this Agreement;  
(b) participation of such an international organization shall in no case confer any rights under this Agreement on member states 
of the international organization;  
(c) in the event of a conflict between the obligations of an international organization under this Agreement and its obligations 
under the agreement establishing the international organization or any acts relating to it, the obligations under this Agreement 
shall prevail.  
302 See (1996) Law of the Sea Bulletin 32, p. 26. 
303 Rosas, A. “Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements” in KOSKENNIEMI, M. (ed.) INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 130. 
304 1979 E.C.R. 2871 at 1917 (paragraph 56). 
305 1994 E.C.R. I-5278, at I-5408 (paragraphs 66-68). 
306 Judgment of 3 December 1996, paragraphs 75, 77. For an academic comment on the case, see Peers, S. “Fragmentation or 
Evasion in the Community’s Development Policy? The Impact of Portugal v. Council,” in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. (eds.)  
The General Law of EC  External Relations, Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, pp. 100-12. 
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MacLeod et al. assert that 
 
“the principal consequence of shared competence is that the Member States still have 
power to enter into agreements and to take action in the areas in question [...]. Although 
the concept of shared external competence is well established in Community law and 
practice, it has not always been possible to persuade third States to recognise that the legal 
powers and interests of the Community and Member States co-exist.307 Third States have 
tended to insist that either the Community or the Member States should accept legal 
responsibility for a given matter, and that both cannot be responsible, or exercise rights at 
the same time, on the same matters. The extent to which international law recognises the 
concept of "shared competence" is therefore open to debate”.308 
At the same time, it must be said that the fact that Member States will have obligations concerning 
the implementation and execution of the agreement does not classify the agreement as mixed. As means 
of evidence, we have Opinion 1/75 (Understanding on a Local Cost Standard).309 Here the Court held that 
“it is of little importance that the obligations and the financial burdens inherent to the execution of the 
agreement envisaged are borne directly by the Member States.”310 Another example is Opinion 2/91 (ILO 
Convention No 170).311 
B.- Type of Mixity
Mixity can also be classified as facultative (non-compulsory) and obligatory, i.e. legally necessary. 
Where the competence of the EC is non-exclusive but there are no competences specifically reserved for 
Member States either, then as a matter of EC law this mixity becomes facultative, optional, non-
compulsory. For example, the environmental agreements or development cooperation agreements. This 
means that you may have pure Community agreements with shared competence. The language of the EC 
Treaty makes it very clear that development cooperation is not exclusive EC competence, and yet the EC 
 
307 This is mainly the case in the World Intellectual Property Organization. 
308 MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 
1996, at 63. 
309 1975 E.C.R. 1355. 
310 1975 E.C.R. 1361 at 1364. 
311 1993 E.C.R. I-1061 at 1082 (paragraph 34). 
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concludes concludes international agreements on its own. Thus, one must have a mixed agreement only 
when part of the agreement covers matters outside EC competence altogether, but EU Member States are 
free to insist on a mixed agreement whenever there is shared competence.  
As Rosas argues, in cases of concurrent competences, mixity is facultative ab initio. However, if 
the Council and the Member States insist on mixity for political reasons, the question arises as to whether 
parts of the agreement become reserved for the Member States, in which case they should all become 
Contracting Parties.312 We should also illustrate, in this same line of argument, the example of an Opinion 
(No. 20/1995) given on 30 November 1995 by the Constitutional Committee to the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the Finnish Parliament. This Opinion discusses problems concerning the ratification of the 
1995 Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their 
Member States, on the one part, and the Republic of Estonia before it was a member of the EU, on the 
other.313 
As far as obligatory mixity is concerned, it is understood that it is necessary to have the 
participation of both the Member States and the EC on a particular issue. A classical example of 
obligatory mixity is the Law of the Sea Convention, where it is highly difficult to have one voice 
representing the EU. In such a case, we deal with what is called “subordination clauses,”314 which provide 
that the EC can become a party only if one or more of the Member States have become parties. As an 
example we have Article 3 of the Annex IX to the Law of the Sea Convention (1982),315 which advocates 
that the EC may become a party only if a majority of the Member States ratifies or accedes.316 
312 Rosas, A. “Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements” in KOSKENNIEMI, M. (ed.) INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 132. 
313 Id. at p. 143. 
314 Close, G. Subordination Clauses in Mixed Agreements (1985), 34 ICLQ, pp. 382-91. 
315 Article 3 of the Annex IX to the Law of the Sea Convention reads: 
 
1. An international organization may deposit its instrument of formal confirmation or of accession if a majority of its member 
States deposit or have deposited their instruments of ratification or accession. 
2. The instruments deposited by the international organization shall contain the undertakings and declarations required by 
articles 4 and 5 of this Annex. 
316 Simmonds, K. R. The Communities Declaration Upon Signature of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (1986) 23 
COMMON MKT. L. REV., 521-44. The LOSC entered into force on 16 November 1994. However, an agreement on Part IX 
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This distinction between obligatory and facultative mixity is not always recognized in practice. 
Proof of it are the discussions in the framework of the Council of the EU (including COREPER and the 
Working Groups) on the European Community versus mixed character of a given agreement, where it is 
almost always taken for granted that the lack of exclusive Community competences requires mixity out of 
necessity.317 
However, it may sometimes be difficult to apply to certain cases, as can be deduced from 
uncertainties such as whether Opinion 1/94 implies that Member States participation in the WTO 
Agreements on services (GATS)318 and intellectual property rights (TRIPS) was legally necessary or 
simply legally possible. The Commission asked the Court to rule that the Community had exclusive 
competence to adhere to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), either under Article 133 EC, the ERTA doctrine, 
implied powers in accordance with Opinion 1/76,319 or Articles 95 EC320 and 235 EC.321 In denying their 
 
of the LOCS has meant that there is a much greater likelihood that more Member States will ratify. Ratification of the LOSC 
by the EC is under active consideration. A delay in ratification already announced by the UK in May 1996 may delay EC 
ratification. 
317 Rosas, A. “Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements” in KOSKENNIEMI, M. (ed.) INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 132, note 34. 
318 For an analysis of the GATS from a European perspective, see Guild & Barth, “The Movement of Natural Persons and the 
GATS: A UK Perspective and European Dilemma,” 4 European Foreign Affairs Review 395 (1999); Eeckhout, P. 
“Constitutional Concepts for Free Trade in Services,” in de Burca, G. & Scott, J. (eds.) The EU and the WTO: Legal and 
Constitutional Issues, Hart Publishing, 2001; Hermann, “Common Commercial Policy after Nice: Sisyphus would have done a 
better job,” 39 Common Market Law Review 7 (2002); Djordjevic, “Domestic Regulation and Free Trade in Services – A 
Balancing Act,” 29 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 305 (2002). 
319 Opinion 1/76 (Re the Draft Agreement for a Laying-up Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels) (Rhine Navigation Case), 1977 
E.C.R. 741. For an analysis of Opinion 1/76, see Hardy, M. “Opinion 1/76 of the Court of Justice,” 14 Common Market Law 
Review, p. 561, 1977. 
320 Article 95 EC reads: 
 
1.   By way of derogation from Article 94 and save where otherwise provided in this Treaty, the following provisions shall 
apply for the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 14. The Council shall, acting in accordance with the procedure 
referred to in Article 251 and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation 
of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their object the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market. 
2.   Paragraph 1 shall not apply to fiscal provisions, to those relating to the free movement of persons nor to those relating to 
the rights and interests of employed persons. 
3.   The Commission, in its proposals envisaged in paragraph 1 concerning health, safety, environmental protection and 
consumer protection, will take as a base a high level of protection, taking account in particular of any new development based 
on scientific facts. Within their respective powers, the European Parliament and the Council will also seek to achieve this 
objective. 
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existence of exclusive competences for the whole subject areas covered by these two treaties, the Court 
concluded that the GATS and TRIPS Agreement are mixed agreements. Some of the Member States had 
argued that those provisions of the TRIPS Agreement fall within their competence. The Court replied that 
"if that argument is to be understood as meaning that all those matters are within some sort of domain 
reserved to the Member States, it cannot be accepted. The Community is certainly competent to 
harmonize national rules on those matters…"322 
What has been said so far concerning the types of competences in the external relations of the EU 
can be graphically shown as follows: 
________________________________________________________________________ 
A.- Type of competence    B.- Type of mixity 
________________________________________________________________________ 
A.1.- parallel competences    facultative mixity 
 
4.   If, after the adoption by the Council or by the Commission of a harmonisation measure, a Member State deems it necessary 
to maintain national provisions on grounds of major needs referred to in Article 30, or relating to the protection of the 
environment or the working environment, it shall notify the Commission of these provisions as well as the grounds for 
maintaining them. 
5.   Moreover, without prejudice to paragraph 4, if, after the adoption by the Council or by the Commission of a harmonisation 
measure, a Member State deems it necessary to introduce national provisions based on new scientific evidence relating to the 
protection of the environment or the working environment on grounds of a problem specific to that Member State arising after 
the adoption of the harmonisation measure, it shall notify the Commission of the envisaged provisions as well as the grounds 
for introducing them. 
6.   The Commission shall, within six months of the notifications as referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5, approve or reject the 
national provisions involved after having verified whether or not they are a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on trade between Member States and whether or not they shall constitute an obstacle to the functioning of the 
internal market. 
In the absence of a decision by the Commission within this period the national provisions referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 
shall be deemed to have been approved. 
When justified by the complexity of the matter and in the absence of danger for human health, the Commission may notify the 
Member State concerned that the period referred to in this paragraph may be extended for a further period of up to six months. 
7.   When, pursuant to paragraph 6, a Member State is authorised to maintain or introduce national provisions derogating from 
a harmonisation measure, the Commission shall immediately examine whether to propose an adaptation to that measure. 
8.   When a Member State raises a specific problem on public health in a field which has been the subject of prior 
harmonisation measures, it shall bring it to the attention of the Commission which shall immediately examine whether to 
propose appropriate measures to the Council. 
9.   By way of derogation from the procedure laid down in Articles 226 and 227, the Commission and any Member State may 
bring the matter directly before the Court of Justice if it considers that another Member State is making improper use of the 
powers provided for in this Article. 
10.   The harmonisation measures referred to above shall, in appropriate cases, include a safeguard clause authorising the 
Member States to take, for one or more of the non-economic reasons referred to in Article 30, provisional measures subject to 
a Community control procedure. 
321 Article 235 EC reads: The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction in disputes relating to compensation for damage provided 
for in the second paragraph of Article 288 [EC]. 
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A.2.- Shared competences 
 a.- Concurrent competences   facultative mixity 
 b.- Coexistent competences   obligatory mixity 
 b.1.- Horizontally 
 b.2.- Vertically 
 
Lena Granvik denotes that "mixed agreements are concluded especially in the field of the 
environment, entailing that both the European Community and some or even all of its Member States 
individually become parties to the international environmental agreement."323 According to this author 
there are two types of mixed agreements: complete and incomplete mixed agreements. Complete mixed 
agreements means that both the EC and all its Member States are treaty-parties, whereas the concept of 
incomplete mixed agreements implies that only some of the EC Member States have acceded to the 
agreement in question along with the EC. However, it must be said that incomplete mixed agreements 
bind all the Member States of the Community.324 What the case-law and primary legislation indicate is 
that Member States, whether they are parties or not, “have the obligation to co-operate with the EC in the 
implementation of the Community’s international obligations.”325 In addition to that, a mixed agreement, 
which does not distinguish between the rights and obligations of the EC and the Member States, gives 
obligations to both the EC and its Member States under all its provisions. 
 
322 1994 E.C.R. I-5418-5419, paragraph 104. 
323 Granvik, L. Incomplete Mixed Environmental Agreements of the Community and the Principle of Bindingness, in 
Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Kluwer Law International, 1998, 
at 255. 
324 Granvik, L. Incomplete Mixed Environmental Agreements of the Community and the Principle of Bindingness, in 
Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Kluwer Law International, 1998, 
at 269. 
325 Granvik, L. Incomplete Mixed Environmental Agreements of the Community and the Principle of Bindingness, in 
Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Kluwer Law International, 1998, 
at 270. 
EC Polycephalous Anatomy  Rafael Leal-Arcas 
 
78
It should be mentioned that the above given typology should only and merely be seen as a tool to 
assist in the structuring of the discussion on the legal nature an implications of mixed agreements.326 
Some agreements may fall under several of these categories, as can be seen from the ILO Convention No. 
170 as interpreted by the Court of Justice in its Opinion 2/91.327 In this Opinion, the Court seemed to hold 
that Part III of the Convention belonged to exclusive EC competence and the other parts to non-exclusive 
EC competence because the relevant Community directives set minimum standards. The representation of 
certain dependent territories belonged to the competence of some Member States. However, this right of 
representation is, strictly speaking, not a question of mixity, as the Member States involved do not act in 
their capacity as EU Member States.328 
VII. Conclusion of Mixed Agreements 
 
There seems to be uncertainty about the nature and legal implications of joint participation by the EC and 
its Member States in the conclusion of international agreements.329 Rosas argues in this respect that “the 
phenomenon of mixed agreements is still surrounded by a host of question marks, both of a theoretical 
and practical nature.”330 In this sense, within the legal scholarship, three main and divergent positions can 
be presented: 1) one part of the doctrine has tried to reduce the mixed procedure to only exceptional cases 
of some compelling legal reasons;331 2) another part of the doctrine has focused on the practical and 
theoretical problems of mixed procedure, limiting EU Member States’ participation in the EC’s 
 
326 Rosas, A. “The European Union and Mixed Agreements,” in DASHWOOD, A. & HILLION, C. (eds.) THE GENERAL 
LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS, 2000, p. 207. 
327 1993 E.C.R. I-1061. 
328 Rosas, A. “The European Union and Mixed Agreements,” in DASHWOOD, A. & HILLION, C. (EDS.) THE GENERAL 
LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS, 2000, p. 207; MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. The External Relations of 
the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, at 65-66. 
329 See Hartley, T. C. “National Law, International Law and EU Law -  How do they Relate?” in Capps, Evans & 
Konstadinidis (eds.) Asserting Jurisdiction: International and European Legal Perspectives, Hart, 2003. 
330 Rosas, A. in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) International Law Aspects of the European Union, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 
127. 
331 Pescatore, P. “External Relations in the Case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities,” 16 CMLRev.
(1979) pp. 624 and 642. 
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international agreements to a minimum;332 3) a third group of scholars has a more dogmatic approach to 
obtain normative propositions by interpreting the various provisions of international agreements or by 
extrapolation from the general schemes of EC law and international law.333 
VIII. Implications of Mixed Agreements for Third Parties 
 
In this section, we shall evaluate the validity and the effects that the EC’s international agreements have 
on non-Member States of the EU.334 As we know, mixed agreements are, together with the exclusive 
Community agreements, one of the two methods by which the Community undertakes contractual 
international obligations.335 In fact, although no specific provision is made in the EC Treaty for joint 
participation of the EC and its Member States in international agreements, the practice of concluding 
mixed agreements is well established in the law of the European Community.336 This has been recognized 
by the ECJ on several occasions. The recognition of the practice by the Court was first implied in cases 
concerning the early agreements of association.337 The first express reference which the Court made to the 
concept of mixed agreement is in Case 12/86 Demirel v. Stadt Schwaebisch Gmuend.338 Another example 
is the dicta in Opinion 1/78 on the International Natural Rubber Agreement.339 
332 Rosas, A. in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) International Law Aspects of the European Union, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 
125; Rosas, A. in DASHWOOD, A. & HILLION, C. (EDS.) THE GENERAL LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS, 
2000, p. 200; Ehlermann, C.D., in O´Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. (eds.) Mixed Agreements, Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers, 1983, p. 3. 
333 Bleckmann, A. “Der gemischte Vertrag im Europarecht,” Europarecht, 1976, p. 301; Stein, K.D. Der gemischte Vertrag im 
Recht der Ausserbeziehungen der Europaeische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Duncker & Humbolt, Berlin, 1986, p. 23; 
Bleckmann, A. in O’KEEFFE, D. & SCHERMERS, H. (EDS.) MIXED AGREEMENTS, Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers, 1983, p. 155. 
334 For a broader spectrum of the implications of international agreements on States, see a legal analysis by Andrew Guzman, 
"THE DESIGN OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS" (November 10, 2004). International Legal Studies Program. 
International Legal Studies Working Papers Series. Paper 8.  
http://repositories.cdlib.org/ils/wp/8 (last visited December 13, 2005). 
335 Ehlermann, C. D. “Mixed Agreements: A List of Problems” in O’KEEFFE, D. & SCHERMERS, H. (EDS.) MIXED 
AGREEMENTS, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983, pp. 3-21. 
336 Heliskoski, J. Mixed Agreements as a Technique for Organizing the International Relations of the European Community 
and its Member States, Kluwer Law International, 2001, p. 2. 
337 Case 96/71 Haegeman v. Commission [1972] E.C.R. 1005 concerning the 1961 Agreement with Greece. 
338 [1987] E.C.R. 3719, paras. 8-9. 
339 [1979] E.C.R. 2871, paras. 2 and 29. 
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The answer to specific legal problems arising from the issue of mixity may vary depending on the 
subject-matter, in other words, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in the field of mixed agreements 
and the responsibility and liability of the EC and its Member States vis-à-vis third States, inter alia.340 
This, then, leads me to the next section. 
 
A.- Liabilities of the EC and the Member States to Third Parties341 
Within the EC legal order, the Community and the Member States are responsible for the implementation 
of those parts of a mixed agreement which fall within their respective competences. The only 
authoritative discussion of the liability of the Community and the Member States under a mixed 
agreement is in the opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs in Case C-316/91, where he literally said: 
 
The Lome Convention was concluded as a mixed agreement (i.e. by the Community 
and its Member States jointly) and has essentially a bilateral character. This is made clear 
in Article 1 which states that the Convention is concluded between the Community and its 
Member States of the one part, and the ACP States of the other part. Under a mixed 
agreement the Community and the Member States are jointly liable unless the provisions 
of the agreement point to the opposite conclusion (Emphasis added).342 
Generally, each party to an international agreement is responsible for performance of its own 
obligations, and joint liability under an agreement is not usually to be presumed. However, the special 
circumstances of the EC and the Member States may lead to an exception to this rule. The EC and the 
Member States generally work together in pursuit of a common policy. Since it is very difficult to 
determine where legal powers lie between the EC and the Member States, for the third party the most 
convenient conclusion is that the EC and the Member States assume joint obligations and that they are 
 
340 Rosas, A. “The European Union and Mixed Agreements,” in DASHWOOD, A. & HILLION, C. (EDS.) THE GENERAL 
LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS, 2000, p. 207. 
341 Nicolin, S. “Modalità di Funzionamento e di Attuazione degli Accordi Misti,” in Daniele, L. (ed.) Le Relazioni Esterne 
dell’Unione Europea nel Nuovo Millennio, Giuffrè Editore, 2001, pp. 177-213. 
342 1994 E.C.R. I-625, at para. 69. 
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required to assure these joint obligations. The ECJ, with its emphasis on the “requirement of unity” in the 
external representation of the Community, concurs. The ECJ also emphasizes this view in cases such as 
Ruling 1/78 (Re Draft Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials)343 and Case 104/81 
Hauptzollamt Mainz v. Kupferberg.344 
In agreements where the rights and obligations of the EC and the Member States are inter-linked, 
the problem of the respective liabilities of the Community and the Member States will arise quite clearly. 
In other words, we are dealing here with cases where the nature of the agreement is such that a third party 
is entitled to respond to Community or Member State action in one area covered by the agreement by 
retaliation of another area. The main example is the WTO Agreement and those agreements associated 
with it, but in principle the issue could arise in any international agreement to which the Community and 
the Member States were parties. Macleod et al. go further in the explanation by saying that: 
 
“if the action and retaliation take place in respect of matters entirely within the 
competence of the Community or entirely within the competence of the Member States, 
the problems are less intractable. If, however, the third party responds to action in an area 
of Member State competence by retaliation in an area within the competence of the 
Community, the need for close cooperation between the Community and the Member 
States is evident.”345 
When an agreement is covered by a general rule of the law of treaties, by which a party is 
responsible for all obligations of the treaty unless it makes a reservation, we are dealing with an 
agreement which is not mixed under a formal or under a substantive definition of mixed agreements. In 
extreme cases, as Schermers mentions, the position might be defended that, in such a case, adherence by 
the Community implies a tacit reservation in the sense that the EC cannot be held liable for matters which 
are outside its competence.346 In these cases, Article 46 of the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
 
343 1978 E.C.R. 2151, at para. 35. 
344 1982 E.C.R. 3641, at paras. 13 and 14. 
345 MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 
1996, at 159-60. 
346 Schermers, H. G. "A Typology of Mixed Agreements' in O´KEEFFE, D. & SCHERMERS, H. (EDS.) MIXED 
AGREEMENTS, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983, p. 28. 
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Treaties347 between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations 
(VCLTIO)348 will apply. It reads: 
 
1.- A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been 
expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude 
treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule 
of its internal law of fundamental importance. 
2.- An international organization may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound 
by a treaty has been expressed in violation of the rules of the organization regarding 
competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was 
manifest and concerned a rule of fundamental importance. 
3.- A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State or any 
international organization conducting itself in the matter in accordance with the normal 
practice of States and, where appropriate, of international organizations, and in good faith. 
B.- Effects on Third Parties of Mixed Agreements Concluded in Violation of EC Law
Despite the fact that the internal legal competence of the Communities and the Communities’ procedures 
for concluding agreements are matters of EC law, both the validity and the effects of agreements, in 
relation to third countries, concluded in the framework of any rules of EC law must be taken into 
consideration in terms of international law, and not EC law.349 As Brownlie points out, the rules of 
customary law on these issues are not easy to state with certainty.350 
Within the doctrine, some argue that international law leaves the matter to the internal rules of the 
international organization to determine the procedures by which its consent to be bound has to be 
expressed. Therefore, any violation of the internal rules of the organization “vitiates the expression of 
 
347 The 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties articulates the basic rules applied to the interpretation of treaties. 
These rules are increasingly important due in large measure to the growth in treaties that directly affect non-State actors, such 
as corporations and individuals. For example, there has been a proliferation of treaties that govern international economic 
relations, trade and investment, enable the enforcement of foreign awards and judgments, protect human rights and regulate 
European integration. 
348 The 1986 Vienna Convention has not yet entered into force but it follows almost to the letter the 1969 Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331. 
349 See in this respect MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. The External Relations of the European Communities,
Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, at 129-32. 
350 BROWNLIE, I. PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, Clarendon Press, 1990, pp. 622-24. 
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such consent, and renders the agreement which has been concluded void or voidable.”351 Others believe 
that the acts of a representative of an organization acting within his authority bind the organization in 
international law, “even if the internal rules of the organization have not been complied with.”352 As a 
matter of fact, the principles which appear in Article 46 of the 1986 VCLTIO fall somewhere between the 
two previously cited schools and represent the views of the majority of jurists. 
When looking carefully at Article 46 of the 1986 VCLTIO, it will be noted that agreements 
concluded in the framework of an organization’s internal rules are not ipso facto void. As Macleod et al. 
(1996) argue, the rule in Article 46 applies in principle in favor of the State or international organization 
which has acted in violation of its own internal rules and amounts to a defence against a claim for 
performance of the agreement by the “innocent” party. Therefore, the rule in Article 46 would not apply 
to a State or organization which has concluded an agreement with the EC to claim that such an agreement 
was void because it had been concluded against a rule of the EC’s internal legal order. The rest of Article 
46 reinforces this presumption in favor of the validity of agreements which have been duly concluded. 
One of the parties in the agreement must show that the violation of its internal rules was “manifest” in 
order to invoke an expression of consent to be bound by that agreement. In order to determine whether a 
violation is “manifest”, Article 46(3) clarifies the situation: the violation must have been “objectively 
evident” to a party acting in accordance with normal practice and in good faith. In addition to that, the 
internal rule involved must have been “of fundamental importance.” 
Determining the extent to which the powers of the Communities relate to a given agreement is not 
always easy. Sometimes the particular roles and competences of each of the Community institutions in 
the process of concluding agreements may not be so obvious. In this regard, irregularities when 
concluding an agreement may not be “manifest” to third parties. This is so because if an agreement which 
has been irregularly concluded is voided, it could be a problem for third parties. 
 
351 MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 
1996, at 130. 
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The ECJ supports this view in Case C-327/91 France v. Commission.353 This case concerned the 
Commission’s power to conclude an agreement between the Community and the United States in relation 
to competition. The Court’s opinion was that the Commission had no such power, but this did not affect 
the validity of the agreement in international law: “there is no doubt… that the [Competition] Agreement 
is binding on the European Communities…In the event of non-performance of the Agreement by the 
Commission, therefore, the Community could incur liability at international level.”354 Thus, an agreement 
concluded by, or in the name of, one of the Communities will almost always be binding on that 
Community as a matter of international law. In the light of this argument, Schermers comments that:  
 
“[Foreign States] cannot be expected to know the extent of the competence of the 
Community. Whenever the Community concludes a treaty, foreign States may presume 
that it has power to do so. If the Community acted beyond its powers, it will nonetheless 
be bound unless it or its Member States can prove both its lack of competence and its 
manifest character. The latter will be especially complicated because of the complicated 
nature of EC Law.” 355 
In this regard, it is pertinent to mention Article 230 EC,356 which suggests that international acts 
are unusual in that, unlike other acts, they cannot be voided. From the reading of Article 230 EC, first 
paragraph, however, one could interpret that it is possible to annul the conclusion of international 
agreements concluded by the European Community. An example of it could be the case mentioned earlier 
 
352 Id.
353 Case C-327/91 France v Commission [1994] ECR I-3641, at para. 25. 
354 Id., at para. 25. 
355 Schermers in “The Internal Effect of Community Treaty Making” in O’KEEFFE & SCHERMERS (EDS.) ESSAYS ON 
EUROPEAN LAW AND INTEGRATION, Kluwer, 1982, pp. 167-78 at p. 173,  
356 Article 230 EC reads: 
The Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts adopted jointly by the European Parliament and the Council, of acts of the 
Council, of the Commission and of the ECB, other than recommendations and opinions, and of acts of the European 
Parliament intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. 
It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, the Council or the Commission on grounds of 
lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of law 
relating to its application, or misuse of powers. 
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction under the same conditions in actions bought by the European Parliament, by the 
Court of Auditors and by the ECB for the purpose of protecting their prerogatives. 
Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, institute proceedings against a decision addressed to that person 
or against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decisions addressed to another person, is of direct and 
individual concern to the former. 
The proceedings provided for in this article shall be instituted within two months of the publication of the measure, or of its 
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where the European Commission concluded an agreement vis-à-vis the USA on behalf of the EC on 
competition (Case C-327/91 France v Commission).357 The French Republic argued that the Commission 
had no power to conclude agreements for it is only the Council of the European Union the institution 
which has competence to conclude international agreements on behalf of the EC. In this particular case-
law, in its paragraph 7, the Court literally arguments as follows (I cite the position of the ECJ): 
 
As we know, under the first paragraph of Article 230, the Court reviews the legality of 
acts of the institutions “other than recommendations or opinions.” According to the 
relevant case-law, however, for the purposes of judicial review, it is not the form of the act 
which matters but its effects and its content which must be verified.358 The Court pointed 
out in the ERTA judgement359 that an action for annulment must be available against “all 
measures adopted by the institutions, whatever their nature or form, which are intended to 
have legal effect.”360 
Concerning the European Community institutions and the Member States, it is not easy to see how 
they could be obliged as a matter of EC law to give effect to an agreement which was out of the 
demarcation of the EC’s powers or which had been concluded in the framework of constitutional 
principles of EC law. However, as Macleod et al. mention, if agreements concluded in violation of 
internal rules of EC law usually remain valid within international law and, therefore, bind on the 
Community vis-à-vis third States, then the institutions and the Member States must make sure that the 
rights of the third State or international organization under the agreement are respected.361 According to 
Macleod et al. (1996), there are three ways by which the EU institutions and the Member States would 
have to take steps to align both the internal and external effects of the agreement: 1) by withdrawing from 
the agreement, supposing this is possible, 2) by rectifying the defect of EC law or practice which has 
made that agreement invalid or 3) by securing the participation of the Member States in the agreement 
 
notification of the plaintiff, or, in the absence thereof, of the day on which it came to the knowledge of the latter, as the case 
may be. 
357 1994 E.C.R. I-3641. 
358 See most recently, the judgment in Case C-325/91 France v Commission, 1993 E.C.R. I-3283, at paragraph 9. 
359 Judgment in Case 22/70 Commission v Council, 1971 E.C.R. 263, at paragraph 42. 
360 Case C-327/91 France v Commission [1994] ECR I-3647, at paragraph. 7. 
361 MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 
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along with the Community. A good example of the second way is the Commission’s proposal for a 
Council decision concluding the Competition Agreement with the U.S. which was the subject of 
annulment proceedings in Case C-327/91 France v. Commission.362 
However, although the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organizations or between International Organizations almost completely assimilates 
international organizations to States, its main weakness is that it does not make a distinction as to treaties 
between an international organization and one or more of its Member States and third parties.363 
Nevertheless, the International Law Commission proposed a new Article 36 bis, which reads: 
 
Obligations and rights arise for States members of an international organization from 
the provisions of a treaty to which that organization is a party when the parties to the treaty 
intend those provisions to be the means of establishing such obligations and according 
such rights and have defined their conditions and effects in the treaty or have otherwise 
agreed thereon, and if: a) the States members of the organization, by virtue of the 
constituent instrument of that organization or otherwise, have unanimously agreed to be 
bound by the said provisions of the treaty, and if: b) the assent of the States members of 
the organization to be bound by the relevant provisions of the treaty has been duly brought 
to the notice of the negotiating States and negotiating organizations.364 
This proposal of a new Article 36 bis came into existence mainly because Member States of an 
international organization appear as “third States” in regard to treaties to which the international 
organization is a party. Following the words of Riphagen, “this fiction is manifestly absurd in most cases” 
due to the fact that Member States are usually closely involved in the conclusion of a treaty by an 
international organization and also because the other party to that treaty expects performance of the 
Member States. This proposed Article 36 bis followed very closely the idea underlying Articles 34 to 37 
of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties. In other words, it followed the requirement of consent 
of a third State. In the eyes of Professor Riphagen, Article 36 bis conserves the idea of consent, “be it 
 
1996, at 132. 
362 1994 E.C.R. I-3641. See Dec. 95/145 (1995 OJ L95/45). 
363 Granvik, L. Incomplete Mixed Environmental Agreements of the Community and the Principle of Bindingness, in 
Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Kluwer Law International, 1998, 
at 262-63. 
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possibly given (1) before the fact, i.e. before the determination of the rights and obligations by the Treaty 
concluded with the international organization, and (2) given collectively.”365 In addition, Member States 
are usually very involved in the performance of the treaty.366 
The Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties did not address the question of direct effect. In the 
eyes of Professor Riphagen, this attitude of a system of general international law ignoring the domestic 
legal systems is remarkable in view of the emphasis nowadays [1987] placed on the international 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
 
IX.- The Panacea: The “Duty Of Close Cooperation” 
 
The origins of the duty of close cooperation may be tracked back to the Treaties themselves,367 
particularly to the duty of loyal cooperation368 derived by the Court from Articles 86 ECSC,369 192 
 
364 Yearbook of International Law Commission 1982, Vol. II (part 2), p. 43. 
365 CAPOTORTI, F., EHLERMANN, E.-D., FROWEIN, J., JACOBS, F., JOLIET, R., KOOPMANS, T. & KOVAR, R. 
(EDS.) DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL AU DROIT DE L’INTEGRATION, Nomo Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987, p. 568. 
366 Riphagen, W. “The Second Round of Treaty Law” in CAPOTORTI, F., EHLERMANN, E.-D., FROWEIN, J., JACOBS, 
F., JOLIET, R., KOOPMANS, T. & KOVAR, R. (EDS.) DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL AU DROIT DE L’INTEGRATION, 
Nomo Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987, pp. 565-581. 
367 For further discussion on the duty of loyal cooperation, see KAPTEYN, P. J. G. & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, P. 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Kluwer, 1982, chapter III, 5.2. 
368 The principle of loyal cooperation concerns relations between the supranational and national levels. According to Article I-
5 (2) of the Constitutional Treaty, it means that “[t]he Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and 
refrain from any measures which jeopardize the attainment of the objectives set out in the Constitution.” 
369 Article 86 of the former ECSC reads: 
 
Member States undertake to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations 
resulting from decisions and recommendations of the institutions of the Community and to facilitate the performance of the 
Community's tasks.  
 
Member States undertake to refrain from any measures incompatible with the common market referred to in Articles 1 and 4.  
 
They shall make all appropriate arrangements, as far as lies within their powers, for the settlement of international accounts 
arising out of trade in coal and steel within the common market and shall afford each other mutual assistance to facilitate such 
settlements.  
 
Officials of the Commission entrusted by it with tasks of inspection shall enjoy in the territories of Member States, to the full 
extent required for the performance of their duties, such rights and powers as are granted by the laws of these States to their 
own revenue officials. Forthcoming visits of inspection and the status of the officials shall be duly notified to the State 
concerned. Officials of that State may, at its request or at that of the Commission, assist the Commission's officials in the 
performance of their task.  
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Euratom370 and 10 EC.371 A similar duty is contained in Article 3 TEU,372 where the Council and the 
Commission are responsible for ensuring the consistency of the external activities of the Union as a whole 
in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies. This duty applies as 
much to mixed agreements as to any other area of the Union’s activity. The European Community and the 
Member States are under a legal duty to cooperate on the negotiation, conclusion and implementation of 
mixed agreements.373 This duty results from the requirement of unity in the international representation of 
the Community.374 Such cooperation is “all the more necessary” if the European Community cannot 
become party to the agreement.  
This duty to co-operate is an obligation imposed on Member States and EU institutions under 
Community law as a consequence of the competence situation for EC participation in the WTO. 
Formerly, the repealed Article 116 EEC was available for that purpose. It obliged Member States to 
proceed within the framework of international organizations of an economic character on matters of 
particular interest to the common market only by common action. However, ex-Article 116 EEC Treaty 
was regrettably deleted at Maastricht. It had proven to be a useful legal basis for coordination of actions 
 
370 Article 192 Euratom reads:  
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations 
arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the 
achievement of the Community’s tasks. 
They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty. 
371 Article 10 EC reads: 
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising 
out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of 
the Community's tasks. 
They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty. 
372 Article 3 TEU reads: 
 
The Union shall be served by a single institutional framework which shall ensure the consistency and the continuity of the 
activities carried out in order to attain its objectives while respecting and building upon the acquis communautaire. 
The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, 
security, economic and development policies. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such 
consistency and shall cooperate to this end. They shall ensure the implementation of these policies, each in accordance with its 
respective powers. 
373 Young, A.R. Extending European Cooperation. The European Union and the “new” International Trade Agenda, 
Manchester University Press, 2002; McGoldrick, D. International Relations Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997. 
374 Examples of the ECJ are Ruling 1/78 (Natural Rubber), paragraphs 34-6, 1978 E.C.R. 2151; Opinion 2/91 (ILO), paragraph 
36, 1993 E.C.R. I-1061; Opinion 1/94 (WTO), paragraph 108, 1994 E.C.R. I-5267. On cooperation obligations, see Article 5 
European Community and Article C of the TEU. 
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of Member States and the Community in the no-man’s-land of dubious demarcation between Community 
and national competences, or where the exercise of these competences was inextricably linked (for 
instance, the international commodities agreements in application of the so-called Proba 20375). Yet, in 
the view of EU Commissioner for trade, Mr Mandelson, this coordination may need to go further still.376 
Nonetheless, ex-Article 116 EEC Treaty was not one of the most transparent provisions of the 
Treaty. Where the Community was not able to act because it was not a member of the relevant 
organization, Member States would have to act on its behalf, and the necessary Community action was 
decided on the basis of Article 133 EC, not ex-Article 116 EEC Treaty. There is a similar issue in Article 
12 TEU in relation to matters falling within the scope of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and 
Article 33 TEU377 in relation to common positions in international organizations and at international 
conferences in various fields covered by Title VI (Provisions on Police and Judicial Cooperation in 
Criminal Matters) of the TEU.378 It is thanks to the duty of cooperation between the EC and its Member 
States that consensus can be found. With regard to cooperation obligations, Article 5 EC and Article 3 of 
the TEU deal in the treaties directly with it. 
With regard to mixed agreements, the duty of close cooperation first emerged in Ruling 1/78,379 
on a European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) case.380 The Court had to adjudicate on the division 
of powers between Euratom and the Member States with regard to a draft Convention on the Physical 
 
375 The informal administrative arrangement known as PROBA 20 is how Community coordination takes place in all 
commodities agreements covered by the UNCTAD’s integrated program, except those under a common organization of the 
agricultural market. PROBA 20 was agreed between the Commission and its Member States in 1981, and intended to improve 
the EC’s external image and to strengthen its internal cohesion and solitarity. PROBA 20 is based on the understanding that all 
legal and institutional considerations which refer to the respective competences of the EC and its Member States are set aside, 
and is important for formalizing an understanding shared with the EU Council that the EC should speak with a single voice. 
376 European Commission, “An Action Plan for Trade and Development in 2005: the EU, the WTO, the G8,” in 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/05/39&format=HTM (last visited June 21, 2005). 
377 Article 33 TEU reads: This title [Provisions on Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters] shall not affect the 
exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the 
safeguarding of internal security. 
378 Treaty on European Union, February 7, 1992, OJ C 224/1 (1992). 
379 Ruling 1/78, 1978 E.C.R. 2151. 
380 For an analysis of the European Court of Justice’s case-law on the matter, see Jacobs, F. “Judicial Review of Commercial 
Policy Measures After the Uruguay Round,” in Emiliou & O’Keeffe (eds.) The European Union and World Trade Law – After 
the GATT Uruguay Round, pp. 329-42 (1996).  
EC Polycephalous Anatomy  Rafael Leal-Arcas 
 
90
Protection of Nuclear Materials. The Court said that “the draft convention...can be implemented as 
regards the Community only by means of a close association between the institutions of the Community 
and the Member States both in the process of negotiation and conclusion and in the fulfillment of the 
obligations entered into”.381 Regarding the implementation of the convention, the Court said that the 
Community would implement measures falling within its competence, the Member States would 
implement measures falling within their competence, and the Council would arrange for coordination of 
the actions of each.382 
Since the essence of mixed agreements383 is that some of their provisions fall within the 
competence of the Community, while others fall within the competence of the Member States, it is hard 
to precisely divide powers between the Member States and the Communities within an agreement. The 
European Court of Justice has discouraged attempts to allocate competence between the Member States 
and the Community.384 Instead, when considering issues dealing with mixed agreements, the Court has 
emphasized the need for common action, or close cooperation, between the Community and its Member 
States “in close association” with each other in the negotiation and implementation of mixed 
agreements.385 The duty of cooperation, which follows from what the Court calls the “requirement of 
unity in the international representation of the Community,”386 is one of the fundamental principles of the 
external relations of the Communities.  
In Opinion 2/91 (Re ILO Convention 170),387 the Court had to deal with an agreement that 
covered matters falling within the exclusive competence of the Community, matters where both the 
Community and its Member States shared competence, and matters within the competence of the Member 
 
381 Id., at para. 34. 
382 Id., at para. 36. 
383 Let us remember that a mixed agreement is an agreement signed by one, more than one or all the 25 Member States of the 
EU and the European Community, on the European side, with a third party. 
384 Ruling 1/78 (Re the Draft Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Facilities and Transports) at 
paragraph 35 (in relation to third parties), [1978] ECR 2151. 
385 O´KEEFFE, D. & SCHERMERS, H. MIXED AGREEMENTS, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983. 
386 Ruling 1/78, paragraphs 34-36 as well as Opinion 2/91, 1993 E.C.R. I-1061, at para. 5. 
387 See Opinion 2/91, 1993 E.C.R. I-1061. 
EC Polycephalous Anatomy  Rafael Leal-Arcas 
 
91
States. The Court said: 
 
“[A]t paragraphs 34 to 36 in Ruling 1/78, the Court pointed out that when it appears 
that the subject matter of an agreement falls in part within the competence of the 
Community and in part within the competence of the Member States, it is important to 
ensure that there is a close association between the institutions of the Community and the 
Member States both in the process of negotiation and conclusion and in the fulfillment of 
the obligations entered into. This duty of cooperation, to which attention was drawn in the 
context of the EAEC Treaty, must also apply in the context of the EEC Treaty since it 
results from the requirement of unity in the international representation of the Community. 
 (37) In this case, cooperation between the Community and the Member States is 
all the more necessary in view of the fact that the former cannot, as international law 
stands at present, itself conclude an ILO Convention and must do so through the medium 
of the Member States. 
 (38) It is therefore for the Community institutions and the Member States to take 
all the measures necessary so as best to ensure such cooperation both in the procedure of 
submission to the competent authority388 and ratification of Convention 170 and in the 
implementation of commitments resulting from that Convention.”389 
The agreement under consideration in Opinion 2/91 was not a mixed agreement stricto sensu. The 
Community could not formally become a party to it.390 This limitation may stem from ILO provisions 
restricting membership and participation only to States. However, the agreement did involve matters 
within the competence of the Community and of the Member States. 
As we have already analyzed, the issue of cooperation between the Member States and the 
Community institutions was raised even more acutely in Opinion 1/94. The context of the WTO also 
shows that in areas of non-exclusive EC competence, it is necessary to have coordinated action in an EC 
framework.391 It is important to note that non-exclusive EC competence does not mean non-existent EC 
competence. In areas of non-exclusive EC competence, the EC can, if the EU Council of Ministers so 
decides, enter into agreements with third countries without formal adherence of EU Member States to 
these agreements, thereby having a so-called pure Community agreement. However, Member States 
 
388 (footnote original) i.e. in the ILO. 
389 Opinion 2/91, paragraphs 36 ff, 1993 E.C.R. I-1061. 
390 Opinion 2/91, paragraph 1, 1993 E.C.R. I-1061. 
391 In this sense, Professor Torrent speaks of a fourth pillar, meaning by that the use of national competences in a European 
Union framework. See Torrent, R. “Le quatrième pilier de l’Union Européenne”, in BOURGEOIS, J. DEWOST, J.-L. & 
GAIFFE, M.-A. (EDS.) LA COMMUNAUTÉ EUROPÉENNE ET LES ACCORDS MIXTES, Collège d’Europe, 1997, pp. 
49-63. 
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normally insist on the mixity of international agreements, even if mixity would not be legally necessary. 
Speaking with one voice, in many domains, has to be ensured through cooperation between the EC and its 
Member States, with the idea of achieving unity of representation.392 
Therefore, the basic principle is that in all aspects of the negotiation, conclusion and 
implementation of a mixed agreement, the Member States and the Community are required to co-operate 
closely and act in close association. This duty of cooperation applies to agreements involving any of the 
Communities, and is binding on the institutions of the Community as well as the Member States. It is also 
important to define the EU’s interpretation of coordination and cooperation. 
 
A.- Community Coordination
When engaged in proceedings involving a mixed agreement, both Member States and the EU institutions 
are obliged to inform each other of their positions, to seek to reach a common view on matters that fall 
within the scope of a mixed agreement, and to proceed by common action within the framework of 
international bodies.393 This involves meetings between the representatives of the Member States and the 
institutions (usually the Commission) to seek a common position. These meetings are called Community 
co-ordination and take place within the framework of the Council, either in Brussels or in an international 
forum in which the Community and the Member States are participants.394 Community co-ordination in 
the negotiation of international agreements is well established in practice. There are informal 
understandings between the Commission and the Council. For example, there are co-ordination 
 
392 Rosas, A. “The External Relations of the European Union: Problems and Challenges” in THE FORUM FOR US-EU 
LEGAL-ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, The Mentor Group, 1998, p. 66. 
393 O´Keeffe, D. “Community and Member State Competence in External Relations Agreements of the EU”, EUROPEAN 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW 4, 1999, pp. 7-36. 
394 When meetings between representatives of the EU institutions and its Member States take place within the framework of an 
international forum to seek a common position, they are known as sur place coordination. 
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arrangements in international commodity agreements and in international organizations, particularly in 
the FAO and the UN.395 
B.- Close Cooperation And Unity of Representation Principle
Trying to reach an agreement on a common position will inevitably lead to difficulties and disagreements. 
For example, a Member State may wish to take a position different from that of the Community and its 
partners during the negotiation of an agreement. An agreement also may not be of equal relevance among 
all the Member States. Therefore, the question arises whether the duty of cooperation requires all the 
Member States to reach a common position or just to use their best effort to reach such a position. In the 
end, each Member State will have to defend its own interests.  
It is important to distinguish between failure to agree on a position on matters falling within the 
exclusive competence of the EC, and failure to agree on a common position on matters where the 
Community and Member States share competences. With regard to matters exclusively within the 
Member State competence, the EC Treaties have in principle nothing to say (although the provisions of 
Titles V and VI TEU may be relevant).396 
In those cases where a common position between the Community and the Member States cannot 
be reached, Member States will be able to express their own national views on matters within national 
competence and exercise their national powers. Support for this proposition may be derived from the 
practice of the EU Council. In addition, there are instances in which a Member State might claim that its 
participation in an agreement was contrary to its national interests or for some other reason undesirable or 
even impossible. 
 
395 A legal analysis that proves the difficulty in finding a coordinated action between the EC and its Member States can be 
found at Heliskoski, J. “Internal Struggle for International Presence: the Exercise of Voting Rights Within the FAO,” in 
Dashwood, A. & Hillion, Ch. (eds.) The General Law of EC External Relations, Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, pp. 79-99. 
396 Pescatore, P. “Opinion 1/94 on “Conclusion” of the WTO Agreement: is there an Escape from a programmed Disaster?,” 
Common Market Law Review 36, 1999, pp. 387-405. 
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C.- Some Preliminary Conclusions
The legal position governing the participation of the EC and its Member States in international trade 
agreements/negotiations is flexible and allows arrangements to be agreed which can suit the 
circumstances of the particular international organization in question while recognizing the position of the 
EC and its Member States. With good political will and common sense on all sides such arrangements can 
work.397 Proof of this is the successful outcome of the Uruguay Round and the conclusion of the financial 
services negotiations in the framework of the WTO in the summer of 1995. In this last case, the EC took 
the lead during the negotiations as a result of combined efforts of the European Commission and the 
Member States: the United Kingdom, given its position as the EU country with the major financial 
services industry within the EU, was better placed to lobby in some parts of the world than the European 
Commission.398 Finally, I would like to argue that it is in the interest of the EC and its Member States to 
use their combined weight to the best effect. The practical application of the duty of co-operation must 
recognize that it is to their advantage to do so. 
 To better understand the Member States’ perspective on mixed competences, we will look at one 
national court’s interpretation of the EC’s role. 
 
X. Conclusion 
 
To sum up this article, and following the line of thought of Timmermans and Völker (1981), mixed 
agreements are one of the most distinctive features of the external relations law and practice of the 
 
397 Stephen Hyett, ‘The Duty of Co-operation: A Flexible Concept,’ in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. (eds.) THE GENERAL 
LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS, Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, p. 253. 
398 Id.
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Communities as well as one of the most difficult.399 Three types of competence are covered by an 
international agreement: 1) competence exclusively with the Community; 2) competence shared between 
the Community and the Member States; 3) competence exclusively with the Member States.400 In the case 
where the Community is the only one competent for matters covered by an international agreement, then 
the Community alone should become party to that agreement. However, there are some cases where even 
if the substance of the agreement is of exclusive Community competence, the participation of Member 
States may also be necessary.401 In such cases it is important to distinguish between the theoretical 
situation and how it is in practice. Theoretically speaking, in these cases Member States do not participate 
in the table of negotiations alongside the European Community.402 Nevertheless, in practical terms the 
agreement itself may require the participation of Member States in the agreement so that the Community 
can exercise its competences and participate effectively.403 
In the case where Member States and the Community share competence, there are several ways to 
carry out this task. Some of the obligations in the agreement may have to do with matters for which the 
Community is exclusively competent. Others have to do with issues for which the Member States are 
exclusively competent.404 Sometimes it is so that by virtue of the provisions of the Treaties the agreement 
is related to an area in which the Member States and the Community share competence to act. On other 
occasions, the agreement may deal with issues where the powers of the Member States and the 
Community run in parallel so that each has an independent and separate interest in participating in the 
agreement. Explained in the words of MacLeod et al.,
399 See generally, Timmermans, C. & Völker, E. (eds.) Division Of Powers Between The European Communities And Their 
Member States In The Field Of External Relations, Kluwer, 1981; O´Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. (eds.) Mixed Agreements,
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983. 
400 Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, at 
142. 
401 Id.
402 This is so because Member States have transferred their competences to the Communities. 
403 Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, at 
142. 
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"where competence for the subject matter of an agreement is shared between 
the Community and the Member States, the full implementation of the obligations 
in the agreement will usually require the participation in the agreement of the 
Communities and the Member States together, each in respect of their powers and 
interests."405 
In the view of Allan Rosas, “pure Community agreements may be preferred not only by the 
Commission but sometimes also by some or all of the Member States, mainly in order to speed up the 
process and avoid complications of various sorts. There have been situations where third States, out of 
similar considerations, have expressed a preference for a pure Community agreement.”406 A practical 
alternative seems to be the adoption of soft law instruments in the form of a declaration plan, which may 
be adopted by the Council and in some cases also signed by the Council Presidency and/or the 
Commission, but without the need of 25 national ratifications. Examples are the Barcelona Declaration 
adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of 27-28 November 1995 and the New Transatlantic 
Agenda signed by President Clinton, Prime Minister González of Spain (representing the then Spanish 
Council Presidency) and President Santer of the European Commission.407 It is important to note, though, 
that what I describe here are soft alternatives to treaty-making as a whole, not to the mixed form of treaty-
making. 
With regard to treaties, and notably bilateral agreements, one could try to devise the negotiation 
directives to be adopted by the Council,408 and to conduct the actual negotiations in order to avoid areas 
of national competence. Member States are often unwilling to authorize the Community alone to 
 
404 Id.
405 Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, at 
143. 
406 Rosas, A. “The European Union and mixed agreements” in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. (eds.) The General Law Of EC 
External Relations, Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, p. 216. 
407 (1996) 1 European Foreign Affairs Rev. 125. See also the documents adopted at the EU-US Summit in London on May 18, 
1998 with a view to resolve the so-called Helms-Burton dispute (Understanding with Respect to Disciplines for the 
Strengthening of Investment Protection, Transatlantic Partnership on Political Cooperation , Understanding on Conflicting 
Requirements). See Smis, S. & Van der Borght, K. “The EU –US Compromise on the Helms-Burton and D’Amato Acts”, 
(1999) 93 American Journal of International Law, 227-236; idem. “The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) 
Act of 1996, Some Aspects from the Perspective of International Economic Law”, Revue Belge de Droit International 1998/1, 
pp. 217-258. 
408 Article 300 (1) EC. 
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conclude bilateral agreements containing concurrent competences.409 An example would be the existence 
of substantive provisions relating to intellectual property rights (as well as in services and direct 
investment). Such provisions in a bilateral agreement would almost inevitably lead to mixity, as some 
Member States seem to interpret Opinion 1/94 as establishing exclusive national competence in this field. 
On the potential competence of the Community to conclude international agreements in the field of 
intellectual property rights, it is pertinent to see Case C-53/96 Hermes International.410 The Commission 
may try to avoid provisions on questions such as intellectual property rights, services, investment or 
monetary policy in order to avoid assertions of mixity. 
Development cooperation agreements and environmental agreements often belong to the category 
of concurrent competences above mentioned, as concurrent competences are spelled out in the EC 
Treaty,411 but a potential competence may exist in many other areas such as intellectual property rights, 
investment or services, covered by the EC Treaty as well. It remains to be seen to what extent the EU 
Council will agree to the Community becoming a party to such agreements and conventions, without 
insisting on Member States’ participation. In most cases, this will probably not be the case and mixity 
will continue to exist.412 The fact that the Nice Intergovernmental Conference in December 2000 did not 
want to broaden Article 133 EC so as to cover all questions of services, intellectual property rights, and 
investment is a clear sign of the unwillingness of Member States to give up mixity even in areas of 
commercial policy. Another example is that of a trade and cooperation agreement negotiated with South 
Africa that Member States refused to accept in the spring of 1999 as a pure Community agreement, even 
if it was obvious that there was no legal need to conclude the agreement as a mixed agreement. The 
 
409 Rosas, A. “The European Union and mixed agreements,” in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. (eds.) The General Law Of EC 
External Relations, Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, p. 217. 
410 [1998] ECR I-3603. 
411 Article 174 EC, para. 4, and Article 181 EC. 
412 Rosas, A. “The European Union and mixed agreements” in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. (eds.) The General Law Of EC 
External Relations, Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, p. 219. 
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agreement was signed on October 11, 1999.413 While the Commission preferred a Community agreement, 
the great majority of Member States wanted the agreement to become mixed. 
413 The proposal from the Commission to the Council to conclude an agreement on trade, development and cooperation 
between the Community and South Africa is contained in document COM (1999) 245 final of May 11, 1999. 
